

THE
SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE

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
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THE SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE



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THE SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE

BY

JOSEPH HERSCHEL COFFIN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
EARLHAM COLLEGE
27654



BALTIMORE
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1913

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PREFACE.

To the practical minded student, whether prospective teacher, lawyer, physician, or merchant, traditional ethics seems to offer little in the way of suggestion for the solution of many of our newly created moral problems. To him the discussions often seem formal and abstract. And yet the big fact remains that if these problems are ever to be finally solved, their solution must be worked out in harmony with moral law.

The purpose of this book is to suggest in present day psychological and sociological terms a working hypothesis—a moral criterion—by means of which the different types of moral situations may be met with some degree of consistency. The author has attempted to state in clear and untechnical terms a point of view with regard to the moral life; and has sought to show how it may be applied in dealing with typical moral situations. There is also a distinct pedagogical advantage in demonstrating the

unity of the moral life with all other phases of life.
Ethics need not be formal and abstract provided
morality be related to the institutional life of society.

Earlham College,

J. H. C.

September, 1913.

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THE SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE

Personality and the Moral Order

CHAPTER I.

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MORAL CONTROL.

Moral control in general.—The majority of mankind desires to be moral; the great institution of morality is proof of this fact. There is always a lively minority which is in rebellion against the mandates of society, and which is forever out of adjustment with the laws which safeguard the common welfare. But the social development of the past has been possible only upon the basis of such common standards of justice, honor, and righteousness as have been attained.

There are indeed wide differences of moral practice observable within any social group and between different groups; but these are to be explained, in part at least, by the fact that men have not yet come to entire agreement as to what constitutes morality. Their differences in practice depend, to a certain extent, upon differences in theory. Moral control is not yet unified; for while all members of every group feel in greater or lesser degree the force of a moral control of some kind, they do not all recognize the authority of the same control.

It is the task of any book on ethics to give a statement of what this common control ought to be; what that moral authority is to which all members of society owe their allegiance. It is obvious that the greatest welfare of society and its members can be secured only when all are living in harmony with a commonly accepted standard of conduct, and when there is mutual coöperation in the attempt to realize life's purposes. Ethics must point the way to a system of rational principles and ideals which may thus be taken as a criterion of conduct.

The moral ideals of any generation are the outgrowth of the ethical thinking and practice of preceding generations; they represent a higher stage in a continuous process of evolution which is always taking place in men's concepts of morality. It will therefore assist us greatly in our attempt to understand what the moral authority ought to be under modern conditions, to review briefly the nature of moral control as it existed in the past, beginning with primitive society; we may then distinguish its general characteristics in present day society.

I. MORAL CONTROL IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY.

Group solidarity.—Primitive society is characterized first by its group solidarity and by the simplicity of its organization. “A Kafir feels that the ‘frame that binds him in’ extends to the clan. The sense of the solidarity of the family of Europe is thin and feeble compared to the full-blooded sense of corpo-

rate union of the Kafir clan. The claims of the clan entirely swamp the rights of the individual. The system of tribal solidarity, which has worked so well in its smoothness that it might satisfy the utmost dreams of the socialist, is a standing proof of the sense of corporate union of the clan. In olden days a man did not have any feeling of personal injury when a chief made him work for white men and then told him to give all, or nearly all of his wages to his chief; the money was kept within the clan, and what was the good of the clan was the good of the individual and *vice versa*. The striking thing about this unity of the clan is that it is not a thought-out plan imposed from without by legislation upon an unwilling people, but it is a *felt-out* plan which arose spontaneously along the line of least resistance. If one member of the clan suffered, all members suffered, not in sentimental phraseology, but in real fact."¹

The various activities which must be carried on in the clan are those pertaining to the necessities of life. They are the activities involved in the securing of food, in the avoidance of danger, in the administration of justice and in the performance of religious rites and ceremonies. These activities are carried on by the group as a whole. At first there is no division of labor; there are no settled occupations. Every member of the tribe contributes his part to the common good by engaging in all the activities. These

¹Quoted in Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 19.

activities seem to fall into three classes: economic, political and religious.

The economic activities of obtaining food by hunting, fishing, or pasturing are performed coöperatively. The men go forth in a group upon their hunting or fishing expeditions and return the product of their labor to the common store-house. In the matter of the necessities of life primitive society is communistic; as long as there is food for one, all alike may share. No one may reserve and withhold anything for his own comfort and benefit while others are in need.

In like manner, the group functions as a whole in what may be called the political relations. These relations are also of a very primitive sort. In dealing with refractory members and in meting out justice to them the tribe as a whole renders the decision. The situation is discussed in the council and the advice of the old men and the chiefs, together with the customs and traditions handed down from other generations, constitute the ruling force. Perhaps there is no severer punishment that could be meted out to a delinquent member than the disapproval of his group. Another kind of political situation is that caused by unpleasant relations with other tribes. In case of war the whole tribe functions as a unit; a course of action is decided upon after deliberation in the council chamber, and the whole tribe participates in the preparations for war. There are war dances, feasts, religious rites, and ceremonies in

which all take part; afterwards all the men make their way to the field of battle in the manner dictated by custom.

As in the economic and political relations, so in religious matters the members of the clan or tribe are to be regarded collectively rather than as individuals. For primitive races religion consists, not in a feeling of a personal relationship between the individual and God, as is the case to a greater or lesser extent among all civilized peoples, but in a system of rites and ceremonies. Primitive religion is entirely objective; it is a tribal relation. These rites and ceremonies are performed by the whole group, or by a priest or medicine-man in the presence of and on behalf of the group. Whatever the nature of the beliefs or superstitions, the god is the god of the tribe, and as such receives homage and sacrifice from the tribe as a whole. The appeal of the group is made through ritual and ceremony—the expression of the superstitious and suggestible nature of primitive man.

Custom.—A second characteristic of primitive society is that it is possible for the group thus to function as a unit through the channel of custom. Custom may perhaps best be defined as a popularly approved mode of acting. In each of the various kinds of group activity referred to there are prescribed or customary ways of acting; these are never called in question or criticized. For example, in the economic activities there are customary ways of or-

ganizing for the hunt, or customary and approved forms of weapons and implements. Huts are built according to a uniform pattern, and are placed in a certain relation to each other. In war, there are certain approved methods, approved not necessarily because they are superior or the most reasonable, but simply because that is the way in which the enterprise has been carried on in the past. Each tribe has its peculiar war dress and its peculiar mode of fighting. Moreover justice is meted out according to certain customary modes; while the dominance of custom in the religious life of primitive people is a familiar fact.

There are also customs other than those governing the economic, political, and religious life of the people, strictly speaking; for example, each tribe has its peculiar customs regarding the education and training of the young men. There are usually a number of initiation ceremonies through which they must pass as they are brought into full standing as adult members of the tribe; ceremonies in which superstition and mystery have a large share; ceremonies which serve to impress the youth with the authority of custom and with respect for the old men of the tribe; ceremonies by means of which the traditions of the tribe are fixed in the minds of those just maturing into active membership. Again, each tribe has its peculiar marriage customs—sometimes very simple and again very complex. Likewise there are customs governing the burial of the dead. In summary

we may say then that all of the vital activities, both primary, such as the securing of food and the avoidance of danger, and secondary, such as education and marriage, are carried on through custom and tradition. And it is by means of custom that the unity and solidarity of the group is maintained.

Closely connected with custom is what is known as taboos; indeed taboos may be regarded as negative customs which are "invested with peculiar and awful sanctions." "They prohibit . . . contact with certain persons or objects under penalty of danger from unseen beings. Any events supposed to indicate the activity of spirits, such as birth and death, are likely to be sanctified by taboos. The danger is contagious; if a Polynesian chief is taboo, the ordinary man fears even to touch his footprints. But the taboos are not all based on mere dread of the unseen. . . . They may be used with conscious purpose. In order to have a supply of cocoanuts for a religious festival the head men may place a taboo upon the young cocoanuts to prevent them from being consumed before they are fully ripe. The conception works in certain respects to supply the purpose which is later subserved by ideas of property. But it serves also as a powerful agent to maintain respect for the authority of the group."²

Origin of custom.—The question as to the origin of custom both in its positive, ritualistic form, and in the negative form of taboo, is a difficult one.

²Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 55.

Psychology, however, offers a helpful suggestion. Analysis shows that there are three ways of learning: the trial and error method, learning by imitation, and learning through the understanding. In applying this suggestion to the question as to the origin of custom, we may presume that a primitive group, or some member of it, faces a new situation of some kind—economic, political, or religious—and that, it being a new situation, there is no past experience by which action may be definitely guided. But some reaction is imperative; and since no customary action is adequate, the individual strikes out in a new direction; a trial is made. If the result of this trial action is unsatisfactory or unpleasant, some other reaction will be made in the future when the same situation arises. But if the result is satisfactory, or at least not unpleasant, the individual or group will probably react the same way in the future, and thus a habit will develop. Other individuals or generations will find it much easier to imitate those actions which have already proved satisfactory than to try out new methods, or to study the situation with a view to rationalizing the reaction. Thus custom develops in the group much as habit develops in the individual. And whether or not the custom is rational, that is, well suited to the ends sought, it soon becomes invested with popular approval and superstitious sanction.

Primitive morality.—A third characteristic of primitive society is that morality consists in blind

obedience to custom and observance of taboos. It would appear that there could be no morality under primitive conditions such as have been described where each individual's life is prescribed and hedged about by custom. This is true if we take the term morality in its modern meaning; that is, if we hold that morality presupposes a certain degree of individual freedom of choice and initiative, personal responsibility, and a body of moral laws as distinct from other law. But if we use the term morality in the larger and more literal sense as synonymous with control of some kind—*mores*—then we shall indeed find the beginnings of morality in primitive society. To be moral from the primitive point of view, is simply to live in conformity with custom. To live rightly is to respect and obey the time-honored customs which each generation receives as its heritage from preceding generations.

It is difficult for us to conceive a moral situation in which the individual has no freedom of choice or action; yet this is precisely the condition in primitive life. As a result there is no feeling of personal responsibility. And as a further result the whole clan must stand responsible for all the acts of all its members. For example, if a member of one clan takes the life of a member of another, the latter feels itself avenged if it can take the life of some member of the former, whether or not it be the individual who committed the original crime. In a more general sense it is also true that the primitive man does not have

what we are pleased to call a personal conscience,—that which constitutes for us the very core and essence of morality. The primitive man's action is conditioned from *without*, not from within, hence not only has he no need for conscience, but any inner force which might lead him to criticize custom and to act in any other than the customary way would itself be condemned in primitive society as wrong.

Primitive peoples are perhaps even more sensitive to the opinions of each other than are those who are more civilized and therefore more independent; and as customs are popularly approved ways of acting, any one who fails to conform to custom lays himself open to social disapproval. So it is the external factor of custom as a popularly approved way of acting that conditions the primitive man's acts, instead of the subjective factor of conscience. Indeed the latter would be out of place and could not survive in any but a society where a higher degree of individuality is present. All acts prescribed by custom are equally right, and disobedience to one custom is as wrong as disobedience to any other. It would be just as wrong to build the hut with the door on the north side instead of the south, if custom demanded the latter, as it would to secrete a portion of the common store of food for one's personal use; or it would be just as wrong to fail to put the war paint on in the approved style as to neglect to perform some religious ceremony. Hence there is in primitive society no morality separate from and independent of cus-

tom; the two things are identical: to obey custom is to be moral.

Custom is thus seen to be of incalculable practical and moral value in primitive society. It binds the group together and furnishes a common response for common situations. ~~It makes a more or less adequate reaction possible in a society whose members are on so low an intellectual level that they could not survive by living alone and attempting to adjust themselves single-handed to a hostile environment.~~ Custom enables the primitive group to adjust itself more or less adequately to its total environment; it makes possible that social solidarity which is so essential to survival. On the moral side the value of custom is equally great; just as the moral law is the conditioning factor of social health in modern society, so is custom the conditioning factor of tribal health and efficiency. It furnishes that cementing force which makes it possible for primitive men to work for common ends and to realize even a degree of inner peace and harmony. We not uncommonly think that might makes right without redress in primitive society; but custom delivers the group from the unrestrained tyranny of brute strength and guarantees at least a form of justice to its members. It provides a certain uniformity of tribal action in all the essential situations of life, and thus makes the latter less the slave of impulse and emotion.

This analysis is sufficient to show that there is a type of moral control even in primitive society; and

that it exercises an absolute authority over the members of the tribe. But this moral control is entirely objective; it is not the expression of an inner evaluation of ends, an inner rationalization of life. It is held in solution in the group as a whole and does not arise from any inner consciousness in the individual of the inherent rightness or wrongness of acts. Personal conscience does not exist; a thing is right, not because of its rational appeal but because tradition and custom demand it. Moral control becomes subjective when the rational level of culture is reached, and when the rationality of obligation and responsibility is realized. Only when each new generation is taught the meaning and authority of conscience as previous generations were taught the authority of custom and tradition, has morality become subjective; and only then have the higher levels of morality been attained.

II. MORAL CONTROL IN CIVILIZED SOCIETY.

Characteristics of civilization.—But what is the nature of moral control in civilized society? In order to answer this satisfactorily we need to bring to mind some of the prominent characteristics of civilization. On the side of the individual, civilization means increased intelligence. Men have attained a high degree of rationality and have arrived at an understanding of their world. Superstition has given way in large measure to the freedom of knowledge, and the standard of living has indefinitely advanced.

In a word, civilization produces the Christian gentleman in contrast to the brute-man of savagery.

On the side of society the difference is equally great. Civilization means superior social organization; this is seen in all the important aspects of life. On the economic side, the processes of food getting and of providing for the other necessities of life are indefinitely specialized. Division of labor is introduced very early in social evolution, and from that time forth civilization is a continuous process of further and further specialization. In the beginning each man made his own crude mocassins; in the end each pair of shoes is the product of the skilled labor of a host of specialists. In like manner the affairs of government are carried on by a group of specialists; while the education of the young is given over to a vast educational system. Also the home and the church add their quota to the perfection and refinement of the race. In a word, again, civilization produces a superior social organization in which the five great social institutions stand out as the supreme achievements.

Custom in civilized society.—It will be seen at once that, owing to the greatly increased individual intelligence and to the superior social organization, the activities of the individual are extremely varied as compared with conditions in primitive society. As a result there is not as clear a field for the operation of custom; men no longer need to do a given thing in concert; rather they need to carry on a

countless variety of activities at one and the same time. It is obvious that custom can no longer dominate the lives of the individuals with the same authority as under primitive conditions. In a society as highly specialized as ours it is impossible that men should behave in all the details of their varied life with the uniformity possible and necessary in primitive society. Hence custom cannot hold the place in modern life that it did in primitive society.

But it has been seen that custom was the cementing force that bound society together in early times; it was the chief factor in rescuing primitive man from social and moral chaos. It is evident then that unless something comes in to take the place of custom as it breaks down, social and moral chaos must ensue. As has been intimated, another factor does appear; namely, conscience. Objective control in the form of custom gives place in a measure to subjective control; each member of society develops a personal conscience as an organic part of a growing individuality, the laws of which we shall presently discuss. And we shall have achieved the highest standard of the moral life when every man recognizes and bows down to the moral law within his own breast.

But this must not be taken to mean that custom will eventually cease to exist and to exercise control over the conduct of men. The fact is that custom and conscience are organic to each other; they are mutually supplementary, and an ideal moral state

would involve both. Custom in society is analogous to habit in the individual; it is a great organizer of familiar and oft-repeated acts. Habit in the individual is a great economizer of time and energy in that it enables one to perform many acts automatically; that is, without the aid of attention. Attention is thus left free to engage itself with new and problematic situations. Likewise custom in civilized as well as in primitive society provides a more or less adequate response for familiar and unessential situations; it reduces the amount of social friction and makes group life tolerable by providing all members with a common reaction for frequently recurring situations. The customs of civilized society need to be continually subjected to the critical light of reason, however, in order that none of an irrational nature may survive and become a hindrance to further progress. They must be made the servants of reason and not allowed to become its master. It is therefore evident that while the subjective factor of conscience is the essence of moral control in civilized society, there is a legitimate field for the operation of objective control in the form of custom; and that the really desirable condition is a proper coördination of the two.

Objective and subjective nature of moral control.—Let us go a little more deeply into this two-fold nature of moral control. To begin with, it must be remembered that society as a whole profoundly influences the individuals of which it is composed.

When we recall that the child of educated and civilized parents makes its start from practically the same basis as that from which the child of savage parentage begins, it will be clear that the mature man of education and culture is the product of a countless variety of social forces. It is his rich social heritage that enables him to become what he is. All the achievements of the race are at hand to be used by him and to help him to achieve his high level of conscious life with the least possible requirement of time and energy on his part.

Now what is true of man's debt to society in general is true, in a special sense, of his debt to it on the moral side. The organic relation of the subjective and the objective aspects of moral control becomes evident. Since every act of each person potentially affects society directly or indirectly, society demands the right to dictate to the individual limits within which he must choose, and to say what kinds of situations are vital enough to be called moral, what are the highest ends, and what principles should govern conduct. I say that society dictates the "limits within which" these things shall be decided by the individual; primitive society dictates *unconditionally*, as we have seen; but as the result of the individualistic tendencies of the past and the increase of efficiency of individual judgment, the individual now enjoys a considerable degree of freedom in which he may use his own judgment and reason. Nevertheless the individual's judgment comes

into contact at every point with the social judgment, and each person's initiative is everywhere hedged about by custom and the unwritten moral law.

Hence it is clear that the moral standard is both subjective and objective in nature. It is the joint product of individual thinking and feeling and of social pressure in the form of custom, tradition, and public opinion. Owing to the instinctive tendency in each person to imitate and to desire the approval of his fellows, this social pressure becomes an extremely important factor in the moral judgment of the individual; and this in turn increases the significance of social pressure. Objective control in its various forms may be regarded as the crystallized deliverance of society as to how men should act and think in general. It provides the "limits within which" men may use their own judgment as to what is right and wrong. Of course the obverse of this is also true: society in turn is made up of these same individuals, and the objective side of the moral standard is profoundly influenced by the thought and feeling of those who compose society. In this way the two phases become supplementary, the one acting as a check upon the other.

The criterion of morality is too big a thing to have its existence within the restricted circle of the individual's life; it extends in the third dimension into the very heart of society and binds the two together in such a way that progress in the one makes for progress in the other. The fact of this reciprocal

relation throws light upon the oft-discussed question as to whether the essence of morality lies in the motive to the act or in its consequences. The truth is that it lies in neither exclusively, but in both. Both phases of the moral standard are operative every time the standard is applied to a moral situation to determine its value.

III. CONSCIENCE IN THE RACE.

The growth of individuality.—Inasmuch as conscience is the key to the control of the moral life of the present, it will be helpful in what is to follow to make a more careful study of the origin and nature of conscience. We shall later have to define the criterion of morality in terms of conscience; moreover the application of the moral law to the moral situations of the present is very largely a matter of enlightening the consciences of men; so a thorough understanding of this factor is not only helpful but necessary.

It was pointed out above that in the primitive group the individuality of the members of the tribe is merged with what we might call the commonality of the group. Now in order to trace out the development of conscience it will be necessary to follow up the development of individuality and show how it emerges from the commonality of the group. This growth in individuality is contemporary with and dependent upon the growth of reason and understanding in the race and the individual. Ever since

man began to think about his conduct at all and to try to rationalize it, he has sought to find some fundamental principle in terms of which he could determine the rightness and wrongness of his acts; some principle by which his action might be unified and organized. This effort has been aided by the unconscious operation of the law of natural selection, which would tend to fix those modes of reaction that are most adequate and to eliminate those that are inferior. The principle of natural selection operating through the means of trial and error and through imitation would tend to stamp in customs which were best adapted to the ends sought; that is, those that were most rational.

But the factor of understanding must be reckoned with more and more as human development proceeds. Understanding criticizes in an increasing degree the customary reactions of a people and discovers new modes of reaction which are more rational and which enable the individual or group to make always an increasingly superior adjustment to its total environment, both physical and social.

Moreover, progress in the matter of the understanding must always come as the result of some one individual's thought. It does not come through a concerted effort in the way in which custom may develop by concerted reaction through imitation, but through the initiative of the individual. This development in the ability to reason gives rise to a greater and greater individuality on the part of the

members of the tribe. This increase manifests itself by way of a partial reaction from the group feeling of solidarity and blind observance of custom. On the other hand it is equally true that this partial breaking away from custom gives increased opportunity for further growth in intelligence and reason. While, in the beginning, the individuality of the members of the group is lost or merged in the group itself, through the growth of understanding and reason the members of the group find themselves; they come into possession of their powers; they gain a new control over the means of life, both inner and outer. In a word, they begin to realize their personalities.

Let us look at this development in a little more detail. In spite of the dominance of custom in primitive life and the superstitious reverence with which it is held to, there must have been individuals here and there who chafed at its restraints. Here is a man, for example, a little above the average in intelligence who challenges the right of blind custom to dictate his every vital act. Accordingly he dares to act in a more individual manner; he deviates a little from the fixed mode of conduct, and perhaps as a result realizes a greater satisfaction. This marks the beginning of individuality.

This growing individuality is accompanied, partly as cause and partly as effect, by increased intelligence. Practical reason, which means the ability to profit by past experience, supplements habit and imi-

tation; and this development works itself out along all lines in which custom has heretofore held sway and particularly in those actions which minister to the needs of life. As ~~tribes~~^{groups} increase in size, food becomes increasingly scarce; and he who manifests the greatest resourcefulness or intelligence is the one who most easily survives and is the greatest benefactor to the group. This fact naturally tends to stimulate individual methods and endeavor. Or again, one man finds that he can do one thing more easily and with greater skill than others. For example, in the primitive group each man makes his own weapons and tools; he also performs all the other activities necessary to life. But perhaps one individual turns out a superior bow or arrow because of superior skill or capacity. It would be natural thenceforth for him to make bows and arrows for his less skillful fellows, and in turn to receive a portion of the spoils of the hunt in which they have participated. As a result barter and trade grow up and division of labor develops.¹ (footnote bottom p. 23, p. 30)

The moral significance of individuality.—Nor is this tendency toward individualism without its moral significance. As individual initiative and action develop, custom must lose more and more of its authority over the separate members of the tribe. The tribe will regard with a constantly decreasing degree of reverence those commonly approved modes of action which have been sanctioned by past generations; and their superstitious fears regarding the conse-

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quences of disobedience to them will also disappear. But it has already been shown that primitive morality consists simply in observing the customs of the tribe. This means, therefore, that as customs break down or are disregarded through the increasing force of individuality, all there is of morality is in danger of disappearing; and unless something else arises to take the place of disappearing custom moral chaos must obtain.

But just as individuality emerges in all the other relations of life, so also does it make its appearance as a new factor in those relations which we call moral in the strict sense. That which we call conscience and moral ^{responsibility} law begins to develop as a compensatory factor in a society which is freeing itself more and more from the authority of blind custom and which is becoming less and less primitive. As the "semi-civilized" man begins to feel the joys of individual conquest and achievement he realizes a new and exhilarating feeling of freedom and a sense of personal independence. While he is in the first flush of this stimulating sense he is likely to trespass upon the rights of others. But slowly, even tardily, the compensatory feeling of responsibility develops. This comes through the observation on the part of each individual that others also lay claim to a like freedom, and that each one is held responsible by all the others for the acts which he does in the name of freedom. It is a hard lesson and painfully learned; but it is learned. And gradually also each individual

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begins to hold himself responsible for his own acts. In like manner each individual learns from the same hard master—experience—that each right claimed in the name of freedom involves a corresponding obligation. Each member is held under obligation by society and, finally, by himself for the rights which are his. Now when progress has gone so far that each new generation is taught the meaning of obligation and responsibility as former generations learned the authority of custom, then individual morality has come into its own and a personal conscience is a part of each man's moral constitution.

IV. CONSCIENCE IN THE INDIVIDUAL.

We have traced briefly the process by which conscience comes to be a part of our racial inheritance. It now remains for us to analyze the process by which it is developed in the individual, and by which it comes to have authority over his conduct. Civilized men pretty generally recognize the existence within consciousness of some "faculty" or inner authority which is supposed to provide them with knowledge of good and evil, and which at the same time prompts to the performance of right acts. It is to the further analysis of this supposed "faculty" or inner authority known as personal conscience that we must now turn.

Rationalistic view.—Historically, there have been many theories regarding the origin and nature of conscience in the individual. Prominent among

these are the rationalistic and empirical theories. In general, the rationalists maintain that there are implanted within the mind of man certain innate ideas; the human mind is so constructed that there are certain fundamental notions organic to it. For example, no one needs to be shown that the whole is greater than any of its parts, that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, or that every event must have a cause. These are self evident, axiomatic truths; the mind knows them intuitively. In like manner, it does not need to be demonstrated that murder is wrong, or that stealing and lying are sinful. ~~These are also self evident truths.~~ God, in His creative wisdom, has implanted within the human mind certain great principles concerning right and wrong. This intuitive knowledge of right and wrong is what we call conscience. Conscience, for the rationalist, then is an inner eye, or sense, or feeling which immediately discovers to us moral truth, and prompts us to choose the good. Some rationalists hold that intuition is a safe and sure guide in each particular situation which arises, while others hold that we have by intuitive knowledge a few great fundamental moral principles and that one must rely upon judgment and reason for the application of these principles to specific cases.

In criticism of this view it may be urged, in the first place, that an anthropological ~~study of the races of the earth shows~~ ^{studies show} that there are no moral principles whatever which are universally accepted. The dis-

crepancy between the moral standards of the different civilized races is not so great. But when we come to compare the ^{actual} moral practices of one primitive race with those of another, or of primitive with civilized races, we find almost no common ground. By some races, lying and stealing are looked upon as desirable accomplishments; and even murder under certain conditions is approved. Further, such questions as honor, chastity, amusement, and the like, receive various moral interpretations even among civilized peoples.

But if, as the rationalist argues, moral principles are the ^{a priori} intuitive possession of the mind of man, we should expect to find a much greater degree of unity of thought, feeling, and practice than the facts indicate. *(now go to here)*

In the second place, biological science has suggested the evolutionary point of view with regard to morals. We no longer regard the moral standard as a finished, permanent thing, but as a dynamic, growing ideal. We have already seen in the previous section that morality undergoes a very radical change as individuality emerges from the commonality of the group. But rationalistic doctrine, in order to be consistent, would be obliged to hold that conscience is an *a priori* mental endowment common to all men of all times. *begin new P*

Empirical view.—But an even more telling criticism against rationalism is that which is brought forward by the empiricists. Empiricism denies out-

right the fundamental tenet of rationalism, namely, the existence of innate ideas. The mind of the new-born child, it maintains, is like a blank tablet upon which experience must write. No knowledge, ideas, or intuitions are inherited; knowledge of moral values, like every other kind of knowledge, must be acquired through experience. This experience covers a very wide field. In his play the child soon learns that nature has her uniform properties and modes of action, and that violation of her laws always brings pain. In the home, his contact with parents, brothers and sisters, and playmates teaches him that there are individual rights and social laws which cannot be violated without consequent disapproval or punishment. The school, and, later, society and the state through public opinion, social pressure, and law all unite to impress upon him the fact that some types of conduct are desirable and others undesirable. The whole institution of education, through all of its agencies, contributes to the individual's development in morals as in all other lines. The great teachers in this school of experience are pleasure and pain. Acts which bring pleasure and satisfaction are right, while those which result in pain and dissatisfaction are wrong. Since one of the greatest sources of satisfaction is the approval of one's fellow men, those acts which secure for the agent this approval are morally good, as well as those which result immediately in pleasure or satisfaction; this furnishes the basis for sympathy and

altruism. In a word, all moral standards represent the condensed experience of man arising in connection with the total environment, physical, mental, and especially ^{cultural} social; and conscience is the acquired knowledge of the agent regarding the expediency of certain kinds of conduct. *end of part III*

Synthetic view.—Of the two theories considered, empiricism seems to be least objectionable. And yet in making its sweeping denial of the fundamental tenet of the rationalist, namely, the doctrine of innate ideas, the empiricist has gone too far. He has denied in the name of innate ideas that organizing principle within experience which gives it unity of purpose, and which makes personality possible. The fact is that conscience cannot be entirely explained upon the basis of either of these theories alone. A deeper psychological analysis shows conscience to be exceedingly complex. It is not to be regarded as any single mental faculty isolated from other functions of mind; but is rather to be considered as the whole of consciousness functioning in a moral situation. Regarded in this way, the rationalist is right in so far as conscience presupposes the ability to judge. Judgment, which is one of the highest thought processes, involves both an *a priori* element and an *a posteriori* element, the former constituting the original forms of thought and the latter supplying the content of judgment through experience. Our definition is therefore a synthesis of certain elements of both rationalism and empiricism.

An adequate discussion of conscience as thus defined would demand a statement of the whole psychology of thinking, which would be out of place in this brief analysis. It will be sufficient therefore to suggest that in all thinking, conscience functions only when there is a problem, that is, in this case, when a moral situation is presented.

Besides the thought processes, conscience presents certain affective aspects; there are feelings of pleasantness and satisfaction toward the object of choice, or, it may be feelings of remorse and regret. Finally, on the volitional side, conscience cannot be regarded as having fully functioned until the choice and decision have resulted in action. In a word then, conscience is the term we apply to the whole of consciousness in its intellectual, emotional, and volitional aspects, as it evaluates moral problems.

In conclusion it would not be inconsistent to invest conscience with divine sanction, to see in it one of God's methods of revealing His will to man. Indeed it has been regarded by some thinkers as the direct voice of God—an inner divine light making plain the way of righteousness. While modern psychology would refuse to accept this simple statement of it, nevertheless if it "is not the voice of God in the mind of man, it at least speaks for those powers in human nature which raise him above the animals and link him to what is highest in reality—his comprehensive intelligence, his free will."³

³Wright: *Self Realization*, p. 55.

We may therefore consistently hold that in the evolution of the race towards biological, psychical, and social, as well as moral perfection, conscience is one of the greatest of Divine Laws.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. Do individual rights exist in primitive society?
2. Is there any connection between morality and religion for primitive man?
3. Make a study of the nature and function of "men's houses" or men's clubs in primitive society.
4. Give examples of educational, marriage, and burial customs. Also find instances of taboos other than those mentioned in the text.
5. What factors contribute to the development of individuality?
6. Are animals moral agents?
7. At about what age does a child 'come to the age of accountability'?
8. What argument is there against the statement on page 10 that "civilization means increased intelligence"?
9. What are the factors in the development from custom to conscience?
10. What is meant by the *summum bonum*? What different types of theory are there concerning this?
11. From what point of view may conscience be defined as a sentiment?
12. What is the value of conscience for human life and welfare in general?
13. Is there such a thing as a moral instinct? (Cf Kirkpatrick: *Fundamentals of Child Study*, Ch. XII.)

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CHAPTER II.

THE MORAL SITUATION.

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

Moral versus non-moral action.—Even a cursory examination of the moral life will make it plain that only a part of our conduct can be called morally good or morally bad. Indeed the major portion of life daily round of life is merely *unmoral*. Obviously we are not concerned here with that portion of life which is unmoral. Ethics is the science of morality and it becomes necessary in the first place to define the subject matter of our science. Not only is it true that some acts are blame- or praise-worthy and others morally indifferent, but it is also true that under certain conditions a given act may be good or bad and under other conditions simply unmoral. For example, under ordinary conditions it is neither good nor bad to take a walk; it is merely unmoral. But circumstances might be such that this act would be praiseworthy, or under still other conditions that it would be wrong. Now the question is: What is it that makes an act good or bad under one set of conditions, and morally indifferent under other conditions? We must distinguish the characteristics of

the moral situation, in order that we may confine our attention to it and leave all others out of account.

Voluntary action necessary to moral conduct.— The first characteristic that a moral situation must have is that the act concerned must be voluntary; there must be freedom of choice and knowledge of what he is doing on the part of the agent. On the one hand, voluntary action as opposed to automatic and reflex action has a conscious motive which determines the nature and direction of the act. On the other hand, voluntary action as opposed to action under compulsion presupposes the freedom of choice referred to. An action would be neither right nor wrong, the conditions of which were entirely beyond one's control or in which there was no motive or freedom of choice. For example, a slave in doing a criminal act at the command of his master, or a soldier in carrying out the order of his superior officer, would not be held morally responsible for his act. Indeed unquestioning obedience in both cases is held to be a virtue no matter what the commission. Or again, in an accident the conditions of which could not have been changed without foreknowledge, one is not responsible, unless indeed foreknowledge might have been had. In this case the individual is held responsible for his ignorance and is therefore condemned for his act. This phase of the moral situation may then be characterized by saying that the agent must have a certain amount of freedom of

choice and must know what he is about; that is, he must act voluntarily.

There are two general types of voluntary action: impulsive and volitional. The impulsive act follows immediately upon an idea or perception which is accompanied by an idea of pleasantness or unpleasantness. There is no hesitation or thought, but as soon as attention alights upon the object or idea the reaction follows immediately. The impulsive act is an unreasoning kind of conduct, stimulated by the idea of pleasantness to be gained, or of unpleasantness to be avoided, thereby. Each individual is held morally responsible for his impulsive acts inasmuch as it is the character back of them that makes them what they are; and it is his control or lack of control of them that determines their moral worth.

Volitional action is reasoned action. Preceding the volitional act there is a period of deliberation when all impulsive tendencies are inhibited and when one considers rationally the possibilities in and the probable results of the act. Deliberation is the process of examining in the state of active attention all sides of a question. Presently a conclusion is reached and a choice is made. This is the kind of action that constitutes the moral situation *par excellence* because it represents the very center and battleground of our conscious lives. Moreover, our conquests of deliberation and choice of today constitute our standards and policies of tomorrow and finally

make up that fabric of habit which rules so large a portion of our lives.

The moral situation then centers around voluntary activity, the highest type of which is volitional action. In real life we perform very few volitional acts as compared with the number of reflex, instinctive, impulsive, and habitual acts. But volitional action is performed so seldom just because it is usually a new and vital situation which demands the attentive deliberation and choice that constitute this kind of action. It is through our volitional acts that our policies of life, our character, and our habits are largely determined; and because of the fact that the new and vital situations are met by this kind of action, that volitional acts are of so vast importance both in a general way and from the point of view of ethics. The essence of personality is that the conduct of an individual shall be an orderly system of acts directed towards a worthy end or system of ends; and it is the deliberative nature of the volitional act that makes it the determining factor in character.

Situation must be vital.—The next point to be noticed in our analysis is that not all voluntary acts are centers of moral situations; not every situation which involves choice can be said to be a moral one. I may choose to take one route to town rather than another, in which case the choice is simply non-moral. One route is as good as another and nothing of particular consequence depends upon the choice; here the

choice is determined by some consideration which is not vital; some immediate end or some capricious desire determines me. But if one route is a trifle shorter than the other and some one's life depends upon my getting to the physician in the shortest possible time, then the situation becomes a moral one and I am under moral obligation to choose the shorter way. Here there is a vital consideration in which there is much at stake. Or if I choose one route in order to avoid meeting a man to whom I am in debt, the choice becomes a moral one because there is a more remote end—a consideration of greater weight—which determines my choice. Moreover, this kind of action shows forth a certain phase of character which is vital, and therefore of moral significance. "Conduct as moral may thus be defined as activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon."¹¹

The act involved in a moral situation is a significant one; that is, it is one that has power to make either for or against life in its totality. This includes all phases of life or, as Spencer called it, the complete life, mental, social, and spiritual as well as physical. It may be the life of the individual concerned or it may be that of another. Thus the typical moral situation is not merely a voluntary act,

¹¹Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 209.

but one in which considerations of real worth are present, and in which one must choose between values which are incompatible. Just *what* acts make for greater length and breadth of life and just what ones tend in the other direction is often difficult to determine. This is where deliberation comes in. But unless we are so pessimistic as to believe that life is not a good but is a curse, we have here found the most fundamental sanction for morality. If any individual is as pessimistic as to see no good in life, then the whole significance of moral values disappears and for him there can be no such thing as a set of moral standards which are equally binding upon him and upon all others.

It will now be clear that those acts of vital significance which make for greater length and breadth of life either of oneself or of others are good and those that have the opposite effect are bad. This is ultimate; we must assume that life is a good or there is absolutely no basis for consistency. It will be further noticed that the *vitalness* of acts is a relative matter. An act which is vital at one time or for one person may not be vital at another time or for another person. This is the point at which good judgment and clear insight are essential factors. Now in order that life may be consistent it is necessary that there be uniform ways of judging and acting; this means that men must have standards by which to judge as to the goodness or badness of action, and in terms of

which to determine their own conduct. Such a set of standards we have in the form of moral law—to live in harmony with which is to be moral.

II. SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THE MORAL SITUATION.

Vital situations arise in social relations.—A second important characteristic of the moral law is that it is a social as well as an individual and personal affair. We have just examined the psychological, that is, the individual aspect of the moral situation, but this furnishes us with only half the truth. The other half is that morality grows in a social soil; moral situations arise only in the form of social problems of some kind. An insight into the organic relation of the individual to society makes this clear. We have to think of human character as the product of a variety of social forces; the materials whose assimilation makes for mental growth are of social origin. By far the larger proportion of those experiences which constitute one's education, both in the broad and the narrow sense, arise out of social relations. Educators talk of the two phases of the educative process; namely, impression and expression. On the side of impression the vast majority of the stimuli whose apperception constitutes so large a share of education, arise out of social relations. They arise in the home through contact with natural objects and with members of the family or in play; or they arise in the school through contact with the teacher and fellow pupils, or through the social

achievement of the past as it is presented in the curriculum; or later they arise out of the vocational and political relations of life. Likewise, on the side of expression, most acts which an individual performs are prompted by social motives and are directed towards social ends. Those things which seem desirable in life and for which men strive, whether wealth, or position, or education, are desirable because of the social demand for them; because they are each centers of community interest.

And even more particularly is it true that in all those situations which we term moral there is a social reference either direct or indirect. The degree of the "socialness" of the situation may vary greatly; sometimes it may appear to be purely a personal matter. But modern psychology has taught us anew that "no man liveth unto himself": it teaches that every experience—even the secret thought—leaves its impress which is likely to function in the future in unexpected ways.

Social complexity indicates moral complexity.—Since moral situations are social affairs they become numerous and complicated just in proportion to the degree of general social organization. Recent years have seen many changes in the social structure, all of which have given rise to new and perplexing moral problems. The changes to which reference is made are those which have come with our modern industrial expansion. This expansion dates from the time of the introduction of steam and the result-

ing machinery. Before this the necessities of life were much fewer in number and were made largely in the home and in the small shop and by hand. Easy means of transportation did not exist, consequently the demand for a given commodity was limited. But with the introduction of the steam engine and its possibilities the change began to appear. By the aid of the machine it was possible to manufacture the article in question in much larger quantities and at the same time much more cheaply. Moreover, machinery made possible improved means of transportation, and all these things together caused a constantly increasing demand for the article. This made necessary a larger supply, which in turn necessitated larger factories and more laborers; thus grew up our large manufacturing centers which attract ever more and more laborers to them. The industrial age is the age of cities; and with the crowding together of people in large cities there arises a countless number of new problems, moral as well as social, political, and economic. By far the larger number of our moral problems of today center in our cities, and their number is legion. For example, there are those connected with the food supply of the city; the milk upon which the health, efficiency, and morals of the next generation largely depend; the problem of food adulteration which is of like importance; the wholesale practice of cheating by the use of false weights and measures—these as well as many others of the same type are all moral as well as economic

problems. The moral questions which center in capital and labor, the coal mine, the machine shop, the textile factory are all comparatively new, at least in form, and present some of the most difficult problems with which we have to deal. Or again, consider the problems which confront modern modes of transportation and communication, creating moral situations which simply did not exist before these methods were discovered.

Not only is there a large number of difficulties which spring directly from these new economic conditions, but there are as many more which follow indirectly from them. Paralleling very closely these moral problems just referred to there are new legal problems. The political situation has been greatly complicated by the industrial expansion. For example, "machine politics" has had its origin and development contemporarily with the growth of the city, which in turn was the result of the new industrial expansion. Machine politics, involving the "boss," and the "ward heeler" has had laid to its charge an unending list of moral sins. Indeed in many instances the political machine has become the organized tool of wickedness. It is the very apotheosis of injustice and iniquity. Government becomes debauched because of the hordes of ignorant immigrants which our industrial system lures to our shores. Furthermore, the temptation is always present to seek the allegiance of organized vice and thus further to strengthen a political machine. The saloon

and the brothel thus widen the influence of the political machines of our cities, and in return the law winks at these enterprises. These same enterprises thrive in the kind of society that the mining, manufacturing, and railway centers attract to themselves.

There is still another phase of the political problem that has ethical significance, one which perhaps grows out of the unjust combination of economic and political interests: namely, the factor of so-called graft. It is a matter of common knowledge that our political and economic affairs are shot through and through with graft, big and little. This is not the place to take up any of these questions for detailed discussion, but this may serve as one more instance of the new problems which the science of ethics faces today. We are not affirming that graft is a new thing, but that there is a myriad of new ways in which graft may be consummated so that it has become a much more virulent problem than it ever was before.

It is such considerations as these that make it necessary for us to reinterpret our moral principles and make the application as concrete as possible. As is seen by the nature of the problem, this re-interpretation must be made from the social point of view. In other words, the science of ethics must be socialized and our consciences must be re-enlightened. We need to become more keenly aware that modern society has invented a countless number of new ways of killing, stealing, and lying. We profess to believe

in the abstract that it is wrong to kill and steal and lie; but we are not keenly enough alive to the new methods of accomplishing these ends; much less have we made the readjustment that is necessary if our practice is to conform to our theory. It is with this thought in mind that we shall attempt in the next chapter to formulate a moral criterion broad enough to underlie all the vital phases of life, yet one which is applicable to the concrete needs and facts of our social life.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. What is the moral significance of instinctive acts? Of habits?
2. Give five examples of moral situations, as distinguished from non-moral situations.
3. What can be said against the doctrine that the moral situation is always a social situation?
4. What is the meaning of the term 'conduct'?
5. What are the arguments in support of the doctrine that Ethics is concerned with the *whole* of human conduct?
6. Make a list of moral problems that are found in the city, which are not found in the country.
7. Give specific examples in which a political machine has been a tool of some form of vice.
8. Is Utilitarianism adequate to the social problems of today?
9. Make a classified list of all of the social problems which have moral significance.
10. Why is there a special need that ethical theory should be socialized?

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CHAPTER III.

PERSONALITY AND THE MORAL CRITERION.

I. MEANING OF PERSONALITY.

Personality contrasted with individuality.—In dealing with the subject of morals we are obliged to presuppose the existence of persons or agents who are moral. Personality is one of the fundamental concepts of ethics; a psychological analysis of it is therefore essential in formulating our ethical standards. We must accordingly first distinguish between personality and individuality. Individual differences, their combinations and permutations, constitute what we call individuality. Thus it is possible to attribute the latter to animals, while no one would claim personality for them. Of course individual differences increase the differences of personality, but the real essence of the latter lies somewhere else. It must be understood that we are here using the term personality in a broader sense than that which is given it by popular speech; we give it a technical meaning. To put it briefly, personality is possible only to those creatures who are endowed with a highly developed capacity of reason. This limits personality to man; and while he may also have a

high degree of individuality, yet it is in virtue of his rationality that man is a person.

Let us illustrate the function of reason in man by contrasting his life with the life of the animal. The animal lives continually in the present; it has very little if any time-sense. Life for it is a continuous succession of "now's." The case of the squirrel as it gathers nuts for next winter may seem to be an exception to this, inasmuch as it appears to be making plans for the future. On the contrary, it is not consciously planning for the future; its action is not the result of conscious deliberation and choice; it cannot voluntarily imagine the conditions of next winter and suit means to ends thus imagined. The squirrel gathers nuts to satisfy a *present* need. So in general; animals do not have conscious plans and purposes with respect to the future; they live from moment to moment in response to blind instinct. Thus the past and the future are largely shut out from their experience, and they are limited to a more or less continuous present.

Now how is it with man? It is obvious that the life of the present is organically bound up with that of the past, and that the character of the future is dependent upon the choices and decisions of the present. Man lives an "historical life;" life for him is more than a succession of now's; it is a continuous whole. Moreover, from one point of view, man also lives in the future. Of course the future can never be immediately experienced; but man lives in the

future in the sense that the experience of the present is continually modified by his plans and purposes which stretch forward into the years of the future. The life of man is a continuous fabric, the warp of which is his plans and purposes running throughout its whole length, and the woof of which is the unending detailed experiences of every waking hour.

Reason in personality.—Now it is the office of *reason* to organize and unify life as just indicated; its business is to construct plans and purposes and policies, and to discover the means by which these may be realized; through it the whole life, past, present, and future, is worked up into one complete and organic whole. Rogers says “the real essence of self-hood [being a person] is this: the consciousness of an active experience in which each step is bound together with every other by its relation to an inclusive end, which is immediately realized in every part.”¹

Accordingly, to be a person means to have an experience bound together through life by a system of ends, some of which are immediate and some remote. Now only a rational being could, under this definition, be a person, because only a rational being could be dominated by a system of ends and purposes. Personality grows in proportion as this system of ends becomes more and more explicit and as the lower desires of sense are dominated by the higher ideals which reason sets up. Morality comes in as an eval-

¹*Modern Philosophy*, p. 195.

uation of these ends, and of the means by which they shall be gained. And the character of the person is determined by the nature of the system of ends which is the ruling force in his life; by the kind of fixed policy which governs his conduct. Hence character may be either good or bad according to the relative value of the ends chosen. It may be either strong or weak according as the person has decided firmly upon some policy, either good or bad, or as the current of life is determined by each new stimulus as it makes its appearance.

Granting, then, that we as moral agents are persons having more or less definite and rational policies of life, a moral standard is any principle upon which we base our choices and order our conduct. Life may be defined in terms of adjustment; it is the adjustment of inner factors to outer and the modification of outer factors to suit inner needs. Consciousness is the highest form of life, of adjustment and reorganization. In this case the inner factors are the elements of personality, while the outer are the elements of the total environment, physical, mental, social, and spiritual.

Now reason is the highest of the organizing forces within consciousness; and it is through the operation of reason within the moral sphere that moral progress is possible. Moral situations may arise in connection with any one of the elements of the total environment just mentioned, and the readjustment may become constantly superior because conscious-

ness constructs for itself new ideals which, in turn, become more perfect as consciousness in the individual and the race develops. These ideals are not, however, the exclusive product of the individual's own mind. All the ennobling forces of society, such as education, religion, aesthetic training, and the like, tend to help form ideals of conduct and character which become the supreme ends within the system that dominates the life of the individual and makes him a "person."

Rights and obligations.—Again, in order that each one may realize his personality to the highest degree we must assume that there are certain great and fundamental rights which belong to him. These rights inhere in the very nature of personality; without them personality could not exist. For example, it is one of the corner stones of our constitution that each one has the "inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." To be explicit, ethics maintains that personality would not have the opportunity to develop unless there were physical liberty. A man who is in slavery is in no condition to realize himself.

There is also the right of mental liberty—the right to think as one likes and to believe and worship according to the dictates of one's own conscience. These factors are even more essential to the development of personality than is physical liberty. There is a further mental right which we in our country prize very highly, and that is the right to an educa-

tion. Education is both the means and the process of self-realization, and the higher levels of personality, and hence of morality, cannot be reached without aid from society in the form of education. Underlying and involving both these classes of rights is the right of every individual to enough of this world's goods to enable him to lay the foundation of personality. This right is involved in the right to live; that is, each one is entitled to food and clothing and the other means of life sufficient to enable him to work and be a productive member of society.

But there is another side to the question. The fact that each person claims these as his rights presupposes the existence of a corresponding number of obligations. In recognizing our own personality we are implicitly recognizing the personality of others; and in claiming these rights for ourselves we are recognizing the claim of others to the same rights. This law that rights involve obligations is one of the fundamental moral laws; and it is equally binding upon all.

Such considerations as these reveal the universality of the moral standard. The fact that the moral situation is in essence the same for all members of society; the fact that the moral standard in both its subjective and objective aspects has authority over each one; the fact that rights involve obligations;—all these indicate the universal nature of morality and of moral standards. These facts are the proof for the opening sentence of this book.

II. GROWTH OF PERSONALITY.

We have been at some pains to make clear what is meant by personality. We now come to the question of the growth of personality. The question may be stated thus: According to what laws or principles does personality develop, and what elements enter into its growth? In seeking the answer to this question it will be suggestive to take the biological point of view and carry over by analogy the laws which govern plant and animal growth and apply them to personality.

Physical fitness.—Accordingly, the first principle is that there must be the conditions for proper physical growth and welfare as the basis for the growth of the higher phases of personality. There must be sufficient food, clothing, exercise, and fresh air; the body must be in a healthy condition in order to take up non-living matter, assimilate it and work it over into the form of living tissue. In a word, this principle is the axiomatic truth that sound physical health is necessary for sound mental and moral health.

The social soil.—The second principle of personal growth is that personality grows in a social soil. "Life is more than meat and the body than raiment," and so is personality more than the physical life, though a healthy condition of the latter is necessary to a healthy condition of the former. To say that personality grows in a social soil signifies that the

elements which enter into its growth are products of social endeavor. Man, unlike any other creature, has a social inheritance; each new generation inherits all that the race has found to be of value in the past. The social environment "includes all the relations in which man as a conscious being stands to his fellows, to what his fellows have done, and to his own personal ideals."² In the upward progress of the race men have preserved in writing and otherwise those things which their own experience has proved to be of most worth; and each new generation has the benefit of this experience. This is the social inheritance. All the beliefs, traditions, customs, knowledge, and institutions which exist are the products of society of the past and present.

In analyzing this inheritance different writers distinguish different elements. Butler³ mentions five inheritances: the literary, scientific, æsthetic, religious, and institutional. Each generation's inheritance from the past is of these five types. Horne⁴ gives a little different classification which, however, includes these same things. He takes as his starting point the fact that there are three main phases of the human consciousness: namely, the intellect, the feelings, and the will. We may expect therefore that the vital experiences of the race will be of these three

²Horne: *The Philosophy of Education*, p. 98.

³*The Meaning of Education.*

⁴*The Philosophy of Education.*

types. Accordingly, the elements of the social inheritance are classified as intellectual, emotional, and volitional. The intellectual includes all the knowledge the race has acquired, especially the most exact form of knowledge—science. Scientific knowledge represents man's classified and organized experience with regard to his total environment, physical, mental, social, and spiritual. The emotional element includes all that the emotions of man have wrought out; this is preserved in the form of the fine arts: music, painting, literature, sculpture, and architecture. And as the permanent form which the volitions of man have taken, there are constitutions, laws, and morals.

These elements are termed social because they are the product not of the effort of separate individuals, but of the race as a whole. While they may have found expression through individual instrumentality, yet the individuals concerned could not have created as they did except as they themselves had benefited by the social inheritance of their respective ages. Moreover, without the coöperation of each succeeding generation, the inheritance could not be ours; it is not the product of any one generation or any one individual, but of all men and of all times.

Now just as the physical organism grows by assimilating certain elements from the physical environment, so consciousness in its higher forms—those which make persons of us—grows by assimilating the elements of this social and spiritual environment.

Each individual is born into this complex social environment as well as into the physical. And while the whole of it is potentially his inheritance, it can become really his own only as he assimilates its elements and thus incorporates them into his very life. These elements are present in the environment of each one as so many stimuli which cause him to react. Reaction means acquisition of new experience, which in turn means so much growth.

Aristotle understood that personality grows only by assimilating the elements of the spiritual environment when he observed that man is a social animal, and when he raised the question whether one could become fully human if one were entirely isolated from one's kind from birth. We may sum up the discussion of this principle of growth by saying that personality is the highest kind of life we know anything about, and that its roots extend into the very heart of society and indeed into the whole life of the race in ages past. Personality could no more grow if it were taken out of this social soil than a plant could grow if it were plucked out of the ground and suspended above it. The great arteries which carry the sustenance of the life of personality are also social affairs; to get out of touch with these would be to sacrifice life itself. No man is entirely self-made; each is indebted to society for the elements of personal growth; and the degree of personality that he has attained depends upon the thoroughness with which he has re-lived the race's experience in his own

life: upon the thoroughness with which he has assimilated the elements of the spiritual environment.

III. PERSONALITY AND THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

The social institutions.—So much for the general nature of the growth of personality. But our analysis cannot stop here, for there is another aspect of social organization which has vital significance for the growth of personality. Not only does society hold these elements in solution, so to speak, for the benefit of all on-coming generations, but it also has definite channels through which these benefits are brought to the door of each individual. There are certain great and abiding social institutions through which society extends to its individual members these elements which are so necessary for the growth of personality. These institutions are the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church.

These institutions are permanent forms of social organization; they reach back into the history of the race and have their beginnings in primitive times. These are the "great arteries" through which the elements of personality flow; they represent the points of contact between each individual and society, both of the present and of ages past. To be more specific, it is only as man comes into contact with the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church that the necessary elements of his growth are supplied.

The home.—Let us carry out this analysis in a little more detail. We must not anticipate too much what is to follow in the next chapters, but it is essential that we shall see clearly at this point the relation of these great social institutions to the making of character. First, as to the home. The home is first in point of time and importance in its influence upon personality. It receives the child at his period of greatest plasticity and continues to influence him for many years. All of his experiences for the first few years are gained within its walls. All the knowledge, all the appreciation of the beautiful, and all the religious conceptions and moral training that come to him, come through the channel of the home. Not only are the elements of his knowledge gained in the give-and-take, the contact and conversation, and the atmosphere of the home, but the habits of life which have such a dominant place in the making of character are also formed for the most part at this time and in this place. The child probably learns as much in the first five years of his life as he does in all the other years put together. And in the nature of the case the bulk of this time is spent in the home. This indicates the great significance for the child's future character of the impressions, habits, ideas, and ideals that are the product of his home environment.

The school.—In the second place, it is the business of the school to take the child as he comes from the home and carry on his education and the making of his character beyond the point to which it has been

carried in the home. The home is the center of a great many activities, and it has neither the time nor the means to make the child's education systematic and complete. This is the specific duty of the school. The school curriculum is the boiled-down essence of the social inheritance—or ought to be; it represents in a systematic way the experiences of the race and presents them to the child in such manner that he may get the benefit of them in the best way and in the shortest time. The child is not left to find things out for himself; he is given the results of the trials and successes of the race in the past; they are presented to him in the most economical way possible. Personality then is developed further in and by the school than could be possible without the aid of such a social institution.

The vocation.—In the third place, although it may not be so evident on the face of things, the growth of personality is largely dependent upon the vocation. We must use the term "vocation," not in the narrow sense of being the fixed occupation of some one individual or set of individuals, but in the wider sense of the whole organized labor of man. It is equivalent to the economic order; the economic process includes all of the activities by which all of the needs and wants of man are supplied. This involves a vast amount of specialization of labor in modern times. The significant fact is that without this highly organized method of producing and distributing the goods of life, without this high degree of coöperation

on the part of the members of society, the needs of no one of us could be so well supplied. If each one of us had to make his own clothing, secure the material for and build his own home, procure and prepare all his own food, no one of us could have as much and as good clothing, as comfortable a home, as varied a diet, or indeed a tithe as many of the comforts as we now enjoy.

Not only is this true, but a further and even more significant fact is that no one would have nearly as much leisure—time over and above that necessary to obtain the bare necessities of life—in which to cultivate the higher faculties, in which to advance his education, in which to develop the higher phases of personality. Further reference will be made to these facts later on, but it is necessary for us to see clearly at this point the debt that each individual owes to an organized vocation which through coöperation brings the goods of life in such abundance and with a minimum of effort on his part to each of the more fortunate members of society. It is true that there is a shameful inequality in the distribution of the goods of life: that some have more than enough while others are suffering for the barest necessities of life. This is one of the many problems with which ethics has to deal; but to all members of society in greater or lesser degree the foundations of personality are laid in the economic order.

The state.—In the fourth place, what is the relation of the state to the development of personality?

This relationship may be looked at from two points of view. On the one hand it is negative in character; the state sets limits within which one's actions must fall. It imposes penalties for the violation of its laws, which laws coincide with the moral law up to a certain point. The state says "thou shalt not kill," the moral law says "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" the state says "thou shalt not steal," while the moral law says "if any man take away thy coat, give him thy cloak also." The state sets an outside limit beyond which a man may not go in his action; a man may obey the laws of the state and yet not be moral, while to be moral implies obedience to a higher and stricter law than that of the state. On the other hand the state undertakes to maintain the peace and to deal with refractory members of society, so that the orderly members may pursue their peaceful occupations and thus realize their ends, so long as these ends are legitimate.

The ideal function of the state is to guarantee the validity of all of the other institutions of society. It should protect the home and endeavor to curb anything that would seek to undermine it and destroy the sacredness of it. It should foster and care for the school and provide the means by which to carry it on. It should safeguard the vocation and attempt to see that every man gets justice in the economic relations of life. And finally it should guarantee to every man the right to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience. In a word, the true

function of the state is to safeguard the life, the liberty, and all the other rights of the members of society in order that they may be free to make the best use of their opportunities for self-development.

The church.—Finally, the church is that institution whose function it is to develop that highest phase of human character, the religious experience. Its duty is to appeal to and stimulate those ideals of character and conduct which are set forth in the Bible, and to bring out the best there is in man. Human personality and character finds its ultimate worth and highest expression in the religious life. This consists, in essence, in a conscious dependence upon and love for God, and faithful and loving service for mankind. And it is the duty of the church to seek man's development along this line. The work of the church, then, is the putting of the cap-sheaf upon personality; and without its coöperation human personality remains merely human.

IV. THE MORAL SITUATION AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

Personal obligations.—The growth of personality is thus absolutely dependent upon the elements of the social environment; and personality can receive these elements only as they are brought to it through the channels of the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church. What, now, is the moral significance of these facts? It has already been laid down as a moral law that all rights involve corresponding obligations, that opportunities mean re-

sponsibilities. It therefore follows that each one who has so richly benefited at the hands of society should render back to society something in return. There is no escape from this obligation; in the nature of the case the obligation rests upon him whom society has nurtured through her social institutions. And how shall one discharge this obligation? Obviously, there could be no more fitting way than to render service commensurate with one's capacities and opportunities back to society; this service should be returned to society through the same channels as those through which society poured out her benefits upon the individual; namely, the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church. To put it more specifically, each individual owes a tremendous obligation to society through these five social institutions.

Obligation to social institutions.—There is also another phase of the moral significance of this. As we have seen in a previous chapter, the moral situation is always a social matter; or, to put it in another way, the moral situation arises only in connection with these social institutions. Those situations of vital importance arise in the home, in the school, or in one of the other institutions, and there are no other relations in life which can furnish moral problems. This is because these institutions when defined in a broad sense include all the important relations of men to each other. There may seem to be exceptions to this, at first sight, as for example, the

question of amusement, which seems to be omitted in this classification of the relations of life. But if we will define the second one of the social institutions as the "school and other educational and cultural agencies," we shall have a term sufficiently broad to cover all cases of this kind. When it comes to the practical, everyday questions of right and wrong, they will always be found to have relation to society on the side of one or more of these institutions.

V. THE MORAL CRITERION.

Realization of the social self.—Now what term or phrase will best summarize these principles and most fully carry their meaning? "Socialized personality," or "realization of the social self" are both suggestive of the desired meaning. They both carry as their connotation the fact that the supreme moral obligation is the realization of the self, and that the self is a social affair. Indeed this last point needs to be emphasized and re-emphasized, for it is most likely to be forgotten. It is only half a truth to say that morality is a personal affair; the other half, is that personality is a social affair. The influence of nearly all of the ethical theories of the past tends to emphasize the *self-realization*; this is because these theories have been based chiefly upon the assumed principle of individualism. But we must keep constantly before us the social nature of morality, and .

bear in mind that moral theory, to be adequate to present needs, must be socialized.

Let us make as clear as possible just what is implied in "socialized personality," or the "realization of the social self." Of course, there is in each of us some personality to begin with; the very fact that man is man means that there is some personality. It signifies that there is at least a degree of reason which is operative in the selection of ends. But the realization of socialized personality demands that the ends which are striven for shall be made to harmonize with the moral law; that is, they must be ends which are conductive to social welfare; in the same way the means used to secure these ends must also be socially desirable. This further signifies that the individual must come to take the social point of view as a matter of habit; he must habitually ask himself in the face of every moral situation what the social implications of his act are. The desirability of the act must be estimated in terms of its total effect upon society.

The socialized conscience.—Or, look at it from another point of view. Realization of the social self means the having of a socialized conscience. We have seen that conscience represents the very heart of morality; and we have defined it as the whole of consciousness functioning in the moral realm or in a moral situation. To have a socialized conscience means to judge as to the rightness of an act in terms of its social effects, bearing in mind the fact that the

individual is himself a member of society. Psychologically, the function of judgment is to enable the organism to meet and economically adjust itself to a new situation. If the situation is a familiar one and has been met successfully many times, judgment is no longer necessary and adjustment is much more rapid and exact when the act is performed through habit.

Now within the moral life there is a place for both judgment and habit. When a moral situation arises for the first time, then to have a socialized conscience requires that one pass judgment upon the situation in terms of the social effect of the act. If the moral situation is a familiar one and has been previously met by a judgment, the latter is no longer necessary; ideo-motor action or, if many times repeated, habit, will then take care of the situation. But in the latter case as well as in the former the action must reflect rationalized character in which the standard of judgment is a social one. Not only must deliberative, ideo-motor, and impulsive acts be social in character, but the whole attitude toward life must be so; life as a whole must be habitually looked at as a social thing. When this habitual attitude is taken, conscience—one's inner evaluation of the situation—will always operate in harmony with the moral principle, socialized personality.

Perry, in his *Moral Economy*, in discussing the nature of the moral life distinguishes five supreme virtues. They are intelligence, prudence, purpose, justice,

and good-will. He does not mention them in connection with what we have called a socialized conscience, but they fit it admirably with our analysis of it. The man whose conscience is socialized must above all things be intelligent about social conditions and relations. Socrates maintained that virtue is knowledge; this is stating it too strongly perhaps, but it is certainly true that without knowledge one cannot be moral, while ignorance may be the cause of vice. For example, it is absolutely necessary to any great reform in society for all members, or at least the intelligent majority, to have knowledge about the facts in the case. In order that society shall do away with that great social disease, the liquor traffic, it is necessary that society shall be well informed about the facts. Or again, when people know the facts about child labor and its evil effects, this social sin will be far on the way towards eradication. And so it is throughout the whole list of moral situations; in order for a man's conscience to be socialized it is necessary for him to be intelligent. This is not merely one of the greatest of the moral virtues, but it is also the moral duty of every member of society to make himself intelligent upon the problems that concern the welfare of society, else by his ignorance is he condemned.

We shall not dwell in detail upon all these virtues. But prudence in the form of thoughtful consideration in the light of all the known facts regarding a moral situation is equally essential to a socialized

conscience. Indeed, conscience could not exist apart from prudence; likewise, purpose. We have seen that the very essence of personality consists in having a system of ends and purposes in life which are in harmony with the moral law; so it is fitting to include purpose in a list of the moral virtues. In the same way both justice and good-will are organic to a socialized conscience. All that has gone before by way of our analysis of personality presupposes that justice is one of the corner-stones of the moral life. But mere justice is not sufficient; it must be supplemented by good-will. An individual may live within the law, always dealing out cold justice; yet a life built upon this foundation alone cannot rise to the higher and nobler levels of morality. Mere justice may be the deadliest of paralyzing forces; it may be easier for one to stand the cruelty of a positively unjust act than to weather the icy blast of mere justice. It must be tempered by good-will. Even a misguided act which is prompted by a generous disposition, although its outcome is not altogether desirable, is at least appreciated as to its motive. But mere good-will, again, unless it be founded upon intelligence, prudence, purpose, and justice, is not entirely moral; without these other factors as a basis, the will is not thoroughly socialized. Indeed without each and every one of these virtues no man's action can be fully social nor can he have a socialized conscience.

The criterion.—In summary we may say that the supreme moral end is the *realization of the social self, or socialized personality*, and the moral criterion by which conduct is to be evaluated and directed is the *socialized conscience*, with its specific virtues of intelligence, prudence, purpose, justice, and good-will. Conduct is *good* only as it both brings to fuller realization the total self and proves itself socially constructive. To be socially constructive it must promote directly or indirectly the efforts of the other members of society to realize the same end for themselves.

The one common factor that is needed in the solution of the social, political, educational, and religious problems of the present day is a re-enlightened and resensitized conscience. Our previous analysis has shown that the moral situation must arise in connection with one or more of the great social institutions; and it is in these connections that our consciences need to be re-enlightened. For example, in connection with the home, society needs to become aroused about the growing problem of divorce and its causes; along the line of the vocation, we need to be more deeply concerned about the loss of life and limb which is so common in our factories and mines, and we need to have a greater care for those in distress and poverty, from whatever cause; in connection with the state, we need to be watchful lest we be parties to graft and misrepresentation. These are

the kinds of moral situations which touch our lives at every turn. These questions are social, political, economic, and religious; but they are also vitally moral. If we choose the easier way, as moralists, of merely speculating theoretically about what the highest good is, we rob morality of its content, for it is just such life problems as these mentioned that make up the fabric of morality. Morality is one of the most concrete facts of life; and ethics ought to supply us with a working theory with respect to these problems. It should provide us with a point of view so that we may be able to face the facts of life with some degree of consistency.

We are now ready to take up some of these problems as they come to us in the business of life in relation to the five great institutional structures of society, and to try to make the application of the moral principle whenever we can. And while it will be impossible to give a final answer to many of these, the stating of the problem itself will be a help in our independent efforts to think clearly upon these important aspects of life.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. Do animals possess the elements of personality? (See Morgan's *Comparative Psychology*, Ch. XII, XVI.)
2. What is the relative value of habit and judgment in the making of character?
3. What is the meaning of 'self realization'?
4. What is the relation of self sacrifice to self realization?

5. Is happiness an essential part of the moral criterion?
6. What would be the content of duty in terms of our moral criterion?
7. What distinctions are to be drawn between sympathy, altruism, and humanitarianism?
8. What limitations are put upon the individual rights of liberty, freedom of thought, and education?
9. Give other examples of moral situations which arise in connection with each of the social institutions.
10. At about what age does a child attain the ability to reason? Is there any connection between this and the development of conscience?
11. Give a detailed illustration of a system of ends.
12. From the Hedonist's point of view, what would be the nature and office of conscience?

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CHAPTER IV.

THE CRITERION APPLIED: THE HOME.

I. DIVORCE AND MORALITY.

The question stated.—Anything that threatens the sanctity and stability of the home also threatens the institution of morality in that it has a deleterious effect upon personality. There are many things in our complex society of today which seem thus to be threatening the home. The prevalence of divorce is evidence of this statement. The fact that at a conservative estimate there are from one-fifth to one-fourth as many divorce proceedings as there are marriages in our country in a given period of time is sad testimony to the fact that there is at work some force whose tendency is to overthrow and disrupt the home. That this estimate is conservative appears from the fact that the divorce rate for the state in which the center of population lies was in 1900, 1 to 7.5; while for one county the rate was 1 to 3.8; and these figures represent approximately two-thirds of the divorce proceedings, the decree not having been granted in the other cases.¹

Divorce itself, however, is not to be regarded so much as an evil in itself, as the symptom of some

¹Howard: *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, III, p. 212.

deeper lying evil. It is society's means of dealing with an intolerable pathological condition. The question is, just what is this pathological condition and what are the causes of the so-called divorce evil; or to put it another way, what are those tendencies which are working for the *overthrow of the home?* Further, what is the proper remedy for these conditions?

Changed conditions.—These are difficult questions to answer; we shall probably find, if we succeed in analyzing out the causal factors, that the trouble is not traceable to any one condition, but that there are many contributory causes. The conditions both within and without the home are very different from what they were before the divorce evil grew to its present magnitude. The maladjustment within the family which is so evident now no doubt grows out of a number of these changed conditions. For example, the time has largely passed in our own country when the daughter is subject to the will of the father in the matter of marriage; likewise the time has passed when the wife is subject to the will of the husband. Hence conditions which formerly may have been borne in silence on the part of the wife may now frequently be aired in the divorce court. Furthermore, we as a people have largely lost the Puritanic point of view which made of suffering a virtue and a duty; we are no longer content to endure in silence conditions for which there seems to be such an easy remedy in divorce. Again, the

church, partly through its decreasing authority over the lives of men and partly because of lack of initiative, has ceased to be as strong a force against divorce as formerly. Corresponding to this laxity on the part of the church, public opinion and custom have ceased to frown so uncompromisingly upon divorce; the divorcee is no longer looked upon as one apart, as a social outcast, but commonly enjoys equality of privilege and opportunity with other members of society.

Another set of changed conditions which gives woman a greater independence is the industrial changes of the last half century. Formerly woman was almost entirely dependent economically upon some male member of the family, and marriage was practically the only door open to her. This fact again accounts for her uncomplaining silence under conditions which were all but unbearable and from which she may now find relief in divorce. But we must not conclude upon the basis of these facts that the increased number of divorces of the present is to be explained entirely upon the ground that people now find a ready relief in divorce, whereas in the past they bore in silence conditions which were all but intolerable. On the contrary, modern life has brought with it many new conditions whose influence is inimical to the home and which are accountable for much of the great increase in the divorce evil. Neither must we conclude that society is more degenerate now than formerly; on the contrary,

divorce may be regarded as a sign of social virility; the social body is exercising its reserve force in the attempt to throw off this disease.

II. MARRIAGE ENTERED INTO TOO LIGHTLY.

The causes of divorce.—There seem to be three general conditions which may be regarded as the causes of divorce. These are: (1) the fact that marriage is entered into too lightly, (2) sex immorality, and (3) certain sources of friction within the home which, while not entirely disrupting it, are nevertheless inimical to the best growth of personality. In considering these it will be necessary to speak somewhat plainly upon topics which are usually tabooed as subjects of social discourse and which are not ordinarily discussed in books on ethics. But after all these and their kind are the vital things of life and they furnish the common everyday questions of morality; they are therefore the things which most need discussion in books on ethics.

The fundamental nature of the home.—The home as a social institution and as the unit of society has its origin and foundation in marriage. Marriage as an institution has undergone many changes in the long ages of human evolution and civilization which elapsed before our present high ideals were attained. It would be beside the purpose here to trace out the evolution of the marriage relation; but a somewhat philosophical view of the nature and function of the home will help us to see the problems that present

conditions have developed, and at the same time will indicate the solution of these problems.

The biological function.—The purpose of the home, whose foundation marriage is, is a very broad and comprehensive one. Indeed it cannot be said to have one and only one purpose; on the contrary its function is manifold. Of these the biological is fundamental. It can never be denied that the original and supreme purpose of marriage is the rearing of and caring for children. The parental instinct is the force which originally brought members of the opposite sex together. Nor have sex feelings and the parental instinct decreased as the race has developed. So they must still be regarded as fundamental.

But while the biological function of marriage is the original and perhaps the fundamental purpose, there are other and scarcely less important purposes which the home ought to subserve. Among these are what we may term the psychological, the economic, the ethical, the social, and the religious purposes. Nature has provided all sentient creatures with the parental instinct, and they perpetuate their kind according to the same laws which govern the perpetuation of the human race. But man's life is more than that of the beasts of the field. It consists not alone in eating and drinking and in following the instinctive round of the seasons; but his life is a mental, a moral, and a spiritual life as well. And the home as a social institution is one of the greatest

factors in the realization of the various ends of this total life.

The psychological function.—Let us consider very briefly these other functions which the home has, beginning with the psychological. Reference has already been made to the incomparable influence that the home exercises in the making of personality. Now personality has been defined almost exclusively in terms of the mind, particularly those higher mental processes of reason and ideals. Here in general then is the psychological value of the home and of marriage which is its foundation. To be more specific, we may say that marriage is the union of two persons—and let us remember the significance of the term “persons”—“into a deliberate, intimate, permanent, responsible union for a common end of mutual good. And it is this common end, a good of a higher, broader, fuller sort than either could attain in isolation, which lifts passion from the impulsive or selfish to the moral plane; it is the peculiar intimacy and the peculiar demands for sympathy and coöperation, which give it greater depth and reach than ordinary friendship.”² It is in the peculiar sympathetic love and service of the home, in the common labor towards common ends and purposes, in the unselfish devotion and sacrifice of husband and wife, of parent and child, that the highest levels of mental development are to be realized. It is through these common experiences that personality is most normally rounded out and crystalized.

²Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 571.

The economic function.—Likewise the home has its economic value. This phase of the total function of the home, however, is not now so great and vital as it once was. In general, the economic process is a two-fold one, namely, production and consumption. Formerly the home was the center of the productive processes whereby the necessities of life were gathered together and prepared for use. Now, however, by far the larger number of these processes are carried on in the factories and shops of the cities. But the home is still the consumptive center of society; there is a multitude of things looking toward the well-being and comfort of its members which can still be compassed only in the home. Consider the fact that nearly all the necessities of life are brought within the home, there to be consumed,—food, clothing, fuel,—even though these things are not now prepared on the premises as they were a few generations ago; also that the great bulk of the earnings of the members of the family is spent through the channel of the home, and it will at once be clear that the home is still the economic center of society as far as consumption is concerned.

Consider also the advantages that accrue from this fact. It has already been shown that division of labor in the economic order is one of the basic principles of civilization. Now there is a considerable division of labor within the home itself. Usually the husband and father engages in some gainful occupation and thus supplies the necessary funds for

maintaining the home. But the activities of the wife and mother must also be regarded as a gainful occupation. It is through her efforts that the raw materials are worked over into the form of food and clothing, and by her many of the resources of the family are conserved and increased. These activities are no less productive than those of the husband. And thus, through this division of labor and coöperation, that "common end of mutual good" of which economic welfare is a phase, is more efficiently gained. It has already been explained that personality can be realized best only as economic conditions are favorable. And thus the economic function of the home is an important phase of its total function.

The ethical function.—The home has also its ethical function. It is not worth while here to dwell upon this point, for it has already been developed to a certain extent; and indeed the ethical value of the home is the topic with which this entire chapter is to deal in a somewhat larger way. But for the sake of completeness in our somewhat philosophical view of the home, it is well to mention its ethical function along with the biological, the psychological, the economic, the social, and the religious.

The social and religious function.—The social and religious values may be considered together. In entering into the marriage covenant those concerned are establishing a new set of social relations. On the one hand, husband and wife come into a much more intimate and personal relation than can ever

be approached in mere friendship; and traits of character and disposition which had not before been suspected become apparent. There is a certain amount of disillusionment inevitable, no doubt, as the humanity of each becomes apparent to the other; but to the extent to which husband and wife are properly mated, there will be an added stimulus to individual and social endeavor; life will take on new meaning and its possibilities will enlarge. From this inner aspect marriage means an enrichment of social experience and a new evaluation of life, with added stimulus for effort and development.

But over and above this, the establishment of a home means the establishment of new social relations of a larger kind. "It is the assuming of ties which make the parties in a new and deeper sense an organic part of humanity." And society in turn expresses its vital interest in the union through its laws and customs regarding the marriage relation. Each party thereafter passes current in the world not merely as an individual but as a member and representative of a home.

The home also, next to the church, is the most important agency in the development of a religious experience, without which no personality has reached its highest possibility. Love, sympathetic service, sacrifice, all take on new meaning. The fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man become more significant; especially is this true when there are children in the home. There the child learns for the

first time by analogy, and the parent relearns in virtue of his parenthood, something of what the love of the Father must mean. And in the proper training of the children the religious side of life is deepened and enriched for all. These then, the biological, the psychological, the economic, the social, and the religious, are the various phases of the function of the home.

Marriage entered into too lightly.—We had set out to consider some of the things which are threatening the sanctity and stability of the home, and it may seem that we have gone far afield in the discussion which has just preceded. But the reason for the apparent digression will now be clear, as we come back to the first fact that was mentioned: namely, that marriage is frequently entered into too lightly. That many divorces are made necessary because those concerned did not seriously consider this step which they were taking, cannot be denied. In all too many cases marriage is entered into upon the sole basis of sex attraction or of passing fancy. It must be granted that in the normal and natural marriage this factor of sex attraction is present. Indeed the fundamental biological function of marriage would be thwarted but for this instinctive attraction. Yet while love is defined largely in terms of emotion, it is based upon other factors also in its higher and more human form. That love which alone can be the abiding basis of a happy and stimulating marriage involves, besides the instinctive and emo-

tional element, a steadfast disposition on the part of each to labor and to sacrifice for the attainment of the "common end of mutual good" to which reference has been made. True marriage is the union of two *personalities*. And this means more than the force of an emotional and instinctive attraction which of itself would soon be consumed in the heat of its own passion and leave the disillusioned ones uninteresting if not actually repellent to each other. On the contrary, true marriage means a union in which there are common interests and ideals, in which those systems of ends and purposes, the having of which constitutes personality, are in harmony. Only those who through education or environment are committed to the same general policies of life and have similar tastes and ambitions, or who, lacking this, discover in each other some other source of sympathy and unity of purpose, can find in marriage a blessing and not a curse. The failure on the part of those concerned to show a proper appreciation of the true function of the home in its entirety cannot but lead to disaster. That is, the failure on the part of each seriously to consider the wisdom of marriage with the other, from the points of view which we have called the psychological, the economic, the ethical, the social, and the religious, makes that marriage a sacrilege and a gamble. This is what is meant by saying that marriage is entered into too lightly. There is no doubt that the ease with which divorce

may be procured makes people willing to take the chance or make the gamble.

It is this failure which makes marriage result so disastrously in so many cases. In developing our principle we have seen that a socialized conscience involves five virtues,—intelligence, prudence, purpose, justice, and good-will. Now it is almost inevitable that when two people hasten into marriage mainly upon the basis of an emotional attraction and without the exercise of these virtues the result will be a failure. On the other hand an intelligent consideration of the fundamental nature of the home as a social institution will prevent many an unhappy alliance which would otherwise come up for dissolution in the divorce court. This intelligent consideration would involve a view of the probable remote consequences and conditions as well as of immediate desire. The whole question as to the compatibility of tastes, ambitions, purposes, and ideals would be rationally considered. For example, to take a question from the economic aspect of the home, the point may well be considered whether the man is financially able to assume the added burden of a home, or whether the woman has tastes regarding dress, home decoration, and social relations which are incommensurate with the income, and whether either one or both are willing to sacrifice those personal habits, desires, and tastes which, if persisted in, would prove stumbling blocks in the way of a harmonious and happy home life. This is only one of

a countless number of concrete questions regarding the foundation of a home which ought to be met frankly and considered intelligently by both parties.

It will not be necessary to consider in detail how the other virtues of the socialized conscience would function if they were operative. It is at once obvious, however, that intelligent consideration of these questions would naturally and normally lead to a functioning of the other virtues of prudence, purpose, justice, and good-will.

Lack of consideration.—When one tries to inquire into the reasons why marriage is thus lightly regarded and hastily entered upon much difficulty is encountered. The fact is that the whole attitude of society to the question of marriage is characterized by levity and a lack of proper seriousness. This is manifest in a variety of ways. For example, domestic infelicities serve as one of the standard subjects of the joke-smith in the funny column and in the Sunday supplement of the daily press. The subject has likewise been one of the most fruitful ones dealt with in a certain type of popular song, on the vaudeville stage, and in the moving picture show. The result is that it has become the custom to talk and think of marriage in a light and superficial way.

It is inevitable that as children witness unpleasant scenes in the family, or pore over the doubtful wit of the funny paper and hear the disparaging jests of their elders concerning marriage, they should come to have a distorted and perverted view regard-

ing this most important phase of life. Further, when these same children come in their turn to maturity, it is equally inevitable that they are those who will be led by the first flame of passion into a hasty and unconsidered marriage. And with their children the disastrous course is likely to be repeated. Thus through unconscious suggestion and imitation every one, and especially the children, slips gradually into an unwholesome attitude regarding this subject unless some definite influence both of example and training is exerted to stem the tide of popular tendency.

The undesirable attitude of society has been further aggravated by the laxity regarding divorce. Divorce is thus seen to be both a cause and an effect of a complicated social evil. The ease with which a divorce can usually be obtained encourages those who most need to consider seriously the question of marriage in making a trial of it with the idea that, if it does not prove to be satisfactory, it can be dissolved. The attitude of a large portion of society is expressed by the statement of the girl who after a few weeks of unhappy married life remarked to a friend: "O yes, George has left me and papa is going to get me a divorce." In actual practice the marriage vow has come to be merely a license to make a trial of the marriage relation which, if not satisfactory, may be nullified by divorce; and the latter is regarded as a commodity which can be purchased by putting up the necessary price and going

through a certain formula. The result of this tacit understanding on the part of a large portion of society is further to increase the laxity with which the more superficial and thoughtless regard marriage and the home. It further obscures the sense of the fundamental and abiding nature of the home as a social institution. It makes it more difficult and at the same time seemingly less necessary to give the subject the intellectual and prudential consideration which in justice to those immediately concerned and to society it should have. The notoriety which the numerous divorce proceedings of the idle rich are given in the daily press is particularly baleful in its influence upon society. Ours is a tendency to evaluate life in terms of money, and the man or woman of wealth is therefore the object of an abnormal and hypnotic attention on the part of society at large. Consequently the actions of these persons, no matter how despicable they may be, are unusually and abnormally strong in their suggestiveness and power as objects of imitation. This tendency then to enter the marriage relation without sufficient consideration is one of the forces which is tending to undermine the stability of the home, and is one of the causes of divorce which has become so prevalent.

III. SEX IMMORALITY.

The sex impulse.—A second great evil which is threatening the home is what is known as the social evil, or sex immorality. This evil and the organiza-

tion by which it is promoted are truly staggering in their proportions. Sex immorality grows out of the abuse of one of the most deep-seated and strongest instinctive tendencies of the race; and the hardier and more virile the race, the stronger the impulse. Biologically considered, a strong sex instinct is an absolute necessity for a strong and progressive race. Looked at from the point of view of the individual also, other things being equal, the more strongly sexed the individual is, the better the foundation for a strong personality. The strength of this impulse may be regarded as an index of the possible strength of character of the individual; of the possible manliness of the man and womanliness of the woman. Upon it depend in large measure the initiative and force of character which make achievement possible for man, and the grace and charm of personality which ought to be the birthright of every woman.

It is thus seen that the sex impulse is not in itself an evil thing. On the contrary, it is a force which under proper conditions is of incalculable worth; for from it may spring motives for achievement in the economic, social, and even religious realms, as well as in the biological and moral. The ethical problem in connection with this great and compelling force is so to direct it that it shall be a source of good both to the individual and to society. The very intensity of the passion and of the sensuous pleasure in its gratification makes its illegitimate satisfaction

one of the supreme human temptations. Hence the problem of directing its force into right and proper channels is one of the greatest and most difficult with which the civilized race has to deal. Furthermore, just because of its strength there is perhaps no human capacity or tendency whose abuse will so rapidly and completely destroy the personality of man as the one under consideration. In like manner, and through the breaking down of personality, it equally rapidly and completely destroys the home of its victim.

The sex impulse commercialized.—In the further consideration of the problem it may be well first to state the facts regarding the status of this evil of sex immorality in society; second, some of its causes; and finally to suggest the remedy for the condition in so far as it rests upon ethical principles. We can only touch the surface with regard to the facts of the situation. One of the saddest features of the whole affair is the extent to which men's passions and woman's virtue have been commercialized. The unholy greed for gain knows absolutely no respect for the persons or souls of the victims who may be the means to its ends. The uncounted army of women and girls who endure a living death is awful testimony to this fact. It is said that in the city of Chicago with a population of two million inhabitants there are as many as five thousand professional prostitutes.⁸ Of these a great many are "white

⁸*The Social Evil in Chicago, 1911.*

slaves," being held in bodily and spiritual servitude against their will. Consider the awful significance of these figures. It means that approximately one in every one hundred women in that city is a professional prostitute; and this takes no account of the uncounted number of shop and factory girls who occasionally yield to the temptation to sell their virtue in exchange for the "good times" and the little extras in the way of dress which their meager earnings will not permit them to have otherwise. It means also that there exists the approximate proportion of one woman of ill-fame to each one hundred men; and this again fails to take account of the unknown number of men who are not willing to be known as patrons of houses of ill-fame, but who do not hesitate to buy with favor or money the virtue of the girl to whom virtue no longer appeals as being such a priceless possession in the face of possible starvation. It means, again, that the sanctity of a possible one in every fifty homes has been sacrificed, and that through unfaithfulness this number of homes will either be wrecked or never established; and this again leaves out of account those homes that are invaded by this evil through the other means referred to above.

If the facts could be known, it would probably be found that there are as many more who have illicit sex relations as are numbered in the professional prostitute class. An industrial system that makes it necessary to pay wages which in some instances will

scarcely buy the bare necessities of life, is one of the things which is responsible for so many selling themselves into temporary or permanent prostitution. In these days of high cost of living, the working girl, whether in shop, factory, or department store, whose wage is five, six, or even seven dollars a week, cannot possibly maintain herself in health and comfort, to say nothing of having the extras in the way of clothing and amusement which are all but necessities to the normal and healthy girl, upon the wage received. In many instances she must also contribute to the support of the family. Under circumstances such as these the wonder is that there are so many who remain true to their ideals of virtue and purity.

The "double standard."—There is another phase of this question which is closely related to the one we have just been considering, and this is the greater or less credence given by society to the proposition that young men must "sow their wild oats." It is tacitly assumed by many that it is a normal and—unhappily—a necessary stage in the development of a young man for him to gratify the new passions that adolescence brings, and that after he has had his fling and gained his knowledge of the world and its ways, there is then time enough in which he may settle down and assume the responsibilities of life. Accordingly, it has been all too common in the past to hold one standard of morality for men and another for women. Society accepts and condones conduct

in a young man which would make of his sister an outcast and a disgrace, and which would condemn her to a social ostracism from which no amount of piety could afterward release her. There is no more inherent reason why a young man should thus conduct himself and escape a just social punishment than there is why a young woman may not. Happily, this old idea of the double standard is passing away. Speed the day when the one universal law regarding sex morality shall be recognized as equally binding upon all members of society alike!

Disease.—There is one more point which must at least be mentioned in this connection. If the fruits of men's sins were visited upon the guilty alone, the injustice of the situation would not be so overwhelming. But such is not the case. The physical, mental, and spiritual suffering heaped upon the innocent through the loathsome diseases which are often the result of sexual immorality is one of the most awful consequences of the whole social evil. A contagious disease is contracted in the days of his sin by a man and is later transmitted to wife and children, who are thereafter doomed to live a life of suspicion and shame as the unjust consequences of his folly. No punishment could be invented which would be too severe for this kind of sin.

Social taboo.—We have just passed in review a few of the gruesome facts pertaining to the sex immorality of our times. Let us now inquire into the causes of these conditions, in so far as they are re-

lated to the moral life. The statement of the causes will in itself suggest the remedy in so far as the principles underlying the latter are concerned. We may therefore consider the two things—causes and remedies—together.

In the first place it is one of the greatest misfortunes which has ever befallen the human race that this, one of the most fundamental and most significant of human relationships, is a subject which may not be spoken of or talked about. The fact that ignorance about sex matters has been counted as innocence and prudery as virtue is responsible for more sexual vice than all other causes combined. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. Social taboo of this subject has driven and will continue to drive the boys and girls of every generation to the vilest and most unwholesome sources of information regarding this phase of life. The very fact of the fundamental nature of the sex impulse and its strength makes it a topic of unending curiosity; and if this curiosity, which is natural and normal, is not satisfied in a frank, straightforward, and scientific manner, it will get satisfaction from illegitimate sources and in illegitimate ways. And if driven to the latter method it is inevitable that the boy or girl will acquire perverted and vicious notions and perhaps practices that will have to be covered up by secretiveness and false modesty, which is worse than degrading.

Sex education.—Proper education and training of children regarding the matters of sex offers one of the very best and most workable methods of enlightening the consciences of the next generation. Obviously this education should be begun in the home, after which it may be more systematically and scientifically carried on in the school. But it is in the home that the child's first questions about the mysteries of his own existence and of sex are asked. And they should be met with frankness and honesty, and the proper and true explanation of these facts should be given in so far as the child is able to understand. But how almost universal it is that the child is given to understand from the very first that this subject is tabooed; that it is one about which he may not ask questions. Or if this is not the case, how common it is to meet the question with some fairy-story-like explanation which satisfies for the time being only. The result of the failure on the part of the parents to face this problem frankly and fearlessly is that the child grows distrustful of them while at the same time his curiosity is unnaturally stimulated so that he seeks and finds the information from other sources which are anything but wholesome.

Origin of double standard.—It is only necessary to mention some of the other factors which are responsible for conditions as they exist. Indeed some of these have already been mentioned. Reference has been made to the double standard, which is rap-

idly passing away. As to its origin, it is probably to be considered as a survival of the time when the wife and children were regarded as the property of the husband and father. Under such conditions, if an assault were made upon the wife or daughter, the man would regard it as attack upon and an injury to his property, and would accordingly resent the assault as a direct personal insult. Furthermore, under these conditions in which marriage was considered partly, at least, as a matter of barter and trade, chastity in a woman had a direct market value. Hence all of the customs and traditions of society would operate to hedge woman about with an iron law regarding sex relations; and in this she acquiesced. On the other hand, man as master and owner was bound by no such law. He *was* the law and his conduct therefore did not come under its dominion; he was at liberty to follow the dictates of his desires and passions.

It is also argued that "There are essential natural reasons why chastity should be more demanded in woman than in man. She is in greater peril; she carries the family line, and her virtue is especially significant where property is to be inherited."⁴ The exigencies of war, of the hunt, and of the hazardous occupation constantly deplete the male population of a tribe or nation, and make polygamous practices a biological necessity. Under these conditions and in the light of the fact that infant mortality is high,

⁴Smith: *Social Pathology*, p. 273.

race survival demands that there shall be a larger proportion of children than could be produced under strict monogamous conditions.

Against this view may be urged the fact that it is the business of civilization to eliminate just the conditions which may perhaps make polygamous practices necessary, or at least give excuse for them in primitive society. Civilization is working towards the extermination of war, of hazardous working conditions, and of all factors which are destructive to life and limb, so that the force of the biological argument is broken, when the attempt is made to apply it to life under conditions of civilization.

Again, from the psychological standpoint, it is doubtless a fact that sex feelings and impulses are stronger in man than in woman; and nature, having adjusted matters in this way, may herself seem to justify greater sex freedom in the former than in the later. But we have seen that the moral life consists in the proper control and organization of impulsive and instinctive tendencies and desires, through the agency of reason. But if man is the possessor of a superior reason—as he sometimes boasts—the argument that his stronger sex impulses should give him greater license does not carry conviction. The truth is that, looked at critically, the doctrine of the double standard has no rational ground under present conditions.

Economic condition of women.—It is only recently that the force of this tradition and custom has begun

to be broken. It is only since woman is no longer bound by custom and necessity to marry at any cost that there is any leverage with which to overthrow the doctrine of the double standard. This change has been brought about largely through woman's increased economic independence, of which mention has already been made. She is now in a position to dictate terms; and it lies within her power to demand that the man who seeks her hand in marriage shall accept and practice the same standard regarding sex morality that rules her own life. This is not only her privilege, but it is her duty. And she must educate her sons and daughters to accept the validity of the single standard; she must teach them both that there is but one moral law regarding this matter and that it is equally binding upon both sexes.

While the economic condition of woman as a class is much better than it was formerly, there is yet much to be desired. Reference has already been made to the fact that the pressure of economic conditions has driven many women unwillingly into a life of shame. And as long as society permits an industrial arrangement in which the minimum wage paid to women workers is insufficient to buy the necessities of life plus enough to insure proper clothing and amusements, the shame of those who fall is upon each and every member of society. The condition is one which can be remedied only as the whole of society coöperates; separate individuals, no matter how efficient and how wide their influence, can do very little. It

behooves the intelligent members of society therefore to consider the question and to do each his share in arousing a thoroughgoing public sentiment against conditions which make it all but impossible for many working girls to earn an honest livelihood without selling their virtue.

The "white slave traffic."—Two other factors should be mentioned as being contributory to this evil, namely, the organized traffic in woman's virtue, and the saloon. Just as a superior organization in any other business creates a greater demand for a commodity, which in turn makes it possible to supply the increased demand with ease and facility, just so does organization in the matter of the social evil work. There is a question as to how far organization along this line has gone, since it is a matter concerning which it is difficult and even impossible to get accurate information. But there can be no doubt that prostitution is a commercialized business. In Chicago the annual profit from the traffic in the 5,000 professional prostitutes is estimated by the Vice Commission at fifteen million dollars. It is also certain beyond doubt that there is more or less thorough organization in the matter of procuring victims for houses of prostitution. It is a further fact that no girl or woman is entirely safe from the clutches of this nefarious organization anywhere in the land, and particularly in our larger cities. How it is possible that a man or woman can sink to the depths where he or she is willing to wrest a liveli-

hood from society through the sacrifice of the physical, mental, and spiritual life of innocent girls is more than a rational creature can understand. But such is the fact. And until society shall be able to exterminate this form of social disease, which means the utter moral degredation and the physical and mental death of unnumbered thousands of young men and women of our country, we must hide our faces in shame at the awful consequences of our boasted civilization.

The saloon.—The licensed saloon also has a large share in this evil. In the first place it is a well-known fact that the saloon is in league with the social evil. It is indeed the exception to find in certain cities a saloon which is not connected directly or indirectly with a house of ill-fame, and likewise which either directly or indirectly lends its aid to the white slave traffic. Indeed the promoters of these two festering social diseases mutually help each other in the task of taking the money and the lives of their common victims; and in all but exceptional cases they coöperate to corrupt city governments in order that the law may wink at their immoral and unsocial businesses. In the second place, the effect of alcohol upon a man is to fire his sensual passions, heighten his imagination, and dull his moral sense. And what his conduct will be under these conditions is too obvious to mention.

The presence of the legalized saloon signifies that the government is willing to license a few men to

fire the passions and dull the conscience and weaken the wills of other men, so that they go forth from the saloon as breakers of the law and as wreckers of woman's virtue. While these are largely matters of social import and problems which must be solved by society as a whole, we must remember that society is composed of individuals and that we are those individuals. Hence there rests upon each one the obligation imposed by the socialized conscience. It is only as the members of society are stirred into action by the promptings of conscience that these evils can be removed from the social tissue and social health be gained. The members of society must act in concert against these traffics.

The moral principle applied.—Whatever else they are, these are moral problems; and ethics as the science of morality must offer the first suggestion as to their solution. The one absolutely essential thing from this point of view is that every member of society shall have his conscience thoroughly aroused in regard to the matter. If this could be brought to pass, the beginning of the end of the condition would have come. But in order that this shall be brought about it is necessary first that the members of society shall be made intelligent upon the question. Socrates' proposition that knowledge is virtue may have been somewhat extreme in an unqualified form, but there is this much truth in it, that knowledge is the prerequisite of virtue; and that other things being equal, the possession of knowledge will lead to virtu-

ous action. So in this case, if the intelligent members of society could have a vivid and complete knowledge of the facts as they are, nothing could prevent them from rising up as an organized whole and eradicating these pathological conditions which have so great a bearing upon the character of our people. Great evils such as these can exist only under cover of the darkness of ignorance. And when once this darkness is dispelled and the members of society are intelligent upon the question, the other virtues of the socialized conscience will at once become operative. Without intelligence as a foundation there is no basis for prudence, purpose, justice, and good-will. The first and absolutely essential thing then is the enlightenment of the consciences of men; this is the basis of the whole solution, as far as ethics is concerned.

IV. FRICTION WITHIN THE HOME.

Temperamental differences.—There are also certain sources of friction within the home which, while not always entirely disrupting it and causing divorce, yet make it a place ill-adapted to the growth of personality; and by virtue of this fact they should be included in a list of the things which are working for the overthrow of the home, at least in its more perfect type. Among these things may be mentioned the following: differences in temperament between husband and wife, differences in occupation, differences in attitude towards the home, the fact that the wife has no purse of her own, and lack of sympathy be-

tween parent and child.⁶ While there are characteristics in each sex which are attractive to the other, there are also differences in temperament and point of view which in the contact of daily life may prove to be sources of friction and tension. This is particularly true when external conditions are such as to tend to make husband or wife nervous and irritable; under conditions of this kind the home life is likely to be marred by discord and inharmony, unless special effort is made on the part of each to exercise patience, forbearance, and sympathy. These temperamental differences are likely to be further emphasized by the difference of occupation of the two. The man's interest is entirely centered in his business or trade, while the home is the center of interest for the wife; and this permanent divergence of interest may easily become a source of misunderstanding. Each gets the idea that the other does not sympathize with him or appreciate his problems, and as a result hasty words are spoken which in turn tend to widen the breach already formed.

In order that the home may not be thus disorganized it is necessary that each member of it shall have a clear conception of what the home is: an organization with common ends and purposes for whose realization there must be a division of labor and a spirit of coöperation, mutual helpfulness, and sympathy on the part of all. These are the characteristics which

⁶This paragraph follows the suggestions of Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 584, ff.

the socialized conscience would demand in each: an intelligent conception of the common ends and purposes, prudent conduct and bearing towards each other, absolute justice, and a will devoted to the best interests of the home as an institution and to each member thereof. Such are the types of character and conduct that the moral law demands of every member of every home.

Indifference.—In like manner the peculiar attitude of indifference which is sometimes taken by the husband and father toward the home is a source of unhappiness and misunderstanding to the wife. The home seems to be regarded by him as merely a place in which to eat and sleep and as a place of diversion. His real interest in life is outside in the business or industrial world; he thinks of home merely as a place of retreat to which he may come when the day's work is done. On the other hand, to the woman who has chosen home-making as her life work, the whole world centers in the four walls of her home. As a result of this situation each comes to feel that the other has lost his interest in and love for the other; so a further separation and alienation takes the place of a hearty coöperation and sympathetic insight. The only remedy for the situation is that suggested in connection with the other disturbing factors already mentioned. The virtues of the socialized conscience are the only solvents for the difficulties arising from these sources.

Economic dependence of wife.—Again, the fact that the wife frequently does not have a purse of her own is a common source of domestic unpleasantness. The husband's argument is that it is he who earns the money, and it is therefore his to control. Accordingly, he doles it out here and there as it is needed, being distrustful of his wife's ability to manage. On the other hand the wife is obliged to "ask" her husband for every penny which she desires to spend, no matter how legitimate the need may be. The patience of a self-respecting woman is soon worn threadbare at thus being constantly reminded that she is a beneficiary. Now the remedy for this situation is again to be found in a proper conception of the nature of the home. The home is an organization for a system of ends and purposes—as has been so often suggested; and whatever income there is, from whatever source, should be regarded not as the personal possession of the one who receives it, but as belonging to the home as an organization. The fact that the labor of the wife is as productive in its way as is the labor of the husband must be kept in mind while attempting to solve these difficulties. In view of the fact that so large a portion of the income of every family is paid out for the necessities and the comforts of the home over which the wife presides, it is but fair and just that she should have a large share in the disbursements. It is her duty therefore to make a study of domestic economy, and to use in the most

intelligent way the money at her disposal. When the wife has the capacity and the disposition thus to deal with the situation—and if she has not the capacity, it is probably due to the fact that she has never been given the opportunity to acquire it—she ought to have the hearty coöperation of the husband. We are thus thrown back upon the virtues of the socialized conscience, the repetition of which is unnecessary at this point, for the satisfactory and permanent solution of this phase of the problem.

Lack of sympathy between parent and child.—It is unnecessary to speak at length of the difficulties which follow from a misunderstanding between parents and children. It is obvious, however, that under conditions of this kind the home fails to exert the force it should in the making of character and personality in the children. In order that there shall be proper influence over the latter it is necessary that the parent take an intelligent and sympathetic interest in those things which interest the child; it is necessary that he re-live his own life in the life of the child. It is impossible that the child should take the point of view of the adult; hence if parent and child are to get together at all in the solution of those problems which, while meaning little to the former, are the most vital things of life to the latter, it must be accomplished as the result of the conscious effort on the part of the parent to see life and its problems through the eyes of the child. The parent who is inconsiderate, arbitrary,

and unsympathetic in his dealings with the child cannot expect that respect, obedience, and confidence from the latter which are the special virtues of childhood.

V. APPLICATION OF CRITERION.

The subjective side.—We have seen in a previous chapter that the moral standard has two phases: the objective and subjective, or custom and conscience. Both phases of this standard must be operative before these problems pertaining to the home are finally settled. The only permanent way in which moral law can be enforced and custom made to conform thereto is by the enlightenment of the consciences of the members of society. This involves an intelligent conception of the home and of the ends and purposes which it as an institution serves. It means also that an intelligent perception of all the problems centering in the home, the most important of which we have been considering, must be had. It means the proper training of the intellects, feelings, and wills of the children in the home and school, with respect to the home and the problems centering therein. It means the exercise of prudence, purpose, justice, and good-will on the part of every member of society with respect to the home and its problems. And when the consciences of the members of society have been thus enlightened and socialized, their opinions and attitude toward the home will become crystallized in the form of law

and custom, which will further control the conduct of those few who continue to be refractory in attitude and action.

Eugenics.—The propagandum of eugenics has done much recently to focus public attention upon many of the problems of marriage. When a way is devised whereby the fundamental principles of this gospel can be applied in the mating process without interfering with the intellectual and emotional elements which must of necessity be present in the highest type of marriage, a long step will have been taken towards the elimination of many of these most perplexing difficulties. And even if the doctrine is never given a legal status, the educative value to which its advocacy gives rise will itself lift the general level of intelligence concerning this phase of life to a much higher plane.

What we have thus far said pertaining to the remedy of the conditions under consideration is on the side of the enlightenment of the consciences of the members of society—the subjective side of the moral standard. A word should now be said with regard to the objective side. It is not the purpose to go into this with any degree of detail, for this is as much a question of the larger subject of sociology as it is of ethics.

The objective side—legislation.—With regard to the objective side of the moral standard, the time is ripe for those members of society who are most intelligent upon these problems and who have in them-

selves reached the higher levels of personality, to inaugurate an active campaign for the better social control of these evils through the agency of law. It is time for those who are most socially minded and who see the problems most clearly to demand legislation with regard to the abuses we have been considering, which would formally express the feeling with regard to the situation which the intelligent majority has already acquired. It is time that the unformed opinions of the many who are passively interested in the welfare of the home should be formulated as law by those who are more actively and energetically interested in social welfare.

As to just what the program of legislation should be there may be much difference of opinion. But some of the things which are most sorely needed would seem to be better means of controlling the issuing of marriage licenses by a more stringent enforcement of existing laws and the supplementing of these where necessary with regard to the health and habits of the applicants; an interval between the application for and the issuing of the license; uniform marriage and divorce laws among the states; certain restrictive measures regarding the re-marriage of divorced persons, and the like.

With regard to the specific problem of sex immorality, the following suggestions seem rational: Society should adopt some means of preventing those from marrying who because of sexual disease or degeneracy would be incapable of producing chil-

dren who would have a fair chance in life. Just as society in certain states now segregates the mentally diseased and abnormal, and prevents them from marrying and having children, so also ought it to treat those who, through disease and dissipation of their sexual powers, have forfeited their right to become parents, and who for the same reason could not properly care for and train their children. Children of such parentage are generally physically or mentally defective, or they are criminally inclined, or vicious; and in any case they are most likely to become a burden upon society, to say nothing of the positively bad social influence they have. Hence from the mere utilitarian point of view, leaving out of account the moral side of the question, preventive measures should be adopted, rather than to continue the policy of trying to deal with the situation after it has been created. The latter method can never be more than partially successful at best. The question as to how the marriage of this class should be prevented will have to be turned over to the sociologist and the political scientist for solution. The point here made is that it is bad moral policy and incompatible with the socialized conscience that conditions should remain as they are.

These may not be all the measures that should be adopted by society, but they are at least suggestive of the kind of legislation that is sorely needed at the present time if society is to cope successfully with the growing problems pertaining to the home. And

it is the moral duty of every intelligent person to throw his influence on the side of righteousness in an active and militant way. Any one who fails to do this is failing in his moral obligation in these days of social complexity when every man is more than ever his brother's keeper.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. What is the meaning of the term 'social pathology'?
2. Is there any essential relation between the elimination of these pathological conditions and morality?
3. Is there any argument against the statement that divorce is to be regarded rather as a symptom of social disease than as a disease itself?
4. Is the presence of divorce in society to be regarded as a sign of social degeneracy?
5. What are the commonly reported causes of divorce?
6. Name some of the specific factors that enter into the divorce problem.
7. What is the effect of the differences between the marriage and divorce laws of the different states?
8. Is the legal profession in any way responsible for the present status of divorce?
9. What legislation other than that suggested in the text would you suggest in relation to divorce?
10. What is the bearing of the moving picture show upon marriage? Upon sex immorality?
11. Is there any relation between the popular amusements of the day and laxness in sex morality?
12. What should be the nature of sex instruction in the home?
13. "Marriage is for a social end as well as or even more than an individual one." Is this true? If so, make it explicit with illustrations.

14. What is your opinion of the biological and psychological arguments in behalf of the 'double standard', referred to on pages 93 and 94?

15. What is the doctrine of eugenics? What is your opinion of it?

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CHAPTER V.

THE CRITERION APPLIED: THE SCHOOL AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AGENCIES.

A. The School.

I. THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF THE SCHOOL.

Educational and moral ideals.—Whether it is specifically emphasized or not, the educational ideal and the moral ideal must be one and the same, at basis. For example, “social efficiency”¹ is the educational ideal adopted by many at the present time. By this is meant the ability to pull one’s own weight in the struggle for life, not to be a drag upon society, but rather a force for good. A little reflection will make it clear that social efficiency involves morality as a part of itself. For example, stealing is a moral wrong—even though it be done in the refined modern way of using a false bottom in the measure. The man who does this is socially *inefficient*; he is by this means getting profits for himself at the expense of others, and is therefore a “drag” upon society. The man who “bears false witness” by the refined method of publishing a dishonest or misleading advertisement is as socially inefficient as he is immoral. In like manner, the breaking of any of the rules of

¹Bagley: *The Educative Process*, Ch. III.

the decalog means social inefficiency. Hence, social efficiency involves morality.

While there has always been substantial agreement between the educational and the moral ideals, there is far greater need today than ever before that the educational ideal shall be stated in moral terms. While the moral worth of human character is no greater now than it has ever been, the complexities of modern society put a far greater strain upon it now than was formerly the case; there is need that every individual shall be even more firmly grounded in the principles of morality, and that he be able to apply these principles to present conditions. For example, the age of the steam engine, the printing press, and electricity increases a thousand-fold a man's opportunity of killing, stealing, lying, and of breaking all the other fundamental moral laws. And if he succeeds in living a clean life in accordance with the doctrine of the socialized conscience, it is because his moral muscle has kept pace in its development with the increase in the opportunity for wrongdoing, rather than that the moral life is an easier life than it was under simpler conditions.

The increased obligation of the school.—There is a further reason why the school has an added obligation along this line. With the introduction of the machinery which has caused the increase in the complexity of life have come the modern factory and the corresponding industrial and commercial organization. With the coming of these the father, and many

times the mother, of the family have gone forth from the home into the factory, shop, or store and have given a constantly increasing amount of time to labor under these conditions. The result is that the children are deprived of the companionship and teaching of parents, which made the old-fashioned home such a force for good in the lives of men. Thus while the conditions which make the moral life a more difficult achievement have increased, the home influence which formerly gave the needed moral training has largely decreased. And the doubly increased burden of moral education must be assumed by the school, or the moral fiber of the nation is in danger of becoming fatally weakened.

These conditions have already so largely influenced the home life of the people that in many cases the home is actually incapable of exerting the proper influence upon its children. Even if such home influences are not positively degenerative in character they are at best only negatively good. There is the constant tendency to make the home merely one's headquarters, and to seek companionship and amusement outside of it; and this tendency is becoming apparent in the children more and more. Likewise the church to a certain extent has lost its grip upon the members of society—the children included—so that on the average the child's moral training is limited almost entirely to that which he gets in the school.

In our own educational history as a nation, there

has been an unending variety of educational fads and fancies; one school ideal after another has held the center of the stage until no one has felt sure of his ground. Educators themselves, to say nothing of the laymen, have labored under the disadvantage of a confused educational theory; and it is needless to say that their practice has shown a corresponding amount of confusion. The only way by which to reduce the confusion and disorder to order and system is to measure each and every theory and bit of practice by the moral standard, and to reject everything that has relatively little value in terms of this. That which remains will easily arrange itself into an harmonious system. The only possible educational end which is both unified and sufficiently comprehensive is a *moral* end. The school should consciously set itself the task of producing "personalities" with socialized consciences, and at the same time, persons who are "efficient," dynamic factors in the world.

This is not the place to discuss further the policy of the school as the institution of education. But it is a fact that the school is better prepared than many homes to give the moral training which is evidently so much needed. Even in cases where the school is not actually better prepared to give moral training than the home, it should supplement the training of the latter by its own more systematic devices. Hence if the school is to fulfill its mission in society and provide that knowledge and training which is of most worth, it must adopt as its own the moral ideal under

which as a standard its means may be systematized and unified.

II. EFFICIENCY AND MORALITY.

The school a socializing agent.—Just how the educational processes are to be organized to this end is a problem in method which the school must work out for itself; and it may not properly be discussed in detail here. But there are a few fundamental principles which bear upon the morals of the situation and these may be briefly mentioned. In the first place, we have been holding up the socialized conscience as the moral ideal. Now the school is the institution whose prime function it is to socialize the members of each new generation. To become socialized involves two things: first, that the individual come into essential harmony with the institutions of society; second, that he do this by making the social inheritance his own. The factors through which this is brought about are first, the curriculum, which represents, or ought to represent, the essentials of the inheritance referred to; second, the give-and-take of the social life of both the class-room and the play-ground.

Based as our civilization is so largely upon the economic relation, it is probable that the best channel through which to accomplish this socialization is the vocation. Since the vocation as an institution is so absolutely fundamental to all the other institutions, probably the best hold can be gained upon the

members of society through this relation. It is for this reason that vocational education is so strongly urged, and with much justification. This would demand that the curriculum be reorganized with particular reference to the vocation; and that the school-room be a work-shop in which coöperation would be a virtue instead of a vice.

Economic Efficiency.—In the second place, we may consider the fact that society demands efficiency in the product of the school, and justly so. If the school has any right to exist, this right must be defined in terms of its ability to develop in those who come under its influence greater efficiency, and a superior mental equipment and social attitude with which to face the issues of life. There are grave doubts whether the school curriculum as now organized is doing all it ought to do thus to fit for life. The school is necessarily one of the conservative forces of society. But it must at the same time remain in touch with the spirit of the times and keep abreast of the practical progress of civilization; otherwise it will cease to have the influence over the lives of men that it ought to have.

It is an unfortunate fact that the school has in a measure failed in this very respect. The curriculum as it now stands still bears the marks of the time when education was for the few and when life was comparatively simple, lacking the vocational organization with which we are so familiar. While our educational ideals in this country profess to be dem-

ocratic; while we make attendance upon school compulsory in many states; yet the curriculum itself is sadly lacking in social character and in socializing force. In the child's actual school work, he has very little opportunity to learn the meaning of coöperation in the various phases of life, social, economic, and political. Above everything else this is the characteristic that is needed in modern life. In order to accomplish this the curriculum must be socialized. It needs to be put upon an entirely different basis, so that the great mass of children, whose school life must be limited to seven or eight years or less, may receive at least the elements of an education which will enable them to take their places as efficient members of a society in which the key-note is inter-dependence and coöperation.

Moral value of efficiency.—Now the moral significance of this is that so long as the school fails to supply that which society demands, the majority of the children will continue to drop out upon the completion of the grades or before. This means that those who most need the moral training will continue to be the very ones who do not receive it. It means also that so long as the school is thought of as a thing apart, having no direct connection with life, as is largely the case at present, the training received there will be abstract and artificial; it means that whatever moral training is received is not available for actual situations as they arise in daily life. True social efficiency can be gained in the school only as

the latter presents for solution problems such as arise in the larger social, industrial, political, and religious life outside. And since social efficiency involves morality, moral fiber can be developed only as actual situations of these types arise within the school.

III. CONSUMPTION AND MORALITY.

Personality depends upon consumption.—But there is another phase of the question which receives less emphasis than it deserves. We have been arguing for social efficiency in the product of the school; this is right and proper and deserves all the emphasis it gets. But when we speak of efficiency we usually have reference to economic efficiency: the ability to produce. This is absolutely essential as a basis for the development of personality, as we shall attempt to show in detail in the next chapter. But the point here to be noted is that every producer is at the same time a consumer. And the school has just as much obligation in the matter of training for consumption as it has in the matter of training for production. The question is, What kind of newspapers, magazines, books, amusements, clothing, house furnishings, light, water, and street-car service do we demand and consume? Are the members of society content with sensational newspapers, cheap fiction, questionable amusements, gaudy and freakish clothing and home decorations, and the like, when other kinds are obtainable? Obviously

the school ought to inculcate at some point suitable and rational ideals and standards in terms of which to evaluate these things. This phase of life shows the value of the so-called liberal education as opposed to the vocational. The fact is that the school ought to represent both in a vital way. The principle in terms of which we must test the relationship between this phase of education and morality is, the significance of these things for character making. On the one hand the kind of reading, amusements, fashions of clothing, and house decorations one prefers is at least an index of character; and on the other hand, it has a direct molding force upon character. It ought to be the business of the school to train those who come under its influence to prefer and choose those things which are of greatest intellectual and artistic value. In giving this kind of training the school will at least be laying the foundation for a sane and healthy personality.

IV. SPECIAL SCHOOL DUTIES.

Habits and ideals.—Besides these obligations of a general sort, the school must also assume the more specific duty of the moralization of its products. Moral education in the narrower sense, however, must be approached indirectly. All authorities insist that the didactic method is of little or no avail in this phase of development. Moral character is rather to be regarded as the by-product of the whole educational process. From the developmental point

of view, right habits and high ideals are the essential factors in morality. It is easy to mention long lists of desirable and necessary habits and ideals; for example: cleanliness, order, self-control, accuracy, perseverance, patience, obedience, honesty, honor, kindness, justice, loyalty, courage, patriotism, love of the beautiful, etc., may all be regarded as being both habits and ideals, and they are all basic to morality. But the difficulty is to secure their establishment as habits, on the one hand, and their adoption as ideals, on the other. The law of habit building is "focalization, plus drill in attention;" and while the indirect method of story telling is invaluable by way of getting the initial focalization, the point of specific difficulty is in eliciting a sufficient number of repetitions to insure permanence. This is the point at which the great moral value of the socialized curriculum would become apparent. Moral character and habits cannot develop unless actual moral situations are repeatedly met and reacted upon properly; and as long as the school curriculum remains so highly artificial, actual moral situations such as arise in the big world outside, cannot be adequately presented to the pupil. On the other hand, if the curriculum were more highly vocationalized and the school-room were more like the shop, the office, or the store, the moral situations that ordinarily arise in the larger world would naturally be duplicated in the school-room. This would supply the data of morality, and give the teacher

something definite upon which to work. Until this readjustment can be made the moral training of the schools, in so far as it depends upon habit, at least, will doubtless continue to be fragmentary and inadequate. There is still the possibility, however, of inculcating right ideals, particularly during the period of adolescence—an opportunity which should by all means be utilized to the fullest extent. The ideals and policies which are gained during this period are most likely to persist throughout life as the common standards of evaluation; furthermore, this is the stage at which the social instinct is coming to its full development, and it is therefore the time when the social point of view should be acquired as a habit; it is the period above all others when conscience should become socialized, and when its special virtues should become ingrained in the character which is just being crystalized.

One other matter deserves specific mention in connection with the subject of moralization: namely, the question of proper sex instruction. Ideally, the proper place to handle this subject is in the home; but inasmuch as the children who need this instruction most as a rule receive the least attention in this regard, the school must assume this added obligation. While suitable courses of instruction have not yet been worked out, many thoughtful educators are giving the question their best effort. And we may believe that if they can secure the hearty coöpera-

tion of all the members of the teaching profession the need will soon be filled.

V. PERSONAL OBLIGATION.

Co-operation.—We have spoken thus far of the duty of the school to the individual and to society. We should now consider briefly the duty of the individual to the school. The school has been referred to as one of the agencies by which society brings the benefits of the spiritual environment to the individual and thus makes personality possible for him. It was also shown that each person owes in return for these benefits a debt of obligation to society through the same channel. Now how may a person discharge this debt? The answer is again to be found in terms of the socialized conscience. It is the moral as well as the social duty of every one to make himself intelligent upon the aims and problems of the school. He must take a personal interest in the work of the school and by hearty coöperation help to make it what it should be. School authorities are always desirous of having the intelligent and sympathetic criticism of the layman. It is through this means that they come to know what society demands of the school; and if those members of society who are most socially minded and most solicitous for the common welfare would give school authorities the benefit of their criticisms and suggestions, the reorganization which is mentioned above could be much more speedily and satisfactorily made.

B. The Press.

I. THE PRESS AS EDUCATIONAL AGENT.

Publicity and progress.—The daily and periodical publications of the present day make the press one of the greatest of all educational institutions. While its avowed purpose is not to educate, as is the case with the school, but to print the news, yet the printing of the news constitutes one of the greatest of the educational processes, using the term ‘education’ in its broadest sense. The press bears somewhat the same relation to the adult that the school does to the child; it is the means of disseminating knowledge of current events to the former as the school curriculum is the means of bringing the best of human experience of the past to the latter. It would accordingly be difficult to overestimate the value of the press as an agency by which the people may be made intelligent upon topics of current interest, the knowledge of which is so essential to every one as a matter of practical education.

Ours is a democratic ideal of government, one in which all the people shall have a share. It attempts to be a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Now a true democracy is possible only when all the people are intelligent. If the government is to be ‘of’ and ‘by’ the people, the people must themselves be conversant with the conditions and problems of government. And there is no other means that possesses a tithe the power that

the press has in promoting public intelligence upon these problems. With its great news-gathering facilities, and with the aid of electricity in the communication of it, the press can give the world within the space of a few hours every detail of an important event. In the evolution of government, democracy must wait upon the printing press, because without a common knowledge democracy must give place to some unrepresentative form of government, even if not to tyranny.

The newspaper is also invaluable in the industrial world as well as in the political. It makes possible a common knowledge regarding the processes of manufacture and transportation. Through the press knowledge of inventions, methods, and materials is carried from place to place; and in it there is found that easy exchange of ideas which is so essential to our modern industrial civilization. Through it society is knit more closely together than could possibly be the case without it. The newspaper is the universal solvent of the information which is necessary for any concerted and intelligent action on the part of the members of society.

“Publicity—scientific investigation and public discussion—is indeed indispensable, and its greatest value is probably not in the exhilarating discharge of righteous indignation, but in the positive elevation of standards, by giving completer knowledge and showing the fruit of certain practices. A large proportion of the public will wish to do the right

thing if they can see it clearly, and can have public support, so that right action will not mean suicide.”²

We hear a great deal of ‘social psychology,’ and of the social effect which the members of society have upon each other: the power of imitation and suggestion, public opinion, and social control through discussion. But it is safe to say that the laws of social psychology were comparatively inoperative before the newspaper made its appearance with its wealth of information, and offering as it does a channel for the interchange of ideas. Thanks to the aid of the press, China is not as far distant today as the next county was before the existence of the daily newspaper.

II. THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESS.

Moral obligation.—Granting the truth of these facts, what is their ethical significance? In the first place, on the part of the press there is the obligation to adhere faithfully to the truth. The press must recognize its social obligation and must constantly hold in mind the fact that it is the molder of public opinion. This is no mean obligation; for, as was said a moment ago, the welfare of society depends in great degree upon its intelligence. Further, that which the paper carries as ‘news’ is as great a factor as, if not greater than, the policy which is maintained in the editorial columns. For example, no

²Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 520.

one would doubt the potency of Jingoism and "yellow journalism" to fire the passions of a nation and to plunge it into an irrational course of action.

Every great social institution of this kind must have a little of the missionary spirit in its work if it would accomplish for society all that it is capable of accomplishing. Naturally from the beginning the press has been mainly a commerical undertaking; those who are engaged in the business are in it largely for the financial gain. But let them not forget the social obligation involved. For while the acts of all the members of society have social as well as individual consequences, this is particularly true of the conduct and policy of the newspaper man. In the nature of the case the product of his labor must come before the scrutiny of society. Of course this must be of such a nature as to sell; but it must also be of such a nature as to make those whom it influences more socially efficient and more socially minded, if the writer is to realize the highest moral value in his work. To be socially efficient—and therefore moral—the newspaper man must not only make for himself a competency and thus pull his own weight in society, but he must be careful that in accomplishing this end he does not cause other members of society to stumble and fall.

Many newspapers, particularly those of the "yellow" or sensational variety, have sacrificed the truth to financial gain. Their maxim is: print what the public wants; and in following out this maxim, fact

gives place to fancy and truth is often distorted beyond all recognition. Now the first duty of the newspaper is to print the truth. If the public does not want the truth, the reason is at least in part that its mental appetite has become so jaded with the sensational that the plain unvarnished truth seems uninteresting. In this case the clear duty of the press is to go to work systematically to re-educate the public, to re-create a demand for facts and to develop in its readers a wholesome interest in things of real social import, in place of the morbid curiosity which has been fostered by the commercialized "yellow" press. One other point in this connection: the press must free itself absolutely from graft. It must not allow itself to be dictated to by the so-called "big interests." It must be absolutely fearless and withhold nothing from the public which the public ought to know. This is setting a high ideal and one which may seem to the newspaper man impracticable; but it is none the less the ideal towards which the press should be moving.

Lack of proportion.—There is another line of criticism to which the press is open, one that is perhaps even more glaring than its tendency towards misrepresentation: namely, a certain lack of proportion. By this is meant the practice of featuring unimportant and purely temporal items. Granted that it is not always easy to single out at the moment those events which are of real value, because time alone

can tell what are of lasting importance; yet the nations are making history every day, and it ought to be a part of the training of every newspaper man to be able to sense those things which are of permanent worth and to give them their proper emphasis. For example, on the first page in flaunting headlines will be featured the write-up of some crime or of the doings of some society leader in a freakish moment, while over on the third page with scarcely a headline, and in fine print, will be buried the report of a world's congress of peace or of science or of religion. The unconscious influence of this kind of thing is worse than if the latter report were omitted altogether, because it suggests that while the event has some news value, it is of very little significance compared with the other. This gives the superficial reader who is incapable of evaluating things for himself a totally wrong perspective and a distorted view of life. The materialistic tendency of a materialistic age is thus further developed.

Personal duty.—While these duties of printing the truth and of maintaining a proper perspective rest upon the press, the other members of society also have their share in the making of a proper press. Only as the members of society coöperate with the press can the ideal thus outlined be approximated. This they can do in two ways. First, they can assume their rightful share in helping the representatives of the press to secure the news. It is not un-

common for one to regard the inquiries of the reporter as mere impertinencies and to accord him scant respect. In the second place, each member of society should give his patronage to the paper which most nearly fulfills the conditions that morality imposes upon it. Not only can he give his sanction through his patronage, but he can make known his approval and his disapproval both directly and indirectly, and thus assist in the general transformation of the ideals and practices of the press. If the motive back of the press is the commercial desire to offer to the public something which is desired by it, then the public through its demand can determine what the nature of the supply shall be. Such, at least, is the law governing the manufacture and sale of other commodities.

With regard to the moral significance of the press the facts mentioned above lead to this conclusion: the press has a profound influence upon the making of personality. If personality consists in the rational ordering of life in terms of a set of policies, standards, and ideals, then its moral significance is indisputable. If the press is indeed the strong educational factor that it seems to be; if it is the great factor in the formation of public opinion which it claims to be; there can be no doubt about its potency as a means of crystallizing men's concepts of duty, justice, righteousness, honor, in short, of all the moral virtues and ideals of character and conduct.

C. The Stage.

I. THE STAGE A PERMANENT INSTITUTION.

Psychological basis of the drama.—The stage may be regarded as one of the permanent institutions of society; and while not one of the most fundamental ones, it at least exercises a profound influence upon the attitude and ideals of society. Notwithstanding the fact that the church and other agencies have from time to time exerted their utmost effort to do away with the stage, it has continued to grow and make a place for itself; it seems to answer a universal need in social life. No doubt there has been and still is considerable ground for the charge made by the church that the stage is the source of much of the evil that besets the members of society and that its influence is undesirable. But we had as well face the fact that the stage has made a permanent place for itself as one of our social institutions, and proceed to inquire into the moral significance of the fact. We may as well recognize that it is no longer profitable to protest against the stage itself; rather, on the contrary, it is our duty to study to see how the stage may be turned to cultural and moral account; to discover how it may be made a force for good instead of evil, as is so frequently the case now.

The reason why the stage is so firmly grounded in society is the fact that its appeal is made to the feeling side of life rather than to the intellectual. From the point of view of psychology, the feelings are

among the most deep-seated and primal of mental processes. There are those who argue that they are even more fundamental than either the cognitive or volitional functions. Be that as it may, it is a fact that the feelings represent life in one of its most fundamental aspects; and any stimulus which appeals to them is by that very fact an exceedingly strong one. Now the stage furnishes an adequate, if artificial, outlet for affective experience. Life in the normal round of duties becomes colorless, indifferent, and unaffectionate; and the stage provides a stimulus for the otherwise unexperienced feelings. Herein it answers a deep and compelling human need. We may rest assured then that whatever may be the proper method of dealing with the stage, it is not to attempt to abolish it.

Now it is this fact that the stage has its foundation in the affective side of consciousness that makes of it such a tremendous force for either good or evil in society. That which moves one affectively is most potent in forming one's ideas, ideals, and impulses; it prompts to acts and these in turn crystallize into character; to see portrayed on the stage an honorable or a patriotic act, one which arouses strong feeling in the spectator, will do more to establish in him the ideals of honor and patriotism than any amount of admonition or instruction. In the same manner ideas about graft or notions of crime may be instilled with equal ease and certainty.

Moral potentiality of the stage.—We know something of the possibilities of the stage at its best; and we do not need to be told what it is at its worst. Psychologists commonly classify the feelings into the sentiments and the emotions. Now the drama may be founded upon either group; and its moral value is largely determined by the group upon which it is founded. When based upon the former and made to portray a noble love, sympathy, altruism, sacrifice, honor, honesty, benevolence, patriotism, and the other finer phases of life, the stage may be of inestimable value in the formation of worthy ideals of character and conduct, and may be of great artistic and cultural value as well. But on the other hand, when the drama is founded upon the instinctive emotions of jealousy, cupidity, revenge, sensuality, and the like, it is a source of incalculable harm, while at the same time it has no cultural value and is of doubtful artistic value. It is an acknowledged fact that the cheap melodrama, and its companion the cheap novel, are the sources of a great amount of crime, particularly among the young. And if it is the source of so much crime, of how much more immorality which is not grave enough to be called crime may it be the source?

It would be interesting as well as instructive, at this point, to go into the question as to what dramatic art is. Is it the purpose of the drama to portray life as it is, or as it ought to be; to represent things as they actually are, or to present the ideal phase of

life? But it would be somewhat beside our purpose here to attempt to give a criticism of art; and besides, the writer could speak only as a layman, and without authority. But judged from the point of view of the moralist, it would seem that true art should be creative and not merely representative, especially in the realm of the art of human nature, the drama. It is a source of satisfaction to note that there is a growing sentiment in this direction. One of our great critics at the present time takes the point of view just mentioned and maintains that the drama, while furnishing recreation, ought at the same time to create and stimulate ideals.

II. MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAGE, INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL.

Attitude of manager.—What now is the moral significance of these facts; what is the relation of the stage to personality and character? What should be the attitude of the manager of the theater to the question, and what the attitude of society as a whole and of its individual members?

It has already been shown how the stage may mold character through ideas, emotion, suggestion, and imitation; how public sentiment and national ideals may be shaped. The truth is that the stage, like the newspaper, has been commercialized to such an extent that the question as to its moral significance is not taken into account by those who have it in charge. Its widespread social influence is lost sight

of in the attempt to produce something that will draw the crowds. "The fact is that the manager aims to produce, not the best play the public will take, but the play, whatever its quality, that seems most likely to win instant and wide publicity. . . What counts is not the quality of the play, but the fact that it succeeds." Now the manager who looks upon the stage merely as a business proposition in this way is failing to live up to the moral standard as we have outlined it; he shows himself to be lacking in a socialized conscience. The moral law is as binding upon the manager of the theater as it is upon any other member of society; and he must be made to see that the actions which he performs under the name of business have a great bearing both directly and indirectly upon the making of human character. He must feel it his duty to help educate public taste and demand along this line, so that it will willingly receive a higher and higher class of plays. The manager argues that his method of gaining a livelihood is a precarious one, and that he must necessarily produce what the people want or go out of business. But he must be made to see that the true and ultimate success of the stage depends upon making it morally good; that nothing which is founded upon wrong can long continue.

Society also responsible.—On the other hand, society is equally to blame for the undesirable influence of the stage. If, as the result of notions gained from the theater or moving picture show, the imagi-

nation and daring of some young man are stirred to the point where he goes out and commits theft or murder, each one shares the guilt of him whom society brands as the thief, and the blood of the murderer is upon the hand of every member of the community. What is needed is the intelligent coöperation on the part of the members of society. Some organized form of censorship beyond that which now exists is demanded. Let the church, for example, which has in the past been indifferent if not actively hostile to the stage, now perfect some organization within itself by which it may combat the evil influences of the stage. Let it perfect a federation of organizations similar to the Anti-Saloon League, and go to work systematically to clean up the stage; and the good results will not for a moment be in doubt. Such a course would react to the benefit of both the stage and the church, as social institutions, as well as to the good of the individual and society. Or let the energy which is sometimes wasted in certain woman's clubs be turned to good account in this direction, in passing judgment upon the plays which are billed for the local theater, and thus forcing managers to secure the best plays possible. In this connection it is interesting to note that a beginning is being made in this type of activity through the efforts of the National Drama League. As a result of this and similar enterprises it is not too much to expect that the objectionable features of the stage,

both locally and generally, will eventually be eradicated.

Now what should be the attitude of the individual toward the stage? The answer to this question must be found in terms of the moral principles already developed. One's conduct with reference to the stage must be governed by the dictates of the socialized conscience. Explicitly then, it is one's moral duty to make oneself intelligent upon the nature of a play to which it is proposed to go; and to lend one's patronage only to those which are best. Also one must exercise prudence as well as intelligence inasmuch as one's influence upon others must always be taken into account. Further, the frequency of attendance must be made a matter of consideration; the moral end would be thwarted by allowing oneself to become the slave of the theater habit.

The moving picture show.—The matter of the moving picture show and vaudeville needs especially to be thoroughly considered. These types of theater no doubt have their legitimate place in the social world. But because of their cheapness and the correspondingly large number who come under their influence they are especially strong in their effect upon the notions and ideals of society, particularly of the young. Amusement has a legitimate place in the moral life, and there are a great many harmless and innocent moving picture films and vaudeville acts which furnish wholesome amusement, when not indulged in to excess. But it is a difficult matter to

draw the line between the harmless and the harmful; it requires the intelligent and thoughtful consideration of those members of society who have the social welfare at heart, whether they are the paid representatives of the public or private individuals. This phase of the theatrical world needs even a closer supervision than the "legitimate" drama, just because of the cheapness and frequency of the performances, and because of the correspondingly large number of individuals who come under its influence.

D. Amusements.

I. AMUSEMENTS AND PERSONALITY.

Leisure and character.—A considerable fraction of the waking life of every one is spent—and rightly so—in some form of amusement or pleasure-seeking. The kinds of amusement which are available to the individual will determine in large measure what the activities of his leisure hours shall be and consequently the nature of his character. The fact that the disposition of one's leisure time so largely determines character needs special emphasis at this point. For the most part the vocational activities of a man are socially beneficial, and seldom morally wrong. So this kind of activity on the whole exercises a beneficent influence upon character. But during their leisure hours men are out from under the authority of the industrial institutions and their acts are spontaneous and impulsive. On the one hand they are

the direct outgrowth of the inner thoughts and feelings; on the other hand, they determine in large measure the habits and point of view of life.

The moral significance of this is at once seen. Not all amusements are of a social nature, but there have come into being in the last few years a great number of organized forms; there is the theater in all of its forms, the sports, the pleasure resorts, the dance-hall, the saloon and its adjuncts. All of these have vast amounts of capital and superior organization back of them. The business of these organizations is to amuse the people, and they go about it with little or no regard to the moral value of the wares they offer.

Moral criterion applied.—Granting that amusement is necessary to a full and complete moral life, the question arises, what kinds of amusements are legitimate and what are not. In answering the question we shall have to refer again to the moral principle already developed. In a word, the answer is that any amusement is of value morally which makes for greater length and breadth of life or which contributes some element of growth to personality and character. It is not the purpose here to take up the various kinds one by one and try to say which are legitimate and which are not, but rather to emphasize the general principle underlying the subject, with the hope that it may prove helpful to the individual in determining for himself what things are right and what wrong.

Personality as defined consists in the subjecting of impulse to reason, and in organizing action for the sake of remote ends. The field of amusement offers a great opportunity for the discretionary power of reason inasmuch as amusement is by nature chiefly impulsive in character. The moral difficulty in the situation is that the individual frequently does not desire to know whether there is anything wrong with his pleasure-seeking, and he accordingly refuses to face the situation squarely. There is only one name for this attitude, and that is—dishonesty. The moral law demands that the individual face the question of amusement squarely and honestly and intelligently, and that he make the results of an unprejudiced judgment the fixed policy of his life. Thus it will first become a matter of rational policy and finally of habit, that certain amusements may not be indulged in under any conditions, because on the whole they do not make for personality and character. The “personal liberty” argument has doubtless been pressed into service as frequently in support of some questionable amusement, when desire and impulse are on its side, as it has been by the liquor interests; and it is as great a fallacy in the one case as in the other.

On the other hand there will be found a sufficient number of amusements which provide a high degree of entertainment which are physically, mentally, and morally stimulating and valuable. These are the things in which one may legitimately indulge to a

temperate degree. It is becoming somewhat trite to say that the virtues of the socialized conscience must be operative in all situations which are moral. And yet this is exactly what is required in all cases, this being no exception.

Social control.—So much for the attitude of the individual to the question of amusement. But most of the amusements are of a social nature, and are promoted by social organizations. It follows therefore that if the social environment is to be of such a nature as to be helpful rather than a hindrance to the individual in his attempt to choose wisely and act prudently, society must act as a whole upon the matter of regulating those amusements which are social in character. Briefly, it may be pointed out that this is another situation in which the same kind of supervision and censorship is needed as in the case of the stage. Not only should society suppress those forms of amusement which are not in accordance with the moral law, but it should make adequate provision for the wholesome amusement of those who are not in a position to secure it otherwise. Every member of society should interest himself in the problem and make himself intelligent upon it. Nothing short of a widespread interest will effect the change needed.

Committees or commissions, either official or independent, whose social duty it would be to give the matter particular study and to serve as the representatives of society in effecting the proper adjustment along this line might well be appointed. This is a

day of specialization; and while every member of society should have a deep concern in the public welfare and a vital interest in any and all movements which look to the betterment of social conditions, yet the most good can be accomplished with the least waste of time and energy if the different members of society would each select some one line of activity and coöperate in an organized fashion with all others who are specially interested in the same line. The work of social progress would thus move with precision and speed.

This duty of coöperation in cultural, moral, and religious matters is one which we have not sufficiently learned as yet. The sooner we incorporate into our moral and religious activities something of the method which has made the present age supreme in a commercial way—coöperation and combination—the sooner shall we bring the time to pass when all men will be good neighbors and when the means of the moral life will be equally within the reach of all.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

THE SCHOOL.

1. Make a statement of the historical aims of education. Do they or do they not involve morality?
2. What is implied by the 'socialization of the child'? Make a list of all of the forces which contribute to this end.
3. What is the relation of bodily health to morality?

What are the specific duties of the school in this connection?

4. Show why economic efficiency is necessary as a basis for the highest type of morality.

5. Explain what a socialized curriculum would be by reference to some one subject, for example, history or arithmetic.

6. Why is it that the vocation probably presents the best approach to the socialization of the curriculum?

7. What should be the criterion of the socialization of the curriculum?

8. To what extent is the school responsible for the pathological conditions of society, such as crime and pauperism?

9. What are the mental virtues of the pupil? Do these bear in any way upon his moral character?

10. Why cannot morality be taught by the direct method.

11. What is your attitude to the question of sex instruction in the schools?

THE PRESS.

12. What are the evils resulting from a paper owned and operated by a capitalist or capitalistic corporation?

13. What is "doctored news"? Is this a common practice? Does this affect the morals of the community in any way?

14. Find specific instances of the lack of proportion spoken of in the text.

15. What advantages would an endowed press have? Would there be any disadvantages in this?

THE STAGE AND AMUSEMENTS.

16. "The use of a nation's leisure is the test of its civilization." (Mackaye: *The Civic Theater*, p. 30). What is your opinion of this statement?

17. What are the possibilities in the way of using the school as a social center for amusement purposes?
18. Outline the program of the National Drama League. Is this a practical approach to the problem, from the moral point of view?
19. What would be the effect upon the stage itself of carrying out the Drama League's program?
20. What is the plan for the Civic Theater? What would be the probable moral value of this enterprise?
21. Make a list of all the places of amusement in your community. What is the moral influence of each of these?

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Ross: *Changing America*, Ch. VII.

ON THE STAGE AND AMUSEMENTS.

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CHAPTER VI.

THE CRITERION APPLIED: THE VOCATION.

I. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND PERSONALITY.

The vocation.—We come now to the consideration of the third great phase of social life: namely, the vocational. As has already been explained, the term vocation must be understood in a broad and general sense; by it is meant, not the special vocation of any individual or set of individuals, but the organized labor of society. It is equivalent to the economic order. “Economics is the science which deals with wealth in its most general aspect; namely, its value aspect.” And the economic order consists of those activities of society which produce wealth in all its forms. By wealth is meant anything which satisfies want in any form and which is at the same time under the control of man. Thus the economic order consists of society’s organized activities through which the satisfaction of these wants of man is gained. It is in this broad sense that the term vocation is here used.

Now since so large a part of life is ordinarily taken up in the pursuit of and struggle for those things which satisfy wants of various types, it is to be expected that the vocational phase of life will present

many moral situations. The term "want" covers a very broad field also. It includes not merely the necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, and the like, but also the comforts and luxuries of life. It includes many of the things which minister to the intellectual and æsthetic phases of life; practically everything that can be bought and sold. These commodities have to be manufactured, and shipped to wholesaler and retailer—each of these complex processes requiring the labor of a large number of persons. In the social relations thus engendered, situations which we have designated as moral must of necessity arise. It is important therefore that we analyze this set of moral situations as carefully as possible and attempt to get at the moral principles which underlie them, and apply them to the situations.

The devices of modern civilization which have made the life of the present so much more complex than it formerly was have also brought increased complexity and difficulty into the moral life. The introduction of machinery and the factory method of production have, as was pointed out in a previous chapter, given rise to a countless number of new moral situations. And yet it would be as undesirable as it would be impossible to go back to the conditions of fifty or a hundred years ago. The general economic plan of the present is essential to modern civilization. It is only in a specialized society such as ours, in which specialization makes possible a

higher degree of efficiency, that the people as a whole can reach so high a level of intelligence and culture. In a less specialized society there might not be so at the extremes; but the general level would be much great a difference between the attainments of those lower.

The vocation and personality.—The general economic plan of the present is one in which division of labor and specialization are the key-notes. This has attained its present high level since the invention of machinery, and makes possible that high degree of efficiency on the part of the laborer without which the increased number of wants could not be satisfied. By the repeated performance of a special kind of work a man becomes highly skilled in his specialty, and is enabled to turn out a superior grade of work at a much more rapid rate than without the skill which practice brings. By the proper organization of the labor of a number of skilled workers, together with the assistance of the machine, the quality and number of articles can be greatly improved and increased; and at a saving of time and material. Skilled labor thus brings a higher wage than unskilled, while at the same time the commodity is cheapened in price. In this way the members of society, if they are fortunate enough to be in the class of skilled laborers or specialists, are benefited in both directions; they receive higher wages and in common with other members of society are obliged to pay less for the commodity produced. This makes

possible a surplus of money with which to buy the product of other men's labor; and as a result of this surplus an increased number of wants can be satisfied. The standard of life accordingly is raised. One argument for a high protective tariff has been that the American workman cannot compete with the "pauper" labor of Europe. If this be true, it is because the former has a higher standard of living than the latter; that is, he has a greater number of wants which must be satisfied. These wants are not merely material and physical; they are intellectual and cultural as well.

Now the higher types of personality depend upon the creation and satisfaction of a larger number of wants, the wants being of a higher and higher type. For example, it would not be difficult to follow the process of the "Americanization" of an immigrant from one of the poorer European countries. His progress would be marked at every step by the appearance of some new desire and the effort to satisfy it. It may not at first seem that a larger number of wants is an index to higher personality. And yet a little examination will convince us that up to a certain point this is the case. For example, in the matter of food, greater variety and superior preparation have a direct relation to personality. So long as an individual is satisfied to gorge himself with one kind of coarse food, paying little or no attention to the taste of it but being satisfied simply with a full stomach, the type of personality is admittedly low.

But as character comes to be of a finer grain, greater attention is paid to the nature of the food eaten, its variety, the way in which it is served, the formality governing eating, the aesthetic arrangement of table, dining room, and the like. And what is true in the matter of food is also true in connection with the other wants of life; and while these wants are not the sole causes of a higher type of personality, they are at least an index of it. From development in these primary matters it is not a far step to the higher development along the lines of the appreciation of music, painting, and the other finer things of life.

Now all these new attainments in the direction of practical, intellectual, and aesthetic development bring with them a large number of new ways of committing moral wrong; particularly is this true of the matter of obtaining these satisfactions. Yet, notwithstanding this fact, the moral life is, on the whole, tremendously broadened and deepened; while the number of moral situations is increased the possibility of moral attainment is correspondingly enhanced. While it may not be counted as morally wrong to fall short of the highest standards of action in these respects, yet negatively, morality has suffered to the extent of one's failure to attain them. The different phases of consciousness—the intellectual, the aesthetic, the practical, and the moral—are so organically bound up together that one cannot fail to be his best intellectually, for example, without failing morally in like measure. Or, from the moral

point of view, one cannot afford to fall short of his highest aesthetic taste, because aesthetic ideals and practices are reflected in moral conduct. It is in the light of such considerations as these then that we assert that personality and character depend upon the creation and satisfaction of a larger and larger number of wants. Of course these wants must be of the right kind, if personality or character is to be morally good. They must be those that make for life more abundant, not those which dwarf and destroy.

II. THE MORAL PRINCIPLE.

The economic order must be socialized.—Coming back now to the economic aspect, we may say that the satisfactions which the vocation supplies are the raw materials of life. It is through the economic relations that the primary and secondary wants of the members of society are satisfied; they furnish the foundation upon which the whole life, moral as well as all other phases, is built. There is thus a double relation between the economic and the moral. On the one hand, the economic, through its superior organization, makes possible the higher levels of the moral; on the other hand, a large number of the actual moral situations which arise in life are economic in nature.

We have seen how fundamental to personality and character economic welfare is. But if the economic is to be the aid it should be, and if the moral tone of

society is to be raised, the economic order must be socialized. If all the members of society are to have an opportunity to develop their possibilities, it is absolutely essential that their economic welfare be assured. This can come about only as the vocation as a social institution is further socialized. This demands that every member of society shall "participate in all the essential satisfactions of life, and that the control of all the fundamental agencies by which those satisfactions are distributed"¹ shall be in their hands. This is not communism; neither does it mean the kind of socialism defined by Laughlin as "an emotional attempt to bring social amelioration by destroying competition and private property." It simply means that all the members of society shall have as nearly as possible an equal opportunity to procure those things which satisfy the fundamental wants of life. In order to secure to them this opportunity, it is necessary that they have some control, through government or otherwise, over the means of procuring these things. And while this is an ideal to be striven for, it is by no means an impossible one. Indeed progress is being made in this direction with rapid strides at the present time.

The principle—Let us state the conclusion of the foregoing arguments in the form of a fundamental ethical principle, covering the economic phase of life. The principle is this: *first, every one should*

¹Gillette: *Vocational Education*, p. 83.

have the economic opportunity for self-realization; second, this involves the socialized conscience. Let us explain fully what this signifies. While it is a fact that in our country every member of society has more nearly an equal chance with every one else than in almost any other country, yet even here there are many inequalities which debar large numbers from the opportunities that others enjoy. While this is the land of opportunity; while our public schools are open to all; while every one has the right to use the courts; while there are libraries and many philanthropic institutions free to all; while there is no aristocracy and no hereditary caste system; yet in spite of these facts, those who have wealth can, and in many instances do, oppress those who have not. Theoretically, the citizens of this Commonwealth (note the term) are free and equal; but in practice and in fact they are not. As long as it is possible for the rich to oppress the poor, and as long as wealth buys power which brings more wealth, and so on *ad infinitum*, we cannot have true equality in fact. We must limit ourselves here to the economic phase of the question; but let it be remarked that true democracy is economic democracy as well as political.

Meaning of opportunity.—For every one to have a chance for self-realization involves two things, a negative and a positive. In the first place there must be no exploitation; and in the second there must be equality of opportunity. Exploitation, as

we use the term, means the unjust or illegal use of resources or service for selfish ends. We will pass over the earlier and cruder forms of exploitation, such as piracy, slavery, serfdom or peonage, and confine our discussion to those forms from which modern society is suffering. The following are some of the more glaring of the modern forms of exploitation, while at the same time they are more subtle and better organized than earlier forms: the sweatshop, child labor, starvation wages, cheating, false weights and measures, a legal system under which it is next to impossible for a poor man to get justice, representatives who do not represent, inflated prices, unjust taxation, and evading the spirit of the law while obeying the letter on the part of large corporations.

Obviously it would be impossible as well as undesirable to go into a detailed discussion of the ethics of all of these instances in which the poorer and less able members of society are exploited by the strong. It will be sufficient to point out the ethical significance of some one, for example, the almost prohibitive, inflated prices fixed by the "trusts" on many of the necessities of life. If a given commodity is indeed a necessity and if its price is prohibitively high, then those who control the price are withholding the means of life from, and even taking the life of those who have not had a fair chance. Can any one deny the moral wrong of this?

Or suppose the case is not so drastic as this. Let us say the price is not absolutely prohibitively high,

but is barely within the reach of most of the members of society. In this case all of the available resources will necessarily be spent for the few fundamental needs of life, and nothing will be left over with which to satisfy those other wants that are the index of the higher levels of personality. The individual is thus held down to a monotonous grind in which there can be neither the desire for, nor the ability to obtain, those things which make for the higher and finer development of personality. Now it is safe to say that on account of the high prices and all of the other forms of exploitation, the majority of the members of society are cramped and held down in this way. Thus the various types of economic injustice are responsible for a poverty of life which is unnecessary and preventable. Not only this, but on the other hand, these same conditions, this pressure from above, constantly sets before each one the temptation to resort to like unjust and unfair methods; hence economic conditions actually become a stimulus for wrong doing.

It is evident then that it is impossible for all the members of society to have an opportunity for self-realization as long as exploitation in its various forms is so rife. Now let us look at the positive side of the principle. We must use the term opportunity in its broadest sense, to include not only the objective side, in which every one would be provided with a market in which to sell his labor at a fair wage, but also to include the subjective side; important as is

the former, it is the latter that we must emphasize at this point.

By the subjective side of opportunity we mean that the individual shall be physically, mentally, and morally fit. The child of the slums who comes into the world with a defective body and whose social environment is such that he cannot reach normal social, mental, and moral maturity has not had a fair chance. In order that the next generation may have a fair chance, it is necessary in the first place that the physical environment of all shall be made the best possible. The filthy places of our cities must be made clean; dirt, foul air, and darkness must be replaced by cleanliness, fresh air, and sunshine. And along with this change of the physical environment must come a corresponding cleaning up of the moral atmosphere, the introduction of proper playgrounds, reading-rooms, amusement halls, etc. Further, our schools must more adequately train children for efficiency both in the trades and in the home.

All of these things will make for a better parenthood and for better home surroundings. And when this shall have been accomplished, each child will receive as his physical and social inheritance those qualities which will make him an efficient member of society. These are the things which constitute the subjective aspect of opportunity; the individual must be in full possession of his latent powers. When this stage is reached the individual will also be bet-

ter able to market his labor, because it will be worth more. There is then a double gain in the matter of equalizing opportunity; the subjective phase enhances the objective, and *vice versa*.

The socialized conscience.—The first part of our moral principle then is that each one shall be assured a chance for self-realization, which in turn signifies the substitution of equal opportunity for exploitation. The second part is that this involves a socialized conscience. That is, if exploitation is to be done away with, its abolition must be brought about because all the members of society, the strong as well as the weak, have come to a recognition of the rights of all, and because they act accordingly with justice and good-will. The moral standard as applied to the economic order is thus seen in both its subjective and objective phases.

The time has come when in our social life we must revert to a form of group morality. The day has passed when morality can be worked out by each individual alone, if indeed this was ever possible. Life under modern conditions is decidedly a social affair. Obviously a group morality at the present time must be organized on a higher plane than it was under primitive conditions. Then, morality consisted in the observance of custom based upon imitation; now, morality must be a rationalized life. But we must remember that human life is as fundamentally social as it is rational. Hence true rationality in the realm of morals means a socialized conscience.

III. ETHICAL PROBLEMS.

Property.—The ethical problems of the economic order may be considered, for our purposes, under two heads: (1) property, and (2) industry and business. The ethical significance of property is well set forth in the following quotation: “That by which the will gives itself real standing, and objective existence, is possession or property. And it is accordingly with what this act involves that abstract law is concerned. Property then is an object, in so far as it has come through seizure and use and alienation, into relation to a human will, and been made an attribute of a ‘me:’ it is an objectified will. It is thus a necessity of concrete freedom, and is proportionately sacred. . . . But now this property relation is not really established, except as my right is recognized and allowed by my neighbor. It involves not simply my will, but the consenting will of another, and thus is the objectification of the common will. The relation between things becomes the relation between wills. This objectification of the common will forms the basis of contract. . . . As, therefore, contracts are arbitrary and accidental, there is no guarantee against their passing into injustice and wrong. This may take the form of unconscious wrong, or of fraud, or of crime, by which, through my property, violence is used against my will.”² A large number of the moral situations

²Rogers: *Student's History of Philosophy*, p. 465.

which arise in the economic order, then, arise through the use that is made of property, since the use to which it is put represents the voluntary action of the agent. Property becomes the tool by which one man works his will upon another.

The socialization of property.—Granting the validity of this view of property, what is the moral principle involved? In the light of the fact that morality must always be defined in social terms, the moral principle in this instance is that property must be used to social ends. This does not mean literally that one must bestow all of one's goods upon the poor, but that one shall not perform anti-social action by means of property. For example, the man who provides a comfortable and sanitary tenement house at a reasonable rent is using his property for social ends. On the other hand, he who wrings from those who can least afford to pay an extortionate rent for ill-lighted, ill-ventilated, vermin-inhabited, fire-trap tenement houses, is indeed acting in an unsocial way. His conduct is as immoral as it is unsocial. Judged by the moral criterion, his action is as base as the act of the cold-blooded murderer. Through the selfish use of his property he is robbing other people of the means for the satisfaction not only of the most fundamental of human wants, but also of the higher wants, which are both the cause and the effect of a higher type of character. He is robbing children of a fair chance in life; he is not only a thief but a murderer as well.

It is unpleasant to state these facts thus baldly, because men guilty of this kind of crime are often among the most respected in the community. They may give liberally to charity and be prominent members of the church and otherwise be wrapped in the cloak of respectability, passing in society at very much the valuation which they put upon themselves. But the moral law is no respecter of persons, and there is but one judgment to be passed upon such conduct as has been described. The time has come when we must fearlessly call this kind of action by its proper name, and proceed to deal with these social offenders and others of their type as they deserve. This is what is involved in saying that our consciences must be socialized. This statement in the abstract may seem perfectly inoffensive to customary modes of thinking and acting. But when brought down to its concrete application, it involves the reconstruction of our thought and action in just such instances as have been mentioned, which are only a few chosen from a countless number of similar type.

There is a further reason why a man may not use his property in this anti-social manner. The value which property represents is, to a certain extent, a social product. The value of a given article consists in its ability to satisfy some want. But if no one desires it, it has no value. It is society then which gives to a thing its value in that it creates a demand for it. And since society has endowed the commod-

ity with value, the owner is not at liberty to use it absolutely as he sees fit, if the use he desires to make of it is unsocial. The owner of the unwholesome tenement house may not charge an extortionate rent for his property and say: "I will do as I please with my property; they may take it or leave it." This attitude is based upon a fallacious conception; one which is unjust and therefore immoral.

With regard to the matter of the unearned increment, the question is not whether a man may lay claim to this as his own, but what disposition shall be made of it in the interest of all. The moral principle clearly indicates that in so far as it is *unearned*, being produced by society, the increase in valuation belongs to society, and not to the individual. A very difficult economic question is to tell with certainty when the increase of valuation is really earned and when not. For example, what would be just in the case in which a man has the foresight to see that the city is going to expand in a given direction, and proceeds to buy up the land in that vicinity? To whom does the increase in the valuation of this land rightfully belong? Does it belong to the individual in question as a reward for his keen foresight, or does a part or all of it belong to society who really created the increase in value? The question is not an easy one, and no satisfactory solution is yet forthcoming. But in cases in which it is clear that the increase in value is unearned by the owner, it is equally clear that the increase belongs to society.

There are many other problems of similar nature for which a satisfactory solution has not yet been found, but upon which the best minds of the country are working; for example, the question of private versus public ownership of public utilities. However we shall not attempt to discuss these further. But we may say in summary, concerning the ethical problems which center in property: First, that the existence of the problem implies that in many instances the owners are using it either consciously or unconsciously as a means of carrying out an unjust or dishonest will. In the second place, the so-called right of doing with one's own absolutely as one pleases is a fiction. As to the exact application of this principle that property must be used to social ends, society has not yet worked out a satisfactory answer. But it is the moral duty of every member of society to exercise the virtues of the socialized conscience, and in so doing to try to assist in the ultimate solution of the problem.

Industry and business.—One of the chief difficulties in the way of applying the moral law to the situations arising in the realm of industry and business lies in the fact that as these phases of the economic life have grown in size and organization, they have at the same time become highly impersonal. As long as the business of production and distribution was in the hands of separate individuals, and as long as the personal contact of the producer and consumer, laborer and employer, was maintained, it was not so

difficult to keep track of the moral situation and apply the moral law. But under present conditions in which producer and consumer, employer and employee, are frequently unknown to each other, and perhaps even widely separated, it is by no means as easy to maintain a vivid sense of moral obligation; and indeed in many instances it is not easy to know what the right is. In cases in which great enterprises are carried on by large organizations of men, in which each one is simply a cog in a great machine, it is indeed difficult to locate responsibility. In fact, it would be unfair in many instances to attempt to place upon any single individual the responsibility for things which are clearly morally wrong. And yet, for every moral wrong some one is responsible; the difficulty is to determine who. But the very fact that it is increasingly difficult to locate responsibility for moral wrongs, and that the old personal relation has given place to a corporate one, makes it doubly necessary that the subject be given thoughtful consideration. If morality is to stand, as indeed it must if society is to stand, we must reinterpret the moral law in this field as well as in others, and apply it in such a way that justice shall be guaranteed to all the members of society.

The best possible commodity.—Now on the side of industry or production, the members of society have the right to expect the best possible commodity at the lowest possible cost. This is necessary if personality is to be realized. In order to accomplish

this capital and labor must be brought together under the best conditions of organization possible. It is a social misfortune that capitalists and laborers should so generally regard each other as enemies. The fact is that each class is necessary to the other and could not survive independently. Each should recognize that the other has its rights, as well as its obligations.

The rights of capital.—It must be granted that capital has the right to seek the best investment, the one that will yield the greatest return upon the money; that it has a right to a fair return; that it has the right also to combine, if by so doing it can increase its efficiency. It seems to be the opinion of many at the present time that all combination on the part of capital is socially and morally wrong. But we must bear in mind that the whole trend of social development is in the direction of combination, coöperation, and corporate activity. This is true not only in relation to capital but in all phases of life; and this right could not be denied to capital without putting a stop to the whole process of modern progress and civilization. While unlimited competition is a valuable thing in a certain stage of social development, yet it is essentially a wasteful and uneconomic process. The abuses which have been made of combination in the first experiments along this line in our country sometimes blind us to the fact that proper combination is the possible source of untold good to society.

The abuses of capital.—But while recognizing these rights on the part of capital, we cannot forget the abuses, the moral wrongs and injustice, which are chargeable to capital in these first years of our industrial expansion. The fact that capital has rights implies that there are certain obligations which it bears to society. The obligation in general is that capital shall be as efficient and productive as possible, and at the same time be just. Capital, like property, should be used to social ends. The abuses or mal-uses of capital which have sprung up in recent years are familiar to every one: monopoly and combination with the purpose of controlling prices, the trust with the same purpose, the watering of stock, the manipulation of the stock market, the trading in margins, and the like. These things have become so common that we would be in danger of losing sight of the moral wrong involved in them if they did not touch the pocket-book in so many cases. These are practical problems in social economy, but we must not forget that they are also deeply moral questions.

For example, we profess to believe that gambling is wrong, that it is unjust, and that it endangers all the qualities which go to make good character. We have our city ordinances and our state laws against gambling in all forms, from crap-shooting to horse racing; and yet we are singularly insensitive, morally, to one of the worst and most far-reaching forms of gambling: namely, gambling on the stock market.

We have not passed beyond the personal stage in our way of looking at it as yet. When one man swindles another out of his property, we rise up in our wrath to condemn him and demand that he be punished. But when a man swindles the rest of society out of a few cents each, we look on unmoved and perhaps even commend him for his shrewdness. Or again, if a poor wretch steals a loaf of bread to keep his children from starvation, we solemnly shut him up in jail for thirty days and fine him twenty-five dollars and costs, because he is a menace to society. But we sit complacently by and watch some financial magnate steal a whole railroad, or the sugar trust steal untold millions from society, or some corporation exploit our national resources—and feel never an emotional tremor. *Our consciences are not yet socialized!* If some one steals from, cheats, or defrauds me, I have no difficulty in seeing the injustice in the act. But if some one steals from, cheats, or defrauds the public, I regard it as lucky that I got off as easily as I did and let it go at that, with not a moment's thought of the moral wrong in the case.

The social point of view.—Now society will not have become thoroughly moral until every member thereof feels the same emotional stirrings when he sees social injustice and wrong in any of these forms, as when injustice or wrong is committed against him personally. That is what is meant by the socialized conscience. Or, put it the other way: my conscience may deter me from stealing from, cheating, or de-

frauding my neighbor; and yet I may count myself justified in defrauding the street car company, the gas or water company. But my conscience has not become socialized until I ask myself not merely whether this act is allowable for me as an individual, or as an individual in relation to my neighbor, but also whether the wider social consequences of my act are desirable.

The points referred to in the last paragraph apply not merely to a man in his capacity as capitalist, but to all men under all conditions. To come back now more specifically to the moral significance of capital, let the fact be emphasized that in so far as it in any way reaps for itself an unjust increase, it to that extent denies the right of self-realization to the other members of society. The trust, in putting up the price of an article to a figure higher than that which represents a legitimate profit, is robbing the members of society of the opportunity of satisfying their higher wants, through the satisfaction of which personality grows. And those who connive at this injustice, together with all the other members of society who submit passively, are lacking in a socialized conscience.

The rights of labor.—Let us now look at the moral questions involved on the labor side of the process of production. Labor, in common with capital, has its rights and its obligations. And unfortunately also there are certain abuses chargeable to the hand of labor. In the first place, what are the rights on

the side of labor? The most important of these are just wages, fair hours, safe and sanitary conditions under which to work, and, finally, the right to combine for the purpose of securing these other rights.

Wages and self realization.—The relation of wages to the matter of personality is at once apparent; and we need not further argue the necessity of a living wage at this point. The question may well be raised, however, what a living wage is. Without going into the question from the economic point of view, we may say that a living wage is one which will enable the worker to maintain himself and family above the poverty line. Poverty may be defined as a condition in which some of the fundamental satisfactions of life are denied: the poverty stricken are under-fed, inadequately clothed and housed, to say nothing of their lacking the means wherewith to satisfy other wants. From the moral point of view it is unjust that a social system should exist which forces a considerable number of the members of society below this line. But we cannot stop even here. It is not sufficient that the members of society shall have barely enough means with which to maintain themselves above the line of necessity from day to day. If personality is to grow and develop as we have indicated, there must be provided sufficient means wherewith to satisfy the fundamental wants, and a little besides. There must be enough so that those members of society who are thrifty and who would make a practice of saving, if they had the op-

portunity, may do so, and may at the same time gratify and cultivate their æsthetic natures. It is only under conditions such as these that they may have the "abundant" life. Anything less is mere existence.

Leisure.—The same principle holds with respect to the matter of fair working hours. Suppose that the wages are just and that all the other conditions of life are equally desirable; if the hours of labor are too long there is left no energy or interest or time through which other than the necessary wants may be satisfied, even if they should be felt. A certain amount of leisure is necessary in the development of the æsthetic life; and it is likewise true of the moral life, at least in the realization of the higher levels of personality.

Working conditions.—The question with regard to safe and sanitary conditions under which to work is a very important one. We are extremely wasteful of human life in our country; and it is time that we count the cost, in terms of human life, of our boasted material progress and see if it has not been bought at too great a price. Maiming and killing in mine, factory, and shop have become such common occurrences that the accounts of them no longer cause more than a passing thought, unless perchance our own circle of family, friends, or acquaintances is invaded by misfortune, and the matter thus takes on a personal meaning. But let us look at it from the point of view of morality. If one man beats another

man's brains out with a club, or shoots him, society knows pretty well what to call the offense and what punishment should be meted out. But what if a score of men lose their lives in a mine because of the negligence of the company? Or what shall we call it when a man gets caught in a machine and is killed; or what of the awful toll upon life when little children work in factory and mine at a period when they should, by all the laws of nature and justice, be growing into the full stature of manhood, physically, mentally, and spiritually? What name shall we apply to the process of systematically poisoning the members of society in a wholesale way by the use of injurious drugs and preservatives in food and medicine? We need the courage and the honesty as intelligent members of society to call these by their proper name, murder, and to demand that in the name of justice and righteousness they shall cease. The impersonal nature of these social sins is no doubt one of the chief causes for our moral lethargy in connection with them. But the gospel of the socialized conscience needs to be preached from every pulpit, in every school house, and in every newspaper in the country. And we cannot lay claim to a consistent moral life as individuals until we engage actively in a coöperative effort to banish these forms of moral wrong from society.

The right of combination.—Some of the things mentioned in the foregoing paragraph are rights which belong not only to the working-man, but

to every member of society. They touch the lives of the laborers more intimately, however, than those of the more privileged classes of society. In line with the foregoing suggestions there is one other right belonging to labor which must receive attention. The assertion has sometimes been made that labor has no right to combine under any conditions or for any purpose. But this is manifestly as unfair as to say that capital has no right to combine under any conditions. It is but just that the men who perform the labor of the country shall be allowed to come together and perfect an organization for the purpose of securing a better understanding of what things are most needed by the working men and of planning how best to gain these. Through coöperative effort along these lines more can be accomplished than can possibly be done when men work for the same things singly. It is true of course that the same objection is apparent here as in the case of capital: it is difficult to locate the responsibility for any abuse that may arise. But this is not a sufficient argument against the right. It is true also that most, if not all, of the abuses which are chargeable to the hand of labor have arisen out of organized labor. This point will be referred to again. The significance of this right from the point of view of morals is that so long as labor attempts by honorable and peaceful methods to gain these desired ends, it is entirely within its moral rights; but that to attempt by any other methods to gain these

ends, no matter how desirable they may be, is morally wrong.

The moral obligation of labor.—But the moral law imposes obligations as well as bestows rights. We have mentioned the rights which a socialized and moralized society would grant to labor. Now the obligations which the working-man owes to society may perhaps be summed up in the one word—*efficiency*. Society has the moral right to expect at the hand of the laborer that he will do the tasks assigned to him with thoroughness, dispatch, and intelligence. In other words, he must give an adequate return for value received; his work must be conscientiously done, with as little waste of time and material as possible. An example of inefficiency is the perennial instance of the plumber who through mere thoughtlessness forgets a tool or fitting that is necessary to the job and takes a half day in which to get the missing part; in the meantime the unhappy house-holder is subjected to the worry and inconvenience of a needless delay; only to discover when the bill is sent in that the laborer has included in it not only the time during which he was returning for the forgotten piece, but even the necessary carfare. This is morally wrong; and labor cannot command the sympathy and consideration it really deserves as long as it tolerates this kind of inefficiency and incompetency. Indeed, an act such as this involves all the essentials of stealing. It is a situation that has been made possible, at least in

large degree, by the intricacies of modern life; but it is none the less morally wrong. And what society demands and has the right to expect at the hands of labor is the simple honesty and justice of efficiency and competency in the different lines of the world's work.

Abuses.—In a labor market where unrestricted competition obtains, as is the case where there are no labor organizations, the incompetents and inefficients do not figure in setting the standard of efficiency because there is little demand for their services. But in many instances the labor union has served to reduce all laborers to a dead level of efficiency. The impetus to individual excellence is destroyed by restrictive rules regarding the amount of work that may be done. Where this is the case the union is a detriment to society, and eventually to labor itself, in that it tends to make its members less efficient.

On the positive side there are many things of an even more anti-social nature which are chargeable to labor. Labor organizations have not shown clearly in the past that they are on the side of law and order. The things done during times of strike, the destruction of property and even of life, indicate that labor is frequently willing to accomplish its ends regardless of means.

Summary.—It is seen that the only final solution of the problems centering in the economic relations

is a fully socialized conscience on the part of all members of society. This is indeed an ideal, the realization of which will require many years of social development; but it is one for which we must none the less strive. Let us sum up the situation and then add a brief word as to the means best adapted to the immediate need: A highly specialized economic structure of society is necessary to our civilization as a basis upon which the personality of the members of society is to be realized. The moral situations which arise in this phase of life are those centering in property and industry and business, in which injustice is committed against one class of society by another. These are exceedingly practical and commonplace questions of honor, honesty, truthfulness, integrity, and justice. Each special structure of society has its rights and its obligations; and the requisite condition of social health under these circumstances is a socialized conscience on the part of all.

IV. PUBLICITY AND THE SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE.

Publicity and the virtue of intelligence.—Now how is this socialized conscience to be acquired in a group in which the old personal contact and relation has been largely supplanted by an impersonal and corporate relation? The answer is that the feeling of personal responsibility must be replaced by publicity. If we are to revert to a type of group moral-

ity, as has been suggested, the only basis upon which this can be accomplished is a systematic publicity campaign along all lines of public interest. For example, if the disposition of the funds that were placed in the hands of the Secretary-Treasurer of the National Association of Structural Iron Workers had been made public at all times, it is altogether probable that the dynamiting outrages perpetrated by the officers of that organization could never have occurred. The same would be equally true with regard to the deeds of capitalists, as for example, life insurance companies. The matter of publicity has come to be a moral duty.

By publicity is meant the social counterpart of individual intelligence, which we have seen to be the basis of all other moral virtues. And as these other virtues function, that is, as the socialized conscience comes to be a conditioning factor in the lives of the individual members of society, it will also register itself in the will of the people as a whole in the form of a public conscience. We have already had enough experience to know that when the public conscience is once aroused, vested sin in any form whatever cannot stand. Let us not conclude that mere publicity in itself can cure all of these ills. It is only as conduct is conditioned by prudence, purpose, justice, and good-will that morality will become dynamic and that readjustment along proper lines will be made.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. Show the moral advantage accruing from a highly specialized society.
2. Does the possession of property or a good job react upon an individual in such a way as make him more highly responsible morally?
3. What are the chief causes of inefficiency? What are the possibilities of psychological efficiency tests. (See Münsterberg: *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*).
4. Does the unemployment of large numbers of men react in an undesirable way upon the morals of a community?
5. What would economic democracy be? Would this make for better morals?
6. Is there any particular relation between good health and good character?
7. What is the most important moral achievement of social settlement work?
8. Point out the moral significance of child labor.
9. What is the moral significance of the sweat shop?
10. What moral potentiality is there in the labor union?
11. What is the moral effect of a strike?
12. Mention different ways in which we are wasteful of human life in this country. What is the moral effect of this?
13. What is meant by the 'watering of stock'? What is the moral significance of this?
14. What is the single tax theory? Would this serve the ends of morality?
15. State some of the facts with regard to food adulteration (See McCann: *Starving America*, Ch. VX). What is the moral significance of this practice?

16. Give other illustrations than those cited in the text, of the statement that our consciences are not yet socialized.
17. Why would more systematic methods of publicity improve the morals of a community?
18. State the advantages and the disadvantages, from the moral point of view, of public ownership of public utilities.
19. Give examples of the unearned increment. What seems to you to be the just disposition of this question?

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CHAPTER VII.

THE CRITERION APPLIED: THE STATE.

I. THE MORAL VALUE OF THE STATE.

Law and morals.—There is a close relation between ethics—the science of morality, and politics—the science of the state. Individual men are universally members of some governed community, and their moral virtues are exhibited in relation to other individuals. Ethics has in the past mainly signified what might be called “private” ethics, as opposed to public ethics; whereas politics is concerned with the good or welfare of men as members of a state or as a political group. The newer attitude which does not believe in a “private” ethics, if by this is meant the process of realizing the moral ideal within one’s own shell, so to speak, regards morality as indissolubly bound up with the state, as it is with every other social institution. Perfect morality would involve a perfect state, and *vice versa*.

While there is thus an organic connection between morality and the state, we must nevertheless distinguish between ethics and law, the mandates of the state. “Moral rules are enforced by individual conscience or by the disapproval of public opinion. Law is enforced by the power of the state. There is, however, a difference in content as well. Ethics deals

with the whole life of man, his thoughts and emotions as well as with his actions. Law is concerned only with the outward acts. . . . It necessarily follows that many things thought of as morally wrong are not prohibited by law. Falsehood, unless under oath or in a fraudulent contract, is immoral but not illegal. Ingratitude, jealousy, meanness, are indications of bad character, but do not come under the cognizance of law unless actual injury to others can be proved."¹¹

Statutory and moral laws are both designed to govern and control the actions of men. But while the former are mainly negative in character, the latter are positive. Statutory law represents society's unconditional negative: it says, "thou shalt not." It marks the limit beyond which a man may not go in his action. And in so far as law concerns some vital human interest, it is morally wrong to disobey it. It is perfectly possible that an act may be regarded as legally right and at the same time be morally wrong. This is because moral law is positive. It points to what a man *ought* to do, not to what he may not do.

The state in relation to personality.—Gathering up the points thus far brought out and generalizing we may say that it is the business of the state to maintain a suitable social environment within which its members can live and develop. We have already

¹¹Gettell: *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 130.

found that the moral ideal is the development of socialized personality and that the latter grows in a social soil. The state must perform its function by defining in clear terms those acts which are obviously anti-social, by providing adequate punishment for these, and by administering these punishments swiftly and justly. This is the whole duty of the state, from the point of view of morals. The state must mediate between the individual and organized society. It must safeguard the rights and liberties of the individual; and it must do this by protecting the whole group against any anti-social tendency on the part of any refractory member of society. The state thus becomes the protector of the home, the school, the vocation, and the church.

II. THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE.

Sovereignty.—Let us now analyze the state for the purpose of determining its essential characteristics. In the first place, how shall we define it? This institution may be defined as a community of individuals organized for the purposes of government. “It comes into existence when the relations of control over and obedience from the individual person are established.”² The very essence of the state is its law-giving power; this is known as its sovereign power. Now the difference between the various forms of government, monarchy, democracy, and so

²Leacock: *Elements of Political Science*, p. 53.

on, lies in the different location of the sovereignty. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that in a democracy the locus of sovereignty is in the people themselves. This sovereign power in a democracy is exerted through the franchise. And whether it be a pure democracy or a representative form of government the sovereign power resides in the people so long as they control the politics of the government through the franchise.

Now the essential functions of the state as a sovereign power are three:³ (1) governmental, including the determination of foreign relations, treaties, arbitration, diplomacy, and internal legislation and administration; (2) financial; (3) military. Besides these essential functions of the state, there are certain other optional enterprises, such as the management and control of trusts, railroads, natural resources, legislation regarding labor, provision for education, public charities, and sanitation and health.

Individual rights.—Before we take up for discussion the specific problems centering in the exercise of the franchise let us look at the question from the point of view of the individual and consider these additional problems along with the others. It is customary in books on political science to set the liberty of the individual over against the sovereignty of the state and to discuss them in relation to

³Ibid: p. 393.

each other. It would seem at first sight that the two factors, the sovereign power of the state and individual liberty, are mutually exclusive and incompatible. But this is not the case, because the state recognizes and undertakes to guarantee the validity of certain so-called rights in the individual. In a democracy these rights are of two kinds: political and civil. The political right of the individual is the right of franchise. Of the civil rights which center in the use of the courts, the right to sue and be sued, there are, freedom of person, equality before the law, security of private property, freedom of opinion and speech, and freedom of conscience.⁴ It will be seen at a glance that there are many questions of moral significance centering in these rights.

III. MORAL PROBLEMS.

In taking up the ethical problems peculiar to the state, let us constantly bear in mind this general question: What is the relation of the state in its various aspects to the development of socialized personality and a socialized conscience? Many of the things here considered may not seem at first to have much relation to morality. Yet if we take the trouble to get back to this fundamental question, the relation will at once become apparent.

International relations.—In a previous paragraph, as the essential functions of the state were mentioned

⁴Gettell: *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 115.

the governmental, the financial, and the military. Under the first come the questions of foreign relations and internal legislation. For our purposes it will be convenient to consider briefly the question of foreign relations and the military function together. In the matter of arbitration, the whole weight of the ethical argument falls entirely upon the side of the arbitration of all possible international differences and the reference of these to an international court of justice. The question has received such widespread discussion in the press and elsewhere recently that it is unnecessary to review the arguments here.

In like manner the weight of the argument regarding the question of maintaining an army and navy is entirely against such a policy. The injustice occasioned by this vast burden is entirely wrong. No one could successfully argue for a moment that militarism makes for socialized personality in the person of any one. And "the argument that war is necessary to prevent moral degeneration of individuals may, under present conditions, where every day brings its fresh challenge to civic initiative, courage, and vigor, be dismissed as unmitigated nonsense."¹⁵

Indeed the only argument against disarmament and universal arbitration which is at all deserving of consideration at the hands of thoughtful men is the so-called inexpediency and impracticability of

¹⁵Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 482.

such a policy. And yet "it is a very slight step to take forward compared to that which has substituted the authority of national States for the conflict of isolated clans and local communities; or with that which has established a publicly administered justice for the reign of private war and retaliation. The argument for the necessity (short of the attainment of a federated international state with universal authority and policing of the seas) of preparing in times of peace for the possibility of war, must be offset at least by recognition that the possession of irresponsible power is a direct temptation to its irresponsible use."⁶ The moral ideal of a socialized society must wait for its realization upon the disarmament of the nations and the substitution of a universal peace based upon unlimited arbitration. In the meantime the moral obligation rests upon every enlightened member of society to lend his influence towards the accomplishment of these things. The person who through indifference or on the basis of a false logic withholds his influence from this end is lacking to that extent in a socialized conscience.

Internal legislation.—The moral problems in connection with internal legislation and administration are indeed legion. The business of legislation is carried on in our country by means of the party system. During the decades in which the rank and file of our countrymen have been engrossed in the eco-

⁶Ibid: p. 482.

nomic process of industrial and commercial expansion, there has grown up a system of "machine politics" in which the "boss" has been supreme. The fact that the great majority have been interested in other things has given opportunity for a class of professional politicians to rise up and take possession of the land; and since they make a business of politics and expect to get all out of it that is possible, a great number of flagrant abuses have grown up.

The "boss."—The professional politician, all the way down from the national boss to the "ward heeler," has in many instances been personally interested, on the one hand, in financial enterprises and has used his political power to further his own ends; on the other hand, he has been in league with the various forms of organized vice and has derived revenue therefrom. This acquisition of money, position, and power by taking advantage of a public office or trust is one of the chief forms of "graft." And it has been one of our greatest national sins that we have been willing to sit by and let this evil develop to its present appalling state. The boss has appealed to a false patriotism in the name of party regularity and party loyalty, and has been enabled thereby to write the party slate and to dictate the legislative measures that shall be passed.

Under these conditions "government" has degenerated, it sometimes seems, into nothing more nor less than a process of barter and trade between the

'interests,' the professional politician, and organized vice. This is a grave charge to bring against a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," as ours is designed to be; and we must remember that there have always been honest and conscientious representatives of the people. But they have been exceptions standing out in contrast to a system in which the boss, the "pork-barrel," and "log-rolling" have been the rule. Yet we may remember with satisfaction that the past few years have brought the promise of ultimate deliverance from these abuses, because the public conscience is becoming aroused upon these matters.

It is a moral and social misfortune, to say the least, that our government should in any way lend its sanction to any form of vice. For example, it is a governmental blunder, judged by any adequate standard of the function of government, that the latter should license one set of men to carry on an enterprise which damns the bodies and souls of others, as does the liquor business. Likewise it is a travesty upon morality, that while the government does not issue a license to carry on such forms of vice, it nevertheless winks at, or at best tries to "regulate" prostitution and gambling instead of doing its utmost to stamp them out. Indeed it connives at these same vices in many instances, by accepting bribes and immunity fees.

Administration of the law.—Before we take up the question of the moral significance of these facts,

let us look at one other aspect of the question: namely, the problem of the administration of the law. From the layman's point of view there is urgent need for greater simplicity and greater dispatch in legal procedure. This is particularly true in the realm of criminal law. Legal form is needlessly complex and cumbersome. Furthermore, there is too great attention paid to form, to the technical points of the law, so that justice is often made a secondary matter; and a trial is more often a battle of wits between opposing counsel than an attempt to determine and execute justice. Here is an example of an indictment: "That the said J. F. G. a certain pistol then and there charged with gunpowder and leaden bullets, which said pistol he, the said J. F. G. then and there in his right hand had and held, then and there unlawfully, purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice, did discharge and shoot off to, against and upon the said F. M., with the intent aforesaid, and that the said J. F. G. with the leaden bullets aforesaid, out of the pistol aforesaid, by the force of the gunpowder aforesaid, by the said J. F. G., then and there discharged and shot off as aforesaid, him, the said F. M. in and upon the upper right side of the back of him, the said F. M. then and there ——" etc. Now to say nothing of the absurdity of a legal form such as this, is it any wonder that "technical errors" creep into an instrument so well designed for the veiling of human thought as this? If the mere absurdity of it were all, there would be

no particular moral significance in the situation. But when we remember that a mere verbal omission—a “technicality”—is often sufficient to cause a conviction to be set aside, then the matter becomes a travesty upon justice. Under such conditions as these the proper end of law—justice—is pushed aside and forgotten, and the “majesty of the law” becomes a byword!

Again, the state holds a man to be innocent until he has been proved guilty; and further, every prisoner is supposed to have the right to a trial before a jury of his peers. But is it consistent with these articles of faith that a man may be arrested upon suspicion and imprisoned and his case not be brought to trial for from six months to two years after the supposed offence was committed? It is no uncommon thing for a court docket to be so full as to delay a case for a period of this length. Now if legal procedure were simple and direct, there would be no necessity for these long delays; justice could be meted out surely and swiftly. This would be for the good of both the criminal and society. On the one hand, the prisoner, if innocent, would be relieved of the stigma and the injustice which attach to his indictment; on the other hand, greater sureness and swiftness in the matter of meting out justice would be a strong deterrent to the criminal, and society would thereby be the gainer.

The moral influence of legal inefficiency.—Now, what is the moral significance of these facts? It is

obvious that these abuses, one and all, whether through the boss system, graft, partnership in social evil, or administrative inefficiency, produce the very conditions which are most unfavorable to the growth of socialized personality. It will be sufficient to make this concrete by reference to one or two of the conditions mentioned. Take, for example, those instances in which the public welfare is sacrificed in order that the party machine may be perpetuated and strengthened; or the case in which a representative of the people uses his vote and his influence to secure the passage of some measure which is favorable to some "interest," for the sake of his own personal aggrandizement. These acts lessen, either directly or indirectly, the opportunity for life and growth of those whom the agent is supposed to represent. If a representative or a city councilman accepts a bribe for his vote, some one will have to pay the price of the bribe. In the long run the "ultimate consumer" must pay the price of all abuses which have been mentioned. The currency in which he pays may be money or opportunity or protection or indeed any and all of the means of personality and happiness. His share of the total cost may be large or small; but he inevitably has some share in it. The injustice involved in these abuses reaches to every member of society; and every abuse levies its toll upon all members.

The locus of responsibility.—Now let us consider the obverse of the subject. In a foregoing paragraph

the statement was made that the essence of the state lies in its sovereign power; furthermore, this power is located in the people themselves in a democratic form of government. The ethical implication of these statements is that the remedy of these abuses lies in the hands of the people themselves. This is a mere platitude; every one is already aware of the fact. But it may not be quite so commonplace to insist that any one who fails to use this sovereign power which is vested in him for the common good is immoral. The moral standard demands that one shall use the franchise intelligently, with purpose, prudence, good-will, and in the interest of common justice. The ballot represents not merely an opportunity to fight political corruption, graft, dishonesty, and injustice, but it also represents a positive moral obligation, a social duty. The function of the state is to provide a healthful social environment in which personality may grow. But this condition can be realized only as each member of society in whom is vested the sovereign power, performs his political duty in accordance with the dictates of the socialized conscience. And this means *every one*; the needed reform cannot be brought about by a few zealous souls here and there. It is a case in which the coöperation of all is an absolute necessity.

Crime.—There are a few problems in connection with crime that should be briefly considered at this point. Crime, as legally defined, is "an act or omission forbidden by law, and punishable upon conviction."

tion." Crime is, with few exceptions, flagrantly immoral; and the interests of morality demand that it should be done away with. Yet we are confronted by the appalling fact that in our country crime is on the increase. But it is not our purpose here to try to find the reasons for this deplorable condition, except in so far as they bear upon the prevention of crime.

In the first place, many persons are driven into criminal practices through economic necessity. The maladjustments in the economic and educational systems must share the blame for this portion of crime. The moral demand is, as has been pointed out in Chapters V and VI, that there shall be a reorganization of such a nature that every one will have a chance, and will at the same time be better fitted educationally to make the most of it. When this reorganization shall have been effected, that portion of crime which arises out of necessity will no longer exist.

In the second place, surer and swifter punishment would be a powerful deterrent to criminals. Reference has already been made to the delay in the administration of justice and to the total perversion of it through technical evasions. Indeed it is said that in a certain county, out of one hundred murder cases only four murderers were brought to justice. As long as it is comparatively so safe to commit crime there will not be wanting those who practice it.

In the third place, the treatment of the criminal

himself is an extremely important question. We are rapidly growing away—and rightly so—from the idea that punishment is the process of getting even with the criminal. Punishment, if it is to perform its full and proper function in the state, must be corrective, not vindictive. Probably the great majority of criminals would, under favorable conditions, have been normal citizens. It must come to be the policy of society first, to prevent the making of criminals by abolishing those conditions which cause crime; and second, to educate and train the criminal back into the life of a normal and useful citizen. With regard to this "it would seem evident that the trend of change is in the general sociological direction of making a system of industrial labor and education, with disciplinary colonies, and the permanent segregation of the most vicious, so as to secure the elimination of their stock. . . . Society must not only handle its criminals wisely; it must also rearrange its manner of life so as to stop the manufacture, as it were, of a vicious population."⁷

Taxation.—The problems of taxation are so many and so intricate that our statement of them will of necessity be very general. The fact that should challenge our thoughtful attention is that while "citizens should contribute towards the support of government as nearly as possible in proportion to their re-

⁷Dealey: *Sociology*, p. 311.

spective abilities," this is not done. Those who are best able to do so are, as a general rule, those who contribute proportionately the least towards the support of government. From the social point of view the greatest need is some just and workable plan of taxation. Under present conditions, where so large a portion of the wealth of the country consists of stocks, bonds, and the like, it is next to impossible to get a true valuation of a man's property, if he desires to withhold the information; it is so easy to withhold a portion of the personal property that it has become a very common thing to do so.

The same injustice is equally discernible in the realm of what is known as indirect taxation: customs duties, excises, or internal revenues. The bulk of the taxes from these sources comes from those commodities which are the necessities of life; they are levied upon the poor as well as the rich. Indeed the greater amount comes out of the poor man's pocket, proportionately, because practically all of his income must go for these very things. But worse than this injustice in the distribution of these indirect taxes is the fact that the money thus collected has not in all cases gone into the hands of the government, but has been diverted into the pockets of the "infant industries." Under the slogan of "protection for our infant industries," we have in the past allowed a system of tariffs to be built up at the dictation of these same industries, which enabled the latter to become almost as mighty as the government

itself. The injustice of the case is doubly great. The bare fact of inequality in the matter of taxation would be bad enough in itself; but it is doubly wrong that the money thus unjustly taken from those who are least able to pay, should have come eventually into the hands of corporations and trusts instead of going into the treasury of the government, as intended. And while we are now attempting to mend matters by lowering the tariff, it will probably require years to overcome the precedents of the past and to check the momentum of high prices so long as the present machinery of taxation is used, if indeed it can be accomplished at all.

The difficulty then is with the plan and machinery of taxation. What is desired from the moral point of view, is a scheme in which absolute justice shall prevail. Until this has been accomplished, the opportunity of a vast number of the members of society to satisfy those wants which make for the development of the higher self will be withheld. So far as they are deprived of the means of life, is their life itself taken.

Personal duty.—But let us also look at the question from the point of view of the individual. The moral obligation upon each person is two-fold. In the first place, it is the moral duty of each one so to use the franchise as to help work out a just and equitable system of taxation. This means that each one shall take an intelligent and thoughtful interest in the problem, and that he shall use his influence

towards a rational solution of it. In the second place, there rests upon each one the moral duty of reporting faithfully and honestly the value of his taxable property. It is a fact that "taxpayers are so slow in coming forward with a full and fair account of their stocks and bonds (and indeed all their property) that those who do so are often regarded as good-natured oddities."⁸ Probably the consciences of these same men would not allow them to cheat a customer or tell a falsehood; and yet they feel no compunction at lying to and cheating the government. Truly our consciences need re-enlightening and socializing. He who is guilty of these practices cannot lay claim to a socialized conscience, inasmuch as he is dealing unjustly with the other members of society.

The franchise.—As has been said before, the political right of the individual is exercised through the franchise. It is the prerogative of the individual, in a representative form of government such as ours, to demand that he be fairly and honestly represented. In other words, he has the right to expect that his vote shall accomplish that which it was intended to accomplish. It is a source of great injustice when the representative of the people, when once elected, uses the power of office for his own ends; and this has been no uncommon kind of moral wrong. Happily, however, the public conscience is being

*Forman: *Advanced Civics*, p. 300.

aroused with regard to this injustice, and there is a popular demand for representation in fact as well as in name. This demand we find expressed in the form of initiative and referendum and recall. From the point of view of political science there may be a question whether these innovations are in harmony with sound principles of government; but there can be no question as to the justice and moral right behind the demand for these things.

The moral obligation resting upon the individual with respect to the franchise has already been suggested; but the importance of the matter will warrant its repetition at this point. The man who sells his vote for money, a glass of beer, a cigar, or an automobile ride sells his birth-right to political and civil liberty for a mess of pottage. Furthermore, the one who is content to let some one else do his political thinking for him, and who votes the ticket "straight" for the sake of "party regularity" or through mere habit, is almost as morally blame-worthy as the one who deliberately sells his vote for a bribe. The moral law will not be satisfied in this matter short of a thoughtful consideration of the social ends that ought to be realized by the vote. This means that each one shall think for himself and make his ballot express the deliverance of his conscience upon the matters under consideration.

Suffrage.—One other point with regard to this matter of the franchise demands brief consideration: namely, the question of woman's suffrage. So far

as the criterion of morality as applied to the state is concerned, there seems to be no moral justification for letting one half of the people do the political thinking for the other half. Indeed, the criterion unmistakably points to the conclusion that common justice would not make the matter of sex the determining basis of the franchise. To put the matter positively, the moral criterion would place but one condition upon the right to vote, and that would be that which constitutes the basis of a socialized conscience—intelligence. The one absolute condition of a successful democracy is the intelligence of its sovereign power, the people. And it is absurdly unjust that any male member of society, no matter how illiterate, may exercise the right to vote, while no female member of society, no matter how intelligent and capable, may exercise this right.

Universal suffrage of all adult citizens would be the moral ideal in the matter of the franchise. But this universal suffrage would be based upon a universal intelligence of a certain standard. And until the time shall come when intelligence shall become universal, the franchise should be denied only to those who fail to measure up to a reasonable standard in this regard, be they male or female. The time is no doubt near at hand when this criterion will be universally recognized in our country. It is a significant fact in this connection that several of our western states have already adopted it in so far as it involves woman's suffrage.

The moral demand for equality before the law.— We will not stop to consider the moral questions which arise in connection with all of the so-called civil rights of the individual, but will limit our attention to one. It is a fundamental article of our faith as a democracy that every citizen is on an equality with every other before the law. And it is obvious that this should be so as a moral fact. But it is a deplorable fact that when it comes to the practical question of getting justice there is one class of persons which has a decided advantage over others. For example, suppose a laboring man receives an injury or is killed because of the criminal negligence of the corporation for which he is working. It is a matter of common knowledge that he or his family stand hardly any chance of getting just damages. If they do get their rights, it is probably more on account of the generosity of the company than because of the justice with which the matter is handled in the courts.

Or suppose it is a case of murder in which the defendant is a millionaire. It is a part of the equipment of the criminal lawyer that he shall have at his command an endless program of devices by which he may secure a postponement of the trial, the debarring of unfavorable evidence, a new trial, or a reversal of judgment, and indeed any and everything which will gain for himself success and for his wealthy client liberty. Contrast this with the im-

personal process of law in the case of a pauper criminal.

This condition of affairs is criminally wrong. The influence of such injustice upon the individual concerned is obvious. But it indirectly affects all other members of society as surely as it does those most directly concerned. It is the moral duty of every socially minded person to coöperate with all the other members of society in making this kind of situation impossible and in ushering in the time when all men shall be equal before the law in fact, as well as in name.

IV. PERSONAL DUTY.

Distrust of government.—All these abuses and cases of injustice and many besides have operated to produce a sort of popular distrust of government; and even when men do not actually distrust it they are often indifferent to the problems and processes of government. They become so engrossed in their own concerns that they are willing to turn the matter of government over to the professional politician, and take an active interest in affairs of state only when some abuse comes so close to them as to touch their pocketbooks.

Both of these attitudes are morally indefensible. With regard to the first attitude, “one of the chief moral problems of the present day is . . . that of making governmental machinery such a flexible or-

gan for expressing the *common* interest and purpose as will do away with that distrust of government which properly must endure so long as 'government' is something imposed from above and exercised from without."⁹ And this condition can be brought about only as the members of society individually take hold of affairs and coöperate in handling them. Of course there have been abuses and injustice; and they will continue to exist until honest and just men insist upon taking the reins of government in their own hands. As long as those who are best fitted to perform these social duties with honesty and justice hold themselves aloof from politics because of its badness, there is little hope for betterment. "The saying of Plato, twenty-five hundred years ago, that the penalty good men pay for not being interested in government is that they are then ruled by men worse than themselves, is verified in most of our American cities."¹⁰

Conclusion.—In conclusion let us bear in mind that in our modern corporate life, the moral situations in which the moral life is lived arise in just such relations as we have been considering. We talk of the moral life in the abstract and are apt to think of it as some celestial plant which grows and thrives upon beautiful sentiments. But we must bring ourselves to face the fact that it is just such situations as we have been discussing that make up

⁹Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 476.

¹⁰Ibid.

the fabric of morality. Let us insist that it is the duty of every person to order his own life in accordance with the principles of the socialized conscience; and that in so doing he is helping to create that wholesome social environment which is so essential to the development of socialized personality in all the members of society. Only by thus intelligently coöperating can the members of society, as organized for the purpose of government, bring about that condition in which the latter shall perform its whole function: namely, to maintain a wholesome and healthful social soil in which moral character and personal worth shall reach their highest social value.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. What are the social conditions which are necessary to complete self realization?
2. Does morality demand a justice above and beyond that given by the state? Give concrete illustrations.
3. Show the moral injustice involved in continual preparations for war. Are there any other phases of this injustice besides the financial burden?
4. What are the social and moral qualities necessary for good citizenship?
5. "We suffer from the bad citizenship of good men." In what respects are good men frequently bad citizens? Is there any evidence that popular indifference to governmental affairs is decreasing?
6. The necessity of "social experts" has sometimes been urged (See Nearing: *Social Adjustment*, p. 328 ff.); what would be the probable field for their operation, and what their function?
7. Give specific instances in which justice has appa-

rently been thwarted by legal technicalities. Who is responsible for this condition of affairs,—the legal profession?

8. What is a political machine? What have been its functions? Is the political machine necessary to our form of government?

9. Is the so-called "boss system" simply an abuse of a desirable governmental method, or is it intrinsically wrong?

10. What are the usual sources of political corruption? What is meant by "organized vice"? How may this factor influence the processes of government?

11. What are the chief causes of crime? What method of punishment does the nature of the causes suggest? What about the efficiency of the ordinary county jail as measured by the true purpose of punishment?

12. In what ways may immigration affect the morals of the country? Is there any method by which immigration may be made a source of moral strength?

13. Find illustrations of the substantial denial of the fundamental rights of life, freedom, and education. Who is responsible for this denial?

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CHAPTER VIII.

THE CRITERION APPLIED: THE CHURCH.

I. PERSONALITY AND RELIGION.

Complete realization of the social self involves religion.—We have seen how personality begins to grow in the home; how its growth is carried on in the school; how the vocation furnishes the materials which satisfy the wants of the individual from the time of infancy on; and how the state guarantees a healthful social soil in which personality may grow. We have also pointed out the special moral problems in connection with each of these institutions, and their general solution in terms of the moral criterion. Let us now, in like manner, point out the general function of the church in relation to the growth of personality, showing the obligation of the church to society and, conversely, the obligation of the individual to the church.

Let it be admitted at the outset that no “merely moral” individual has reached the highest level of personality. While it is possible for a man to order his life in harmony with the moral law, as we have thus far outlined it, without a religious “experience,” yet the deepest meaning of life and its significance do not thus come to him. It is only as the so-

called moral life is completed and crowned by a conscious dependence upon and relationship with the Divine, that life takes on its deepest significance and that the highest level of personality is attained. No person is *truly* moral in the large sense of the term who is lacking in a vital religious life.

The nature of religion.—It is the function of the church to foster and promote religion, both as an individual experience in the different members of society and as a living social force. Before we can go further in our discussion it will be necessary to make a general statement of what religion is; and we will do best to limit ourselves to the essentials of the Christian religion. Accordingly, there are two fundamental elements; these are: first, a belief in and a feeling of dependence upon and love for a personal God; and second, a dynamic belief in the brotherhood of man, resulting in social service. In Chapter III reference was made to the three-fold function of consciousness, the intellectual, the emotional, and the volitional, and to the fact that these furnish the elements of the spiritual environment. Looked at psychologically, “we mean by the spirit, mind in its relation to Deity, and by educating the spirit, we mean bringing man in his integrity into right relation to God.”¹ Religion is not something apart from the thought life, or the life of feeling, or of action. It is the synthesis of all of these—the

¹Horne: *Psychological Principles of Education*, p. 334.

whole consciousness in its relation to God. Religion is a way of living—"the way of life"—not objectively alone, but subjectively as well. It involves the subjective intellectual processes of faith and belief, and the emotional process of love for God and mankind; it involves the volitional process of willing the good, which results in the objective side, service.

We cannot stop here to show why men do and must, if consistent, believe in God; we simply call attention to the almost universal fact that they do and feel that they must. Men also feel that they are in some way subject to the will of God. In primitive forms of religion this feeling manifested itself in fear and in the effort to appease the wrath of the gods by offerings and sacrifices; but in the highest of all religions—the Christian religion—this feeling of dependence takes the form of a personal love for God who is thought of as a Father. This is the very heart and core of the Christian religion. But this love, like all emotions, must find expression in some way; and the natural and normal way is through worship on the one hand, and through loving service on the other. Thus it is that religion is a way of living; it is a social life implying relations to God and mankind. "It is not reducible to one of the elements of human nature as its basis, but writes itself large upon human life in its integrity." It expresses itself in the whole life, both individual and social.

II. DUTY OF THE CHURCH TO SOCIETY.

The religion of the churches too individualistic.— It ought to be the function of the church to cherish these essential truths, to foster the simple virtues of Christianity and to promote the kingdom of heaven in the hearts of men and in society. But unfortunately the church has not always followed these ideals with singleness of purpose; and as a result it has not had the influence upon society that it should have. There are doubtless many reasons for this. For one thing, the church has in the past preached an individualistic and a hedonistic religion; it has taught that the sole purpose of religion is to provide a plan by which the individual may escape everlasting punishment and gain eternal happiness. It has thus reflected the spirit of individualism which has characterized the centuries past along all lines. And society has come to feel the inadequacy of this point of view in religious matters as in all others. The church has not met the vague feeling on the part of society that religion is organic to the mental and social life of the people; that spiritual life, like personality, strikes its roots deep into the social tissue as well as into the eternal life of God.

Again, religion has too frequently been divorced from the give-and-take of life. It has been a thing apart: something to be practiced on Sunday, and put aside on the other days of the week. The reason for this misconception is that the teaching has been, im-

plicitly at least, that the chief function of religion is to prepare one for death. Now, without minimizing this phase of it, it must yet be admitted that to a virile, red-blooded man in the strength of youth this is not as strong an appeal as religion can and ought to make. Only by being identified with life itself can religion get hold of and grip men in a large way; and only as the social phase of it is brought to the fore is it seen to have this identity. For life as men know it in the home, in the school, in the market-place, in the state, and indeed everywhere, is a social affair. The church as the institution of religion must relate the latter to the total life of society if it would fulfill its mission in the world.

Doctrinal conflicts.—Another reason why the church does not have the hold upon society that it ought to have is that it has so obscured the essentials of religion by wranglings and petty discussions over non-essential points of doctrine and creed that the essential message of Christianity has been lost to view. And while the heads of the church have been engaged in these profitless enterprises, society in general has largely lost interest and has gone about other, and to it more interesting, occupations. The Protestant churches of today inherit something of the attitude and methods of the mediaeval church in the days of Scholasticism. The various denominations of the Protestant church represent not only the shades of emphasis in scholastic orthodoxy, but a variety of new doctrines which arose out of the Reformation as

well. And while we are coming to lay less and less stress upon these non-essential things, the time is not wholly past when one may behold in certain communities the spectacle of the members of one congregation spending what little so-called religious energy they can muster in warring with the members of a neighboring congregation over matters of creed and doctrine.

The time has come when these differences of opinion on the part of the various denominations must be laid aside. We are not ready to maintain that all inter-denominational lines should be broken down. No doubt these lines of demarcation have been of more or less value in the evolution of the church as an institution; and there is perhaps still need of general lines of distinction. But the supremely imperative demand is that points held in common shall be emphasized; that all church organizations unite in the common task of spreading the gospel of Jesus, the Common Brother of men. It is one of the tragedies of social development that so much of the energy of that institution whose business it is to develop all that is noblest, purest, and of deepest significance in human character and personality, should have been diverted into other channels and expended in vain argumentation, when it might have been making itself the greatest of social forces.

One of the things that the leaders of the church most need to learn is the distinction between the *fact of religion* and *theology*. Religion is a kind of life,

after the pattern of the life of Jesus of Nazareth; while theology is the attempt to explain this fact; it is a theory of religion. From time immemorial men have defended some theology or other, and have assumed that they were therefore religious. They have taken the letter for the spirit, the form for the substance. It does not so much matter what a man believes *about* religion as that he live the right kind of a life. It does not so much matter what one's theory about salvation or immortality is, as that he make the principles of Jesus the policy of his life. Recall our analysis of personality—particularly the fact that the very essence of personality is the having of a system of ends and purposes, a set of standards or a fixed policy, in accordance with which moral problems shall be solved. Now the essential thing is that the ends and purposes which thus dominate the life of the person shall be those which dominated the life of Jesus. This applies not only to the objective side of life, but to the subjective side as well. When this becomes a fact in one's life, then is one truly religious and at the same time truly moral.

III. THE CHURCH AS AN ORGANIZED AGENT OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

A social program needed.—The statement was made in the beginning of this chapter that the highest levels of personality are reached only as it is completed and fulfilled by a religious experience.

We have now shown what this statement means from the point of view of the person himself. We must now look at it from the social point of view. The statement has also been made that the function of the church is to promote the religious life of the members of society. This is indeed its function; but there are certain enterprises in which the church ought to engage as a means to this end. It is the business of the church to wage organized warfare against sin and iniquity of every kind and in every place. We pray "lead us not into temptation" and sometimes forget that the effective prayer is the one which is accomplished by work and sacrifice on our own part. The fact is that the church can and ought to rid society of those forces which serve as temptations for men towards vice and moral sin. The church ought to be society's organized agency—as well as the divine institution—through which to wage warfare against social, economic, and political injustice and iniquity, as well as against individual sin.

The organization referred to is not merely that for the purpose of administration and church government; the church is perhaps already highly enough organized along this line. But what is needed is a superior organization for the practical enterprise of fighting social sin; for in this the church is sadly lacking. The church needs to socialize its methods. All the other great social enterprises, economic, political, and educational, are carried on by elaborate

practical organization. Moreover, the need for like machinery on the part of the church is made doubly great by the fact that practically all of the great social evils are perpetuated and enabled to grow through monstrous organizations of men who have capitalized the appetites, passions, and cupidity of humanity. In order successfully to war against these intrenchments of evil the church must organize and secure the coöperation of every member. All denominations must cease striving among themselves over non-essential points of doctrine and unite in a concerted and systematic effort, if the evils referred to are to be eradicated from our social tissue.

There are then two lessons the church needs to learn along this line: the social nature of religion, and social methods of working. As soon as these lessons are learned the church will experience such a revival as it has not experienced since the days of Calvin, Wesley, and Fox. As soon as religion is seen by the masses to be a dynamic force which makes for social as well as individual welfare, for the life of the present as well as the future, great numbers of those who are not now interested in the church will become interested. And further, when, through these organizations, each one is offered an opportunity for effective social service, the church will discover within itself large numbers of efficient and interested laborers and will attract to it many others.

It is true that the church has already made a substantial beginning in this matter of organization, but it is after all only a beginning. The best illustrations of activity in this direction are the Anti-Saloon League and Layman's Missionary Movement. In each of these instances there is an elaborate and powerful organization. These organizations are so newly established that we cannot yet know what their ultimate worth will be; but the results already accomplished give promise of untold social amelioration and religious quickening. But these lines of activity represent only two of the many possible lines of similar activity in many other directions.

The church and the other social institutions.—We have had occasion from time to time in the last four chapters to point to the various abuses and social sins that have grown up in connection with the different social institutions. We have said that it is the business of the state to guarantee a healthful social soil in which personality may grow. We may consider this a negative duty; the duty of the state is to deter men from performing unsocial acts. But the work of the church should be a positive social force for the up-building of society. Now the way in which the church can make itself felt as a positive social force is to enter the lists in an organized battle against vested iniquity in every form.

To illustrate the possibilities of a social program which the church might adopt with untold profit to itself as an institution and to society, the following

lines of action may be taken as suggestive and typical: Let the church declare itself as the vigorous and eternal champion of the home and make an active campaign to preserve and increase the sanctity of the home. Let it perfect some kind of organization with which to combat those forces which are threatening this sanctity and resulting in divorce. The factors which were mentioned in a previous chapter as being responsible for the increasing divorce rate were, the fact that marriage is entered into too lightly, sexual sin, and friction within the home. Let the church perfect some organization which shall deal with these forces in a complete and systematic way. To be more specific, the problem of the white slave traffic offers a point of attack. Let it perfect some method of collecting the facts with regard to the situation and of putting the necessary information before the whole membership. Let it awaken a public sentiment against this traffic by thus educating the church membership. Let it suggest ways of attack; and further, let it lead in the fight.

Again, attention was called to the evil which is found in connection with the stage and amusement. The church has held long enough to its theoretical antagonistic attitude to the stage while, in fact, being more or less indifferent to it. Let the church now take upon itself the duty of exercising a systematic censorship over the stage and over popular amusements, and thus through public sentiment and

demand bring these great factors to the point where they will at least be harmless, and in time even to the point where they will be of positive individual and social good.

Or again, let the church enter the realm of the vocation and through some suitable organization help to solve the problems of this phase of life, in harmony with the principles of Jesus. For example, there is the problem of child labor which seriously needs thoughtful study in order that justice to all may be secured. Let the working man, and indeed all members of society see that the church is actively interested in their total welfare, and they will no longer hold themselves aloof from it, but will be anxious to join its forces and to assist in its great social, moral, and religious enterprises.

Finally, let the church enter the realm of politics. This does not mean that the church should seek to exercise authority over the state, or that there should be any direct connection between the church and state, as institutions. Indeed, we in this country are committed to the policy of the separation of the church and state. But what is meant is that a proper organization within the church should undertake to enlighten the public conscience along political lines. The duty of the church is not only to promote religion, in the narrow sense of the term, but to make men better citizens, better neighbors, and better members of the family. Indeed its duty is to promote religion *by* doing these things; and religion

is not a vital force unless these results are apparent.

The various organized efforts suggested involve a large division of labor. No one individual could work effectively in all of these lines; perhaps none could work effectively in more than one. Individual preferences and abilities would direct the different members of the church into one or another of the various lines of church activity; and there would be great enough variety to suit all capacities and preferences. Let us grant that the program here suggested is a large one; perhaps larger than the church could now manage. But if the church should adopt this kind of policy and go to work upon these problems, society would not be long in feeling the new influence, and the membership of the church would be quickened into greater religious life. The church would grow and increase in strength in proportion to the magnitude of its new tasks. *The church should be the greatest force for righteousness and clean living in society; and there is no other way in which this may be realized except by identifying itself with life in its manifold problems.* Were the potential powers of the church as an institution thus set free in society, all the other social institutions would immediately feel its beneficent influence. The home would feel its sanctifying power; the school and the other educational and cultural agencies would be more spiritually toned; in the vocation, men would feel themselves to be their brothers' keepers; and in the

state, justice and good-will would be the common practice.

IV. PERSONAL OBLIGATION.

The abundant life.—Finally, there is the question of the moral obligation of the individual toward society, through this institution. The moral law demands a socialized conscience on the part of every person. This means that each one shall so act as to contribute to the growth of the personalities of all the other members of society. From this point of view the church has a supreme claim upon the life and service of every member of society. The fact is that no one can wield his greatest influence towards the securing of the desiderata suggested in this book without allying himself with this institution of society. There is a two-fold reason for this statement. In the first place, granting that a person lives the most abundant life and is therefore completely moral only as his life is consciously polarized by a vital religious experience, as was maintained in the first part of this chapter, it follows that this can best be brought about by casting one's lot with some church organization. While there may perhaps be exceptions to this statement; while there are those within the church who use their membership as a cloak with which to hide an evil and hypocritical life; and while the church has its many faults; yet on the whole, in view of the social nature of religion, the religious life of the individual is best fostered and

developed by his association with other members of society who are interested in the same great purpose and end. There is a decided advantage to be gained in the uplift and inspiration of corporate activity and in mingling with those who are dominated by a common motive.

Co-operation.—The other reason for urging this obligation is the social one. In these days of corporate activity it is next to impossible for any one to accomplish anything single-handed. It is only through coöperation on the part of all that the ends which have been suggested can be accomplished. And since the socialized conscience demands intelligent and altruistic action for social ends, it is more practical and more prudent, and it is also the part of wisdom to ally oneself with those institutions in which the members of society seek to coöperate for the accomplishment of these great purposes. It is because one's service will count for the most possible, in this way, that it is the duty of every person to ally himself with the church.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. What, to your mind, is the best definition of religion? Is there such a thing as a religious instinct?
2. What is the nature of primitive religion? Do all peoples conceive religion and morality to be intrinsically related?
3. What is the common idea among our people as to the relation of morality and religion to each other? What is your opinion of the statement that "No person is truly

moral in the large sense of the term who is lacking in a vital religious life”?

4. What mental functions are involved in the highest type of religious life?

5. Why must we hold that religion is essentially a social matter? Is “spiritual life” a personal or social affair, or is it both?

6. Is religion dying out in this country? How else can you account for the alienation of the working classes from the churches?

7. Why has the church been so slow in awakening to its social mission?

8. What have been the methods of the church in the past in regard to charity?

9. What are the most approved methods of philanthropy today? Does scientific philanthropy open up a special opportunity for the modern church?

10. What might the church do in the way of improving housing and sanitary conditions in the congested districts of cities? What would be the probable reflex effect upon the church of this kind of effort?

11. Describe the movement known as the “institutional church.” Does its work constitute a vital social program?

12. Is the personalness of religion in danger of being sacrificed in the presence of so much “welfare work” and “social service”?

13. Does the church now exert any considerable influence by way of molding public opinion? Is there any way by which it might have a greater influence in this direction?

14. Is the church ceasing to emphasize the “other-worldliness” of religion? What is the moral significance of your answer?

15. Is there any valid argument in support of the

statement that one can do more good outside of the church than in it? What would be the ultimate moral effect of the argument?

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CHAPTER IX.

THE MORAL IDEAL.

I. MORALITY AND PROGRESS.

The nature of the ideal.—We have now completed the task of developing a moral criterion and of applying it to the moral situations as they occur in connection with the great institutions of society. It remains for us to gather up these conclusions and state them in the form of a moral ideal which shall have both a personal and a social reference.

We must not think of the ideal as a static thing, an unchangeable, metaphysical absolute; it must be thought of as a growth. As mind develops, as experience increases, and as intellectual capacity enlarges, ideals become more perfect. As one approaches the ideal in conduct and action the ideal itself moves on; it is never reached. By virtue of its emotional appeal it leads on from effort to effort in the attempt to realize it. The only sense in which the ideal may be said to be absolute is that it is never attained: that it is always beyond. The moral ideal is not some glorified state in which all progress is a thing of the past; but it must be thought of as change and growth. If the change is to be truly pro-

gressive it must take place in harmony with moral law; life must become more and more organized; reason must come to exert a greater and greater control; this is the only avenue of approach to the moral ideal.

Progress arises out of struggle.—As in the larger biological field, so in the moral realm; moral progress arises out of the give-and-take, the struggle and stress of an active life. That life in which morality grows is a social life. Like biological adjustment again, moral progress is the result of a process of selection, except that in this case the selection is a conscious instead of an unconscious one. And it is just here in this conscious selection that the struggle comes. On the personal and psychological side the struggle consists in the conflict of reason with impulse, instinct, and habit. This is the center of difficulty and, at the same time, the achievement of the moral life. As was said in a previous chapter, these impulsive and instinctive tendencies are not wholly wrong in themselves; they become so only when they lead to unworthy and irrational conduct.

This conflict is the forge in which character is made. As was brought out in our analysis of the moral standards, it is the portion of reason and judgment to organize and of habit to provide the momentum of the moral life. Further, reason constitutes the very heart and core of personality; and unless there is struggle and conflict in which deliberation, choice, and volition are demanded, there is no oppor-

tunity for real character to be made, if by character we mean the having of a set of policies and fixed plans in harmony with which it is proposed to live. Character is formed, that is, personal progress is made as impulsive tendencies which are inconsistent with one's ideals are inhibited or are redirected into new and consistent channels. But this requires struggle and "will power;" it means that in very many instances a present pleasure or desire must be sacrificed for the sake of a remote end; and the struggle will be great or small in proportion to the strength or weakness of the present desire, or in proportion to the weakness or strength of the individual's ideals and standards. Each decision made is not only significant for the moment, but tends to add momentum in its own direction which will be of value in all future instances of like nature; it points either towards or away from progress. Consequently each conquest of reason over impulse is a moral achievement and further strengthens character.

Conflict centers in a moral situation.—Now the conflict out of which moral progress arises centers in a moral situation. This was defined as a situation in which a volitional act is demanded, and the consequence of which is, to some extent at least, of vital significance. The ultimate value of one's behavior in the face of a moral situation is thus seen. In order to make this more concrete, it may be well to recall the various kinds of moral situations that actually do arise. In the first place they are always of a

social nature; they always arise in connection with one or another of the social institutions. It may be a question of justice within the home or in the market place; of truth in the press or on the stage; of good-will in the factory or in the legislative halls; but everywhere it is a social situation and one in which some individual must make a choice which will affect in a vital way the welfare of some one—either of himself or another, or both.

Morally good acts tend to be self-preservative, whereas morally bad acts tend to be self-destructive; therefore the former is rational action and the latter is irrational. In human society the struggle for existence takes, in the main, the form of the struggle of reason over the impulsive and instinctive tendencies, and this is truer the further advanced society becomes. Putting these facts together it is obvious that moral progress does arise out of the conflict of the moral situation and that total welfare is the result of a rational and therefore morally good choice.

II. PERSONAL PROGRESS.

The phrase "total welfare" suggests the two phases of moral progress, the personal and the social. Morality is ultimately a personal affair; but we must remember also that personality is a social affair. As has already been pointed out, these two are organic to each other; and in like manner the personal and social aspects of moral progress

are also organic to each other. Let us examine in a little more detail this moral progress from each of these two points of view, while remembering at the same time the organic nature of the two.

Education of the total self.—Personal progress in the matter of morals involves the education of the total self,—intellectual, emotional, and volitional. Psychologically, these three phases of mind are organic to each other; they represent three types of mental function, and are not three separate, water-tight compartments of mind. Now it is true that reason—that which constitutes the essence of personality—is defined as an intellectual process. But this must not be taken to mean that complete personality involves only the development of the intellectual phase of mind, as contrasted with the emotional and volitional. The statement that these three phases of consciousness are organic means that mind is never *pure* intellectual activity, or *pure* emotion, or *pure* volition. Consciousness may be predominantly one or another of these at any moment, but it would be impossible, for example, for one to experience pure emotion with no “intellectual” content about which to feel. It follows from this that a proper intellectual education, particularly of reason, necessarily involves development along these other lines. This is the meaning of the statement that personal growth involves the education of the total self.

This may be made more specific by reference to that class of “feelings” called the sentiments. Sen-

timents are defined psychologically as affectively colored judgments; they are usually classified as intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and religious, and are concerned with the questions of truth, beauty, goodness, and righteousness, respectively. Now it would seem that there is nothing in the whole catalog of conscious experience that has greater significance for moral progress in the individual than these. They all have reference to the ideal. The moral significance of the ideal is immediately obvious, once its psychological nature is seen. Briefly defined, the ideal is a concept or generalized idea which is affectively colored; that is, the moral ideal is *ideal* by virtue of its attracting and pulling power. If it lacks this characteristic it is merely an indifferent and impersonal *idea* and has no power to call forth appreciation; without this there is no stimulus to action.

Peculiar significance of the sentiments.—Let us illustrate still further the significance of the feeling side of life for moral progress. The intellectual side has already received a good deal of consideration in connection with the virtue of intelligence, and this whole book deals with the volitional side of consciousness, at least from a large point of view. We will take the case of the æsthetic sentiments as illustrative of the point, both because of their importance and because of their partial neglect in this connection.

As was said above, the æsthetic sentiment deals

with the question of beauty, having as its task the judgment as to whether a given object is beautiful. Now the social institution which is founded upon sentiment is art. Art is the attempt to discover and to express the ideal of beauty along the several lines of literature, music, painting, sculpture, and architecture. The æsthetic ideal is a progressive one, like the moral ideal, and hence is never attained. It can only be approximated; and the masterpieces of the world represent the nearest approach to the ideal.

Now there is nothing else which more completely makes for life more abundant and which gives it value more consistently than does the æsthetic interest. Judged therefore in terms of complete personality, the feeling side of life, and particularly the æsthetic sentiment, is of great moral significance.

Perry in his *Moral Economy* (Chapter V), in giving the reasons why the æsthetic interest is able to enrich life and develop personality, points out that it has some six different characteristics in virtue of which it possesses this moral value. These characteristics are as follows: self-sufficiency, pervasiveness, vicariousness, stimulation to action, fixation of ideal, and liberality. By way of further emphasis upon this point, it will be worth our while to define these terms briefly. The æsthetic interest is *self-sufficient* in that it makes the individual more or less independent of his immediate environment and gives him a means of happiness within himself "without

the aid of his fellows or the favor of fortune." It is *pervasive* because it gives color to all the incidents of life: nature, work, play,—everything is looked upon with eyes of appreciation.

The æsthetic interest serves a *vicarious* function in that it enables one to experience certain sentiments without there being an immediate objective stimulus therefor. It enables conscious life to be rounded out and completed by calling into play those instincts and emotions which would be engaged were the situation actually presented instead of being ideally presented. It does not need to be further shown that the æsthetic interest *stimulates* to action. It is like emotion in this regard. In like manner, where the æsthetic interest does not lead to immediate action, it crystallizes the ideas into ideals by *fixing* upon them the stamp of affection. As has been said, this is one of the most important functions of the æsthetic interest. And finally, we find in art the great *liberalizing* factor of life. As examples of this, one has but to recall the solemnizing, refreshing, and inspiring influence of beautiful music to realize how æsthetic appreciation lifts one out of the commonplace into relation with the larger things of the spirit.

"But art promotes liberality of spirit in an even more definitely moral sense. For art, like all forms of culture, and like the service of humanity, provides for the highest type of social intercourse. The æsthetic interest is one of those rare interests which

are common to all men without being competitive. All men require bread, but since this interest requires exclusive possession of its object, its very commonness is a source of suspicion and enmity. Similarly all men require truth and beauty and civilization, but these objects are enhanced by the fact that all may rejoice in them without their being divided or becoming the property of any man. They bring men together without rivalry and intrigue, and in the spirit of good-fellowship."¹

It is out of such interests as these, together with the struggle and conflict of the more practical moral situations as they arise in the home, state, and vocation, that personality grows into the abundant life. This is the moral ideal, the abundant life, as looked at from the personal point of view. There are different levels or different degrees of perfection of personality just as there are different levels of perfection represented in the trees of a given species, depending upon the favorableness of the environment. There is this difference however: while the growth of the tree is conditioned from without, personal growth is conditioned from within as well as from without. There is possible for the human being a conscious selection and choice which is one of the most important of conditioning factors. The unfolding of human character is in no small measure the result of the individual's

¹Op. cit.

own will. It does not come without effort; on the contrary, a conscious selection often has to be made. Sometimes this effort must be put forth along lines not commonly regarded as involving moral situations. To acquire an aesthetic interest is not usually regarded as a moral obligation. While thought of as a desirable attainment, an aesthetic interest is yet regarded as more or less superfluous from the moral point of view. But morality is "nothing more nor less than the law which determines the whole order of interests, within which art and every other good thing is possible." And there is no other one thing in the whole realm of human possibilities which can more fully enrich and sweeten life, which can make possible the abundant life in greater degree, than the aesthetic interest.

Summary.—We may now summarize the discussion of the personal phase of moral progress by saying that it consists in *the growth of personality: the unfoldment of life*. This is the ultimate moral ideal. But while holding that the growth of personality is the ultimate moral ideal, we must remember that personality is ultimately social. As was brought out in the chapter on the moral criterion, the roots of personality extend down into the very heart of society. Personality is a living, growing thing, deriving its sustenance from society through the channels of the social institutions and making progress by adjusting itself to its social environment. *The abundant life, like personality, is a social matter, and*

can exist only in a social soil. It is inconceivable that an individual isolated from society in all its forms could realize the abundant life; it is only as one is an organic part of society that this is possible. It is only as one comes in touch with others in the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church that life takes on its deepest significance. It is only as the higher moral capacities are stimulated and brought into play in connection with the practical problems that center in these institutions, that life more abundant is experienced. Further, life has come to its full fruition and is rounded out and sweetened by a keen appreciation of the literature, the music, and the other art of the world, thus coming into personal touch with the great souls of all ages. Thus it is that the spirit of man is exalted to its full humanity and the moral ideal is approximated.

III. SOCIAL PROGRESS.

Personal progress contributes to social progress.— We have perhaps dwelt at sufficient length in earlier chapters upon the social significance of moral progress, so that a brief mention of it here will be sufficient. Further, the preceding paragraphs have shown how organically personality and society are related. As the moral ideal is approximated in the person of each member of society, that is, as each one comes more and more to meet in a rational way the moral situations that arise in the various rela-

tions of life and as he further acquires those graces of character which are the product of the finer feelings, the ills of society will tend to disappear. In the chapters dealing with the social institutions we have called attention to the various abuses which are present in society as now organized. But if the life of each member of society were dominated by the socialized conscience, as would be the case if this ideal of progress were approximated in the person of the members of society, these abuses could no longer exist; the various forms of social disease would be eliminated from the social tissue. Social amelioration such as this is the dream of the sociologist. But no such objective social progress is attainable until the moral law has carried on a parallel process of regeneration in the hearts of the persons who compose society.

Publicity and co-operation.—Further, our social life is growing so big and so complicated in all directions that the older order of personal relations is disappearing and a new order of impersonal social relationships is taking its place. “The very magnitude of modern operations and properties serves to bring out more clearly the principles involved. The impersonal character allows economic forces pure and simple to be seen in their moral bearing. Publicity has become a necessity.”² It is at this point that the newspaper can be of such great moral value. Since

²Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*, p. 511.

the moral situation is now so extensive, arising as it does between great groups of people, the only hope of a sound moral condition in society lies in the direction of thorough and accurate information on the part of all concerning these social situations.

But while publicity is a powerful deterrent to anti-social and immoral practices, it is not in itself a cure-all. It comes to have moral value only as it serves to stimulate and guide groups of men who have initiative and moral enthusiasm. Morality is not merely a passive piety which refrains from committing positive wrong; it is a dynamic, constructive, purposeful attitude which shows initiative in the application of social and moral principles.

We have reached the place in our social development where moral progress can be achieved only as those individuals who have already reached a high level of personality for themselves shall coöperate in the planning and execution of a moral program. Practically all of the glaring social sins and conditions of injustice, such as the social evil, gambling, graft, political chicanery, and the like, are controlled by powerful organizations of men who use in their sharp practices the most productive of economic principles. And the hope of moral progress lies in the social potentiality which a proper organization of the many who are already socially-minded would represent. Thorough coöperation and systematic methods are the two factors which are necessary to success in carrying out such a moral program.

Conclusion.—In conclusion, we will have to return for our ultimate point of view to the fact that society and personality are organic to each other. And while it is possible to talk of moral progress as applied to the individual and as applied to society, yet in truth these phases of progress are as organic to each other as are the individual and society. It is impossible that a person should make progress within his own life, as suggested above, without thereby affecting society; and it is equally impossible that society should progress without affecting to some extent the welfare of the individual. The moral criterion demands that progress in the moral order shall be the ideal towards which all effort, both individual and social, shall be directed. It demands also that all members of society shall coöperate to the fullest extent with each other and with the established social institutions in order to bring this to pass. The socialized conscience on the part of every member of society will have to be actualized as the ruling force in the lives of men as they meet in the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the church. As this shall come to pass, the moral ideal will be approached; and the kingdom of heaven will come into the hearts of men.

QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

1. From the psychological standpoint, what does moral growth imply? Illustrate fully.
2. What is the psychological meaning of self control? What is the value of it for moral development?

3. From what point of view may moral progress, both personal and social, be thought of as emancipation?

4. What biological factors are operative in the evolution of species? Are there any new factors of a psychological nature distinguishable when we come to the evolution of human society?

5. Show the relation of the moral law to social evolution.

6. What is "mob mind"? May this ever be turned to good account morally.

7. In Chapter III the statement was made that personality grows in a social soil; is this soil a static or a dynamic thing? Explain.

8. What should be the effect of publicity upon personal development? Is publicity a possible source of danger?

9. What does the term "public morals" mean? Give illustrations which will show the reciprocal relation between public and private morals.

10. Should the church as an institution hold a peculiarly strategic position in the matter of social progress? If so, why?

11. Are all of the institutions of society equally advanced in the way of socialization?

12. Mention the types of established social machinery through which it is the duty of the members of society to work coöperatively.

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